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A petrol filling station (PFS) is a common facility that is available in urban and rural 
areas. It stores and sells a highly flammable liquid.  A PFS has potential hazards to the 
people, asset, and environment.  Variety of hazards such as fire hazards, static 
electricity, fuel tank explosions, transportation hazards and air pollution evoked by 
aromatic organic compounds are found to be the major causes of accident/incident 
occurrences at PFS.  Many companies are using different risk assessment methods to 
priorities hazards related to their work activities.  In this study, a new risk and safety 
analysis model for PFS is to be developed. 
In this study, 3.5 years data of non-compliances was collected from 2500 PFS 
located in various cities in Pakistan.  The significant numbers of health safety and 
environment (HSE) non-compliances recorded were due to various factors during 
operation and maintenance of PFS. The HSE non-compliances were classified into two 
categories i.e. hazards contributing factors (HCFs) and incident occurrences [fatality 
(F), accident (A), incident (I) and near miss (NM) cases].  The hazards contributing 
factors were then further classified into 8 categories.  These were Housekeeping (HK), 
Transportation Hazard (TH), Slips, Trips and Falls (STF), Carelessness (C), Fire Risk 
(FR), Electrical Faults (EF), Miscellaneous Cases (MC) and Medical Treatment Cases 
(MTC).  A monthly, quarterly and seasonal categorization of HSE non-compliances 
was carried out to evaluate the hazard occurrences flow pattern for the two categories.  
The risk assessment of the hazards was carried out and prioritized by using three 
different widely used risk assessment methods.  These were, risk ranking criterion, risk 
matrix criterion and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  The hazard 
prioritization results by using each risk assessment model were found to be different.  
Gaps were identified and finally data was analyzed by using a new risk and safety 
analysis model for PFS.  With the use of irrelevant risk assessment model the hazard 
merely shifts within the system but not eliminated.  Therefore, availability of database 
for development of risk assessment model is needed. 
 ix 
A new statistical safety and risk analysis model was then developed with reference to 
statistical association among the hazard contributing factors.  The proposed safety and 
risk analysis model was based upon seasonal occurrences of hazard contributing 
factors.  The model was then validated and finally, hazards were prioritized and 
mitigation strategies were proposed to control the occurrences of these hazards.  The 
proposed model was based upon the actual data collected and found successful.  It 
introduced a systematic approach to analyze the hazards that exists within a system.  It 
is hoped that by analyzing activities with a new risk and safety analysis model the 
occurrences of hazards can be controlled during operation and maintenance of PFS.  
The proposed model was developed by using HSE non-compliances recorded during 
PFS operation with the use of same approach the risk and safety analysis model for 
other industrial sectors can be developed for hazards prioritization.  It helps to take 
remedial and preventive measures to protect the facility with upcoming hazards and 
ultimately leads to a safe and accident free work environment. 
 x 
ABSTRAK 
Stesen minyak (PFS) adalah satu kemudahan yang biasa boleh didapati di kawasan-
kawasan bandar dan luar bandar.  Ia adalah satu-satunya sumber untuk membekalkan 
bahan api untuk kenderaan khususnya kereta.  Stesen minyak menyimpan dan 
menjual cecair yang sangat mudah terbakar. Sebuah PFS mempunyai potensi bahaya 
kepada manusia, aset dan persekitaran.  Pelbagai bahaya seperti kebakaran, elektrik 
statik, letupan tangki bahan api, bahaya pengangkutan dan pencemaran udara yang di 
timbulkan oleh sebatian aromatik organik didapati menjadi punca utama kepada 
kejadian kemalangan/kejadian di PFS. Risiko yang berkemungkinan terjadi ini 
berbeza dari satu PFS kepada PFS yang lain. Banyak syarikat menggunakan kaedah 
penilaian risiko yang berbeza mengenai keutamaan bahaya yang berkaitan dengan 
aktiviti kerja mereka. Kajian yang berkaitan untuk mengutamakan kepentingan 
langkah-langkah keselamatan di PFS tidak mencukupi, ternyata di negara-negara 
membangun.  Dalam kajian ini, risiko baru dan analisis model keselamatan untuk PFS 
akan dijalankan. 
Dalam kajian ini, data ketidakpatuhan sepanjang 3 setengah tahun telah 
dikumpulkan dari 2500 PFS yang terletak di pelbagai bandar di Pakistan. Bilangan 
ketidakpatuhan kesihatan, keselamatan dan alam sekitar (HSE) yang dicatatkan adalah 
disebabkan oleh pelbagai faktor semasa operasi dan penyelenggaraan PFS. 
Ketidakpatuhan HSE telah dikelaskan kepada dua kategori iaitu penyumbang faktor 
bahaya dan berlakunya insiden  [kematian (F), kemalangan (A), insiden (I) dan 
hampir berlaku (NM) kes]. Faktor penyumbang bahaya kemudian diklasifikasikan 
kepada lapan (8) kategori. Ini adalah Kepenjagaan (HK), Pengangkutan Bahaya (TH), 
Tergelincir, Renjatan dan Jatuh (STF), Kecuaian (C), Risiko Kebakaran (FR), 
Kegagalan Elektrik (EF), Pelbagai Kes (MC) dan Rawatan Perubatan Kes (MTC ). 
Setiap bulan, pengkategorian suku penggal dan bermusim ketidakpatuhan HSE telah 
dijalankan untuk menilai aliran corak bahaya kejadian untuk dua kategori. Penilaian 
risiko bahaya telah dijalankan dan diutamakan dengan menggunakan tiga jenis
 xi 
penilaian kaedah risiko yang digunakan secara meluas. Ia adalah kriteria 
kedudukan risiko, kriteria matrik risiko dan serendah praktikal yang munasabah 
(ALARP). Jurang diantaranya telah dikenal pasti dan akhirnya data telah dianalisa 
dengan menggunakan risiko baru dan analisis model keselamatan untuk PFS. 
Keputusan keutamaan bahaya dengan menggunakan setiap model penilaian risiko 
didapati berbeza.  Penggunaan model penilaian risiko yang sesuai untuk 
mengutamakan bahaya adalah sangat penting. Dengan menggunakan model penilaian 
risiko bahaya tidak berkaitan mengalami perubahan dalam sistem tetapi tidak 
dihapuskan. Oleh itu, keperluan pangkalan data bagi pembangunan model penilaian 
risiko adalah diperlukan. 
Statistik keselamatan yang baru dan model penilaian risiko kemudiannya 
dibangunkan dengan merujuk kepada statistik di kalangan faktor penyumbang bahaya. 
Model penilaian risiko keselamatan yang dicadangkan adalah berdasarkan kejadian 
bermusim faktor yang menyumbang bahaya.  Model itu kemudian disahkan dan 
akhirnya, bahaya telah diberi keutamaan dan strategi mitigasi telah dicadangkan untuk 
mengawal kejadian bahaya ini.  Model yang dicadangkan adalah berdasarkan kepada 
data sebenar yang dipungut dan didapati berjaya.  Ia memperkenalkan satu 
pendekatan yang sistematik untuk menganalisis bahaya yang wujud di dalam sistem.  
Adalah diharapkan bahawa dengan menganalisis aktiviti dengan risiko baru dan 
model analisis keselamatan kejadian, bahaya boleh dikawal semasa operasi dan 
penyelenggaraan PFS. Model yang dicadangkan telah dibangunkan dengan 
menggunakan ketidakpatuhan HSE yang dicatatkan semasa operasi PFS melalui 
pendekatan risiko yang sama dan analisis keselamatan bagi sektor perindustrian yang 
lain boleh dibangunkan untuk keutamaan bahaya.  Ia membantu untuk mengambil 
langkah-langkah pemulihan dan pencegahan untuk melindungi kemudahan daripada 
bahaya yang akan datang dan akhirnya membawa kepada persekitaran kerja yang 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents brief description and discussion of various areas that covered in 
this study.  The problem statement, objectives and scope of study will be discussed in 
subsequent sections.  The structure of complete thesis is presented in the last section 
of this chapter. 
1.2. Background 
A petrol filling station (PFS) is a facility most commonly available in urban and rural 
areas which sells fuel and lubricants for automobiles.  Different countries know them 
with different names such as retail outlets, filling stations, gas stations, fuelling 
stations or service stations.  PFS’s are also important for airports, refineries, sea ports 
and other places where the movement of vehicles and other fuel operating machines 
such as generators and engines are common.  The availability of fuel depends upon 
the requirements at a particular location.  At PFS, the most common fuels sold are 
petrol, compressed natural gas (CNG), diesel and kerosene oil.  PFS’s may contain 
only one fuel among these three or a combination of them.  Fuel storage capacity, 
associated hazards, layout, area, location, number of staff working, climatic 
conditions and safety considerations at the PFS’s vary from place to place.  The 
number of PFS’s is increasing continuously as the number of vehicles and the use of 
fuel for other uses are increasing.  The numbers of refueling stations to satisfy market 
demands has been investigated in a number of studies [1-4].  The number of vehicles 
to determine the required number of petrol filling stations was also highlighted by  
[5-7].  The studies conducted didn’t highlight the hazardous impacts of PFS’s on the 
nearby residential areas, environment, soil and water bodies.  
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A study conducted by [8] was related to the suitability of a filling station at a 
particular place.  The Geographical Information System (GIS) and Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) were used in integration.  A spatial analysis was performed 
for identification of a suitable site by computing the environmental considerations.  It 
included water system protection from underground storage tank leakages, vicinity 
area protection from PFS fires, explosion hazards, proper land use selection and 
access road selection to access–egress activities.  
The contamination of ground water aquifers with fuel spillage and leakages from 
underground storage tanks was reported by [9, 10].  Ground water contamination has 
major effects on people’s health living in the surroundings of a PFS.  Many localities 
rely on the use of ground water for their daily life due to the scarcity of a fresh water 
supply, especially in rural areas.  A United States Geological Survey study conducted 
in the year 2003 detected the petrol additive MtBE (Methyl-tertiary-butyl ether) in 40 
percent of the wells out of 225 in Rockingham County.  A correlation was found 
between the Methyl-tertiary-butyl ether concentration and the proximity to the 
underground storage tanks as was also mentioned by [11].  Studies conducted by [12, 
13] discussed the harmful impacts of petrol vapours on fuel station attendants.  They 
found that petrol vapours that were emitted during vehicle filling are hazardous to the 
health.  The studies have also proved that exposure to benzene via gasoline vapours 
and exhaust put workers at significant health risk.  Both studies highlighted two 
significant aspects to health, safety and environment (HSE); the first is the great 
number of workers employed in petroleum distribution trades and the second is the 
relevant contribution of such sources to the pollution burden in urban environments. 
       In a recent study conducted by [14], it was proposed that many urban rivers, lakes 
and ponds are rendered unfit for use as drinking water sources due to pollution from 
petrol filling stations. 
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Figure 1.1:  Typical Flow Diagram of Fuel Leakage and Spill during Petrol Filling 
Station Operation 
Many PFS’s discharge effluent from their septic tanks into storm drains without 
any treatment.  Figure 1.1 shows the impact of fuel leakages from underground 
storage tanks on the surroundings.  The sources of pollution released from petrol 
filling stations contaminate the air, soil, and water [15]. 
The main sources of contamination at PFS’s are tank leakages, spills on 
driveways and uncontrolled petrol waste disposal as mentioned by [16] in an 
environmental impact assessment of petrol usage.  Different processes related to soil 
and groundwater contamination are highlighted in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2:  Various Aspects Related to Soil and Groundwater Contamination due 
to PFS 
The hazardous effects posed by the availability of petrol filling stations in 
surrounding areas are also highlighted by [17].  He mentioned that the petrol filling 
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stations can have potential hazards to the health and well being of persons living in 
the vicinity. 
1.3. Health Safety and Environment (HSE) Non-Compliances during Operation 
and Maintenance of Petrol Filling Stations 
Hazards posed by activities are different from one operating sector to another.  The 
hazards that can pose a significant risk to the construction industry are not the same as 
for the petroleum industry.  Therefore, to prevent unwanted scenarios, each sector’s 
hazards require a different strategy.  The HSE non-compliances recorded during 
operation and maintenance of PFS produce variety of hazards that may cause 
fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases.  A PFS is a unique facility that 
stores and sells a flammable and hazardous material in close vicinity to houses within 
rural and urban areas.  Normally PFS contains large quantities of hazardous materials.  
A PFS poses potential hazards to the people, assets, environment and reputation of an 
operating company.  Hazards related to PFS operations can be mainly divided into 
two categories, i.e., onsite hazards and off site hazards.  Fire hazards, static electricity, 
and air pollution evoked by aromatic organic compounds are major causes of 
accident/incident occurrences at PFS.  There are other potential hazards in PFS 
operations which make them unsafe.  Activities such as carelessness, maintenance, 
housekeeping, slips, trips and falls, transportation hazard, major and minor injuries, 
robberies and snakebites have a potential to create unsafe conditions.  The level of 
risk of these hazards varies from PFS to PFS as it depends upon many factors as 
highlighted in section 1.1.  To control occurrences of these hazards noticed difficult 
due to some of the components at PFS were in direct use of customers.  At some PFS 
concise information to use these components was found clearly written but most of 
the places it was missing.  Another important aspect is that whether the customers that 
are coming to take the fuel at PFS are giving consideration to these instructions or not.  
Two important sources for the occurrences of fire and explosion remains exist at PFS 
throughout the operations hours i.e. continuous arrival and departure of customers 
vehicles and the presence of public [18].  
Caltex is a PFS retail outlet organization operating in many countries around the 
world.  The total treated injury frequency rate (TTIFR) for employees recorded were 
21 per million hours worked in 2002 and 16 in 2003, and for contractors were 30 in 
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2002 to 12 in 2003 as shown in Figure 1.3.  Figure 1.4 depicts that 3 fire cases 
occurred in the year 2002 and each caused damages exceeding $2,000 [19]. 
 
Figure 1.3: Caltex’s Total Treated Injury Frequency (TTIFR) Rate for the Year 
2002 & 2003 [19] 
 
Figure 1.4: Fire Incidents at Caltex [19] 
A study conducted in France with reference to hazardous conditions that can 
caused by PFS [18].   The report consisted of petrol filling stations accidents in France 
from 1958 to 2007.  The sample of 270 large scale accidents studied in details.  The 
study highlighted the effects of PFS on people, environment and company assets.  The 
accidents reported caused degradation of environment due to spillages of fuel, 
explosion due to fire and carelessness, inappropriate maintenance practices and 
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violation of standard operating work practices.  The summary of few accidents is 
depicted in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Causes of Accidents at Petrol Filling Stations [18] 
No Description Root Cause 
1- 17 people killed in an explosion that occurred in a garage 
equipped with fuel distribution pumps.  The explosion 
happened when the garage owner activated the electrical 
switch.  The switch ignites due to fuel vapours emitted via a 
leak caused by severing an obsolete pipe that had been left in 
place after undeclared expansion work. 
Vapours 
Leakage 
2- During degassing and cleaning process of underground 
storage tank an explosion occurred.  Two people died and one 





3- An explosion occurred in a truck contains di-isocyanate (a 
product use to manufacture plastics) drum.  The truck was 
parked at filling station. 
Carelessness 
4- Leakage in fuel distribution line at PFS caused spillage of 
24,650 litres of petrol into the ditch.  No containment dike 
was constructed at PFS.  Pollution was detected in ground 
water. 
Leakages 
5- In super market at PFS, a premium unleaded petrol line was 





6-  During a welding process of tank lorry an explosion 
occurred.  A worker died on spot.  No hot work permit was 
issued and job hazard analysis was performed before 
performing the task. 
Carelessness 
7- In adequate distancing of vents in the compartment of fuel 
tank caused explosion and death of one person.  The all 4 
vents were interconnected.  The welding job was carrying out 
in the 4th compartment.  Due to interconnection the 
accumulated vapors in the 4th compartment was exploded. 
Carelessness 
8- 3 catastrophic explosions were occurred due to leakage in 
defective LPG delivery line.  A tank truck was also exploded 
followed by a raging fire.  Three fatality cases were reported 
and 189 people were injured. 
Leakage 
Different causes for occurrences of 270 accidents were identified. Table 1.2 
shows the number of cases reported due to type of product involved and the category 
of accident. 
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Table 1.2: Type of Product s Involved Contribute to Accident 
 
Typologies 














199 12 5 21 3 237 
Fires 20 3 5 6 27 60 
Explosions 18 1 4 2 6 30 
Others (near 
accidents) 
2 1 0 0 4 7 
Total number of 
accidents 
202 13 5 21 32 270 
Various hazards associated with petrol filling stations have occurred reported in 
various studies;   such as fires  and explosions due to open flames reported by [20], 
static electricity by [21], air pollution induced by aromatic organic compound 
concentrations by [22], and the traffic jams due to vehicle queues to access the petrol 
filling station [23].  It was found that these HCFs were not independent of each other 
and have a strong correlation. 
1.4. Risk and Safety Analysis Models 
Risk is a combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event with a 
specified period or in specified circumstances and the severity of injuries or damage 
to the health of people, property, environments or any combination of these caused by 
the event.  A documented and well established process for performing detailed risk 
assessments is required for compliance to the standard code of practices, and also to 
satisfy the concerns of the buyers [24].  There are various risk assessment methods 
available that are implemented in industries.  The application of an inappropriate risk 
assessment method is the main cause of hazard occurrences.  A risk assessment 
method that can be applied to calculate the risk for the construction industry is 
unsuitable to calculate the risk in refineries and vise versa.  With the use of an 
incompatible risk assessment method, the risk shifts from one zone to another zone 
but the actual risk within the system remains same. 
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Three widely used risk assessment models .i.e. as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP), risk matrix criterion and risk ranking criterion were used in this study.  
Same data was analyzed but different results were obtained.  It was due to the 
unavailability of guidance and instructions for the application of risk assessment 
models.  The brief description of three risk assessment models is described below;  
1.4.1. As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
According to ALARP, all risks in a company must be managed at a level which is as 
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) for that company.  ALARP is implemented in 
oil and gas companies in Malaysia [25].  To each activity a particular consequence 
and probability number was assigned and it was based on the severity level.  Table 1.3 
shows the ALARP risk assessment matrix.  The consequence levels have a rating 
from 0 to 5.  The rating can affect people, assets, the environment and the reputation 
of an operating company. 




1.4.2. Risk Matrix Criterion 
The risk matrix evaluation method is widely used in upstream oil and gas sectors in 
Pakistan to determine risks [26].  Risk associated with any activity depends upon 2 
parameters, i.e., severity and likelihood.  Risk is the multiplicative product of severity 
times likelihood.  
Table 1.4 shows the risk matrix criterion to calculate the risk score associated with 
hazardous activities.  During risk analysis, a severity and likelihood value is assigned 
to the hazardous event. 
Table 1.4: Risk Matrix Criterion to Calculate Risk Associated with Hazardous 
Activities 
 
The risk value can be calculated by using equation 1.1.   
Risk Score = Likelihood (L)   X   Severity (S)  (1.1) 
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A risk score value is calculated and put up respectively in Table 1.5.  Based upon the 
risk score value, the hazard is categorized into one among the four main groups.  The 
action required depends upon the category of hazard. 
Table 1.5: Risk Evaluation Scale 
Evaluation Scale 
Score Category Action Required 
80 – 100 Critical 
Isolate the hazard immediately. Take Corrective 
measures on high priority and eliminate the 
hazard as soon as possible. 
50 – 79 Major 
Isolate the hazard as soon as practicable. 
Engineering control and administrative controls 
need to be taken.  Regularly monitor the 
cause(s) until rectification.  
30 – 49 Moderate Must fix the cause(s) when time and resources 
permit.  Administrative control is to be taken. 
 29 Minor Need to monitor and consider.  Administrative control is to be taken & use appropriate PPEs. 
1.4.3. Risk Ranking Criterion 
The risk ranking criterion is normally used to rank the hazards [27].  According to the 
risk ranking criterion, there are many processes in progress at any work place.  It is 
not possible to tackle the entire hazard process effectively because it may be time 
consuming and this may cause delay to the work.  Thus, a ranking system based on 
priority for the list of hazards to be controlled is performed to arrest the problem.  All 
components should be assessed and the probability of the risk of hazard to occur is 
formulated.    Table 1.6, Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 describe further steps to determine 
the risk score by using the risk ranking criterion. 
Table 1.6: Probability of Hazard 
Rating Likelihood Frequency Description 
1 Highly unlikely 
About 1 in 1000 
activity times 
Unlikely to happen 
2 Unlikely 
About 1 in 100 
activity times 
Probably will happen 
but rarely 
3 Likely 








Table 1.7: Consequences from the Hazard 




Hazard will not result in serious injury or 
illness, remote possibility of damage beyond 




Hazard can cause illness, injury or equipment 
damage but result would not be expected to 
be serious. 
15 Harmful (Critical) 
Hazard can result in serious illness, severe 




Imminent danger exists, hazard capable of 
causing death and illness on a wide scale. 
The ranking of risk can be calculated using the equation 1.2, 
Risk Ranking = Probability of hazard x Consequences (1.2) 









Relevant action and control measures are 
required and records need to be kept.  
Consideration need to be given for an effective 
solution or improvement.  Monitoring is 





Efforts should be made to minimize the risk.  
Control measures should be implemented.  
Where moderate risk is associated with 
extremely harmful consequences, further 
assessment may be necessary to establish more 
precisely the likelihood of harm as a basic for 






Work should not commence until the control 
measures have been taken to minimize risk.  For 
work in progress, take action within the same 
day.  Work should be stopped immediately until 
proposed control measures has been taken 
satisfactorily to eliminate or minimize risk. 
Immediately 
The gaps were identified during data analysis in the three risk analysis 
approaches.  A statistical approach was used and a new risk and safety analysis model 
was developed.  The study proposes a detailed methodology for the development of a 
new risk and safety analysis model during the operation and maintenance of petrol 
filling stations. 
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Risk analysis models are work system design methods and are helpful to address 
the associated risks in a project.  During the study it was felt that many resources are 
available within an organization to minimize accidents/injuries but due to under 
utilization of the resources accidents/incidents occurs.  After calculating the risks, the 
application of available resources can be done more appropriately.  In case of 
unavailability, requirements can be highlighted and applied strategically to get better 
results.  The application of an inappropriate risk analysis model to calculate risk will 
not give suitable results because of the difference in the base data used to establish 
these criteria.  Therefore, there is a need for a new risk and safety analysis model that 
can be applied to determine risks on PFS related activities.  An intrinsically safe 
working environment is equally needed at petrol filling station. 
During the study no guidelines were found with reference to the use of a particular 
risk analysis model for specific industrial use.  It was also noticed that companies 
were using risk analysis methods without any consultation with the experts.  It may be 
the root cause of occurrences of non-compliances that can lead to any catastrophic 
event.  This can be considered as the main cause for occurrences of fatalities, accident 
and incidents in industries.  Therefore, there is a need for the development of industry 
specific risk analysis models. 
1.5. Checking and Review Process Based upon HSE Non-Compliances 
Checking and corrective action is an essential component to measure the workability 
of any proposed system of practices.  In this study to measure the checking and 
creativeness of a study a corrective and measurement framework was developed, 
proposed, implemented and tested.  The methodology for corrective and checking 
framework is illustrated in Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.5: Flow Diagram of Checking and Review Process Based upon HSE 
Non-Compliances 
The framework consists of seven steps.  The detailed description of each process 
is presented in chapter 4.  
1.6. Problem Statement 
Occurrences of accidents, incidents and near miss cases are quite common at PFSs.  
The principal factors for occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions are due to 
variations in hazard contributing factors and the use of inappropriate risk assessment 
criteria.  Various risk assessment criteria are currently in practice in many 
organizations.  Continuous occurrences of hazard contributing factors during 
operations and maintenance of PFS’s indicate weaknesses in these approaches.  These 
hazard contributing factors have the potential to create unwanted scenarios at PFS’s.  
Therefore, there is a need to develop a risk assessment method that prioritizes hazards 
and calculates the risk value to assist health safety and environment professionals in 
their decision making.  This study will focus on the identification of the hazard 
contributing factors and the development of the safety and risk assessment criteria 
model in depth. 
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1.7. Objectives 
This research endeavors to address the following objectives: 
i. Identification and Classification of Hazard Contributing Factors (HCFs) 
during the Operation and Maintenance of PFS’s. 
ii. Develop a Safety and Risk Assessment Model for PFS’s. 
iii. Forecast Hazardous Events that can be occur in future. 
iv. Develop Safety Triangle for PFS’s. 
1.8. Scope of Study 
The study is comprised of 3.5 years of data that was collected from 2500 petrol filling 
stations located in various cities of Pakistan.  The duration of the data collection was 
from July 2007 to December 2010. 
1.9. Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is structured in five chapters.  The first chapter gives an introduction to the 
whole research in addition to brief background on all the concepts involved in this 
work, the problem statement was discussed, objectives and finally scope of research.  
Chapter two provides related works and mentions reviews of literature.  Methodology 
of this research was illustrated in chapter three.  Chapter four discusses the results of 
monthly, quarterly and seasonal classification of HSE Non-Compliances, risk and 
safety analysis models, analytical hierarchy process, development of safety triangle 
for PFS and exponential smoothing approach.  The last chapter is the conclusion and 
recommendations.  It concludes the major conclusions of this research work, 
recommendations for future research and research contribution to the body of 
knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter intends to review literature related to petrol filling stations (PFS) and 
also link it with the present situation.  This research concentrates on enhancing the 
safety measures at PFSs.  PFS is a common facility that is equally important in urban 
and rural areas.  It is important being the only source of fuel supply to automobiles.  
PFS stores variety of fuels such as petrol, diesel, gas and compressed natural gas 
(CNG), a little negligence has potential to cause catastrophic loss to the human, 
company assets and environment.  The proposed study is considered as an effective 
work as it produced a methodology for the development of risk and safety assessment 
models after incorporating gaps and drawbacks noticed in present risk assessment 
methods.  The literature review covers various terminologies that are essential for 
better understanding of the study work.  In subsequent sections literature related to 
objectives of the study will be presented. 
2.2. Terminologies 
The following terminologies were used for the study conducted.  These terminologies 
will help to clearly understand the concept and framework proposed in this study. 
2.2.1. HSE Non-Compliances 
HSE Non-Compliances can be defined as “The unsafe acts and unsafe conditions 
(UAUCs) recorded during the operation and maintenance of PFS’s within the 3.5 year 
data collection period.  These UAUC’s have the potential to create unwanted 
scenarios and harmful effects on people, the environment and company assets”. 
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2.2.2. Unsafe Act 
The unsafe act is a violation of an accepted safe procedure which could permit the 
occurrence of an accident. 
Examples of unsafe acts are as follows: 
 Operating without authority  Failure to wear or secure  Operating at improper speed  Making safety devices inoperable  Using defective equipment  Using equipment improperly  Failure to use personal protective equipment  Improper loading or placement  Improper lifting   Taking improper position  Servicing equipment in motion 
2.2.3. Unsafe Condition 
The unsafe condition is a hazardous physical condition or circumstance which could 
directly permit the occurrence of an accident.  This could be the result of an unsafe act 
by someone. 
Examples of unsafe conditions are as follows;  Inadequate guards or protection  Defective tools, equipment, substances  Congestion  Inadequate warning system  Fire and explosion hazards  Substandard housekeeping  Hazardous atmospheric conditions due to gases, dust, fumes, vapours etc  Excessive noise  Radiation exposure  Inadequate illumination or ventilation 
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2.2.4. Risk 
Risk is the product of the occurrences of a hazardous event or exposure and the 
severity of the injury or ill health that can be caused by event or exposure [26]. 
2.2.5. Severity 
Severity is defined as the degree of injury or illness which is reasonably predictable 
[26]. 
2.2.6. Likelihood 
Likelihood is defined as the chance that a given event will occur [26]. 
2.2.7. Risk Control 
Risk control is the process of deciding how and to what extent risk factors can be 
reduced or eliminated by considering the risk assessment, engineering factors, and 
social, economic and political concerns [27]. 
2.2.8. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment  is a process of evaluating the risk arising from a hazard taking into 
account the adequacy of any existing controls, and deciding whether the risk is 
acceptable or not [27]. 
2.2.9. Hazard 
A hazard can be a situation, condition or environment which has a potential to cause 
harm, damage, human injury or ill health, or combination of these [26]. 
2.2.10. Accident 
Accidents are unexpected happenings that may cause loss or injuries to people who 
are not at fault for causing the injuries.  Accidents have a potential to cause a fatal 
occupational injury or non fatal occupational injury [26]. 
 18 
2.2.11. Incident 
An incident is an undesired event which under slightly different circumstances could 
have resulted in harm to people or failure of a process [26]. 
2.2.12. Near Miss 
Near misses are events that occur without causing injuries to the people involved [26].  
Most accidents occur as a result of an unsafe condition or unsafe action coming 
together with a person.  The end result is the person gets injured.  Often unsafe acts or 
unsafe conditions have several misfires and the result is a near miss accident or 
incident.  The only difference between a near miss and an accident is luck. 
2.3. Accidents and Causes 
Safety matters play a vital role on the reputation, well being and marketability of 
companies associated with retail outlet businesses.  These firms have direct customer 
dealings during the everyday operation of their business.  The petrol filling station 
(PFS) is one of those kinds of businesses in which the relationship between the firm 
and the customer is of vital importance.  A growth in the population yields an increase 
in the number of vehicles; therefore, the rise in the demands for PFS’s is obvious.  At 
PFS’s, the significance of safety aspect considerations vary from company to 
company.  Matters pertaining to safety issues also vary from country to country.  It 
was noticed that attention towards safety principals were more important in developed 
countries as compared to developing countries.  Developing countries prefer to give 
less focus on reporting occupational health & safety deficiencies; thus, they were 
found to possess no records.  Therefore, very little room exists to do improvement.  
On the other hand, developed countries possess data bases, records and histories of 
their occupational health & safety statistics.  By manipulating this data, they can 
figure out the problems in a better manner to resolve the issues.  Therefore, safety 
records in developed countries are improving continuously.  Occupational accident 
estimates were elaborated by [28]  using World Bank divisions.  Table 2.1 shows the 
occupational accidents by continent in 1994, 1998 and 2001. 
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Table 2.1: Occupational Accidents by Continent in 1994, 1998 and 2001 
Continent Fatal Accident 
Accident causing 
greater than 3 days 
absence (average) 
 1994 1998 2001 1998 2001 
Africa 62604 61237 59332 46733548 45279851 
America 33910 37313 47047 28475899 35904311 
Asia 212774 222776 223407 170013413 170494538 




944 979 1040 747422 793712 
World 333560 347414 353204 263606649 268023272 
A petrol filling station operating company in Pakistan [29] achieved 27.21 million 
safe operational man hours without any lost work days from July 2002 to June 2007.  
The incident rate remained at 0.669% for the (FY 06–07).  The potential causes of 
unsafe acts and unsafe conditions reported were poor housekeeping, snakebites, 
carelessness, poor maintenance, electrical faults, mechanical faults and miscellaneous 
cases. The Pakistan State Oil (PSO) incident cause analysis as depicted in Figure 2.1 
highlights the percentage distribution of incident causes during operation and 










Figure 2.1: PSO Incident Cause Analysis 
PFS’s are normally operated in 3 main ways.  These are fuel station company 
operated retail outlets, contractor operated retail outlets and company & contractor 
operated retail outlets.  More violations related to standard operating procedures were 
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observed at petrol filling stations operated by contractors operated and company-
contractor operated.  The PSO report 2007 highlighted that unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions were caused by contractor’s workers during the period 2008.  Figure 2.2 
shows the incident cause analysis results observed by contractors.  
 
Figure 2.2: Contractor Incident Cause Analysis 
The incidents reported by contractors and the PSO were 172 and 130, 
respectively.  The  PSO and the contractors identified carelessness as the main root 
cause for the occurrences of incidents [29].  Table 2.2 shows the monthly distribution 
of incident occurrences by the PSO and the contractors from July 2006 to June 2007. 
Table 2.2: Summary of Incident (FY 06-07) for PSO Employees and Contractors 
Months July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec  
Year 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006  
PSO 12 5 20 6 8 4  
Contractor 13 16 21 5 17 8  
Total 25 21 41 11 25 12  
        
Months Jan Feb Mar Apr May June  
Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 Total 
PSO 12 6 12 9 14 22 130 
Contractor 2 9 17 15 16 33 172 
Total 14 15 29 24 30 55 302 
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Figure 2.3: Monthly Occurrences of Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions at PFS 
Figure 2.3 shows the graphical representation of the monthly occurrences of 
incident cases by the contractors and the PSO.  It can be observed that the highest 
number of incident cases was reported in the months of September 2006 and June 
2007. 
Many safety studies have been conducted to highlight the importance of safety 
climate and safety culture.  Safety culture development at fuel stations could reduce 
the occurrences of hazardous conditions.  Safety culture comes from the people’s 
behaviour and their way of working.  To produce a safety climate at sites, more effort 
is needed from the management.  The application of a safety climate has been 
addressed in many studies.  The safety climate plays a vital role to reduce accidents 
and injuries during work operation and was investigated by [30-33].  A safety culture 
introduced in an organization to minimize incidents has been identified as more 
helpful to improve health safety and environment statistics in an organization and was 
studied by [29, 34-36].  Safety practices in developing countries were studied by [37] 
and reported as unsatisfactory.  Continuously, the accident, incident and fatality rates 
were found increased due to negligence towards safety matters.  In many 
organizations, the safety rules and regulations exist but implementation is found to be 
weak.  Implementation of the safety rules and regulations can be improved by 
incorporating them into government legislations.  The enforcement can be carried out 
through government authorities.  It was mentioned by [38] that one of the main 
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reasons to give a significance value to safety aspects is the weak structure of 
occupational health and safety guidelines in a country’s byelaws and regulations. 
2.4. Components of Petrol Filling Stations 
A petrol filling station (PFS) is a facility where petrol or other fuels such as kerosene 
oil, diesel and compressed natural gas are sold.  Apart from the selling of fuel, other 
amenities to facilitate customers are available.  It includes minor automobile repair 
services, mini shopping market, automated teller machine (ATM) card machines, 
public toilets and water dispenser units [39].  The availability of the desired facilities 
depends upon a customer’s needs and requirements.  The main components of PFS’s 
can be categorized into 10 elements; these 10 elements are further divided into sub 
groups.  Table 2.3 highlights the main components of PFS’s. 
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Table 2.3: Components of Petrol Filling Stations 
1-Fuel System 2-Forecourts 3-Non Fuel 4-Equipments  Underground 
Storage Tanks  Fuel supply pumps 
Fuel supply piping 
system and  Tank Lorries 
(T/Ls) 
 Surfacing  Islands  Oil separator 
 By the way   Car wash   Tyre shop  Oil Suction   Machine  Service Bays 
 Generator  Compressor 
5-CNG 6-Allied Facilities 7-Signages  CNG island   Compressor shed   Fire rated wall   Control room  Pipe Channel 
 Restaurant   Prayer Area    Credit Card 
Reader   Security post  Public Toilets  Water cooler  Truck parking  
Shed 
 Car wash   Restaurant  Lube trolleys    Decantation 
sign   Fire 
extinguishers 
and buckets  Canopy 
column   Safety signs   
 Canopy 
Fascia  Monolith/ 
Flag/Pole   In/Out/CNG    Site Name   Service 
block  Shop fascia   Tyre shop   Waiting 
room   Oil change  
8- Canopy 
9- Forecourt: Forecourts are normally designed as tollgate, echelon or four square 
arrangements.  The provision of forecourt depends upon the availability of space. 
Figure 2.4 shows the three main design shapes of forecourt. 
 
Figure 2.4 Tollgate, Echelon and Square Configuration of Forecourts 
10-Fuel Tanks: Fuel tanks are normally bitumen coated single skinned mild steel 
tanks.  The fuel tanks are located depending upon the safe decantation position of 
the Tank Lorries and to minimize pipe-work costs.  The number of tanks required is 
determined by selecting the closest configuration of the three nominal sizes which 
best meet the sales volumes for a five (5) day fuel supply.  The nominal tank sizes 
are 18000, 27000 and 45000 liters.  Tanks maybe single or double compartment for 
the 45000 liters tank.  Reinforced concrete pits were provided around the tanks. 
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Numbers of accidents cases reported at PFS associated with these components.  It 
was reported in a study conducted in France [18] that during operation and 
maintenance of a PFS the activities such as general operation or unspecified specific 
circumstances, fuel procurement operations and maintenance work shall be given due 
considerations.  Table 2.4 illustrates an origin and circumstances of accidents cases 
related to these trades.   





















































































































































10 10 0 0 47 67 30.5% 
Tank fill units 0 15 0 0 0 15 7% 
Pipes 2 2 0 0 32 36 16.6% 
Fuel pumps and 
connected 
equipment 
0 1 14 0 17 32 15% 
Stores / Annexes 1 4 0 0 27 32 15% 
Water treatment 
equipment 
2 0 0 0 4 6 3% 
Petrol station 
delivery vehicles 
0 5 0 0 0 5 2% 
Customers 
vehicles 
0 0 7 0 11 18 8% 
Petrol station is 
general 
1 0 0 0 5 6 3% 
Unknown 0 10 1 1 41 53  
Total 16 47 22 1 184 270  
%age 6% 17.5% 8% 0.5% 68%   
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2.5. Hazardous Effects of Petrol Filling Stations 
Hazard contributing factors for every industry are different.  Petrol filling station have 
potential hazards to the people, assets, environment and reputation of an operating 
company.  Fire hazards, static electricity, and air pollution induced by aliphatic and 
aromatic organic compounds are major causes of accident/incident occurrence at 
PFS’s.  A Table 2.5 shows the human and environmental consequences due to petrol 
filling stations.  Total 27 fatalities cases were reported in 8 accidents. 
Table 2.5: Consequences of Incidents [18] 
Description Number of Accidents 
Human Consequences Fatal 8 
 Causing serious injury 16 
Environmental Consequences  157 
Material Damage Internal 74 
 External 19 
There are other hazards available in fuel station operations which make them unsafe.  
Activities such as carelessness, maintenance, housekeeping, slips, trips and falls, 
transportation hazard, major and minor injuries, robbery and snakebites have a 
potential to create unsafe conditions.  The level of risk of these hazards varies 
according to location and country.  Moreover, the emphasis on safety considerations 
by the government is variable all around the world.  Developed countries’ safety 
records are much better as compared to developing countries.  Developed countries 
found to practice significant safety improvement techniques that are useful to reduce 
the occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions.  Filling stations are the most 
commonly available facilities that contain flammable and hazardous materials in 
urban, rural and most importantly in a close vicinity of human beings.  Due to the 
continuous operation of petrol filling stations, they pose various hazards to people, the 
environment and the assets of an organization.  The PFS operation is unique as 
compared to other businesses.  For a smooth operation, it demands the involvement of 
the operating company, contractor and operator groups. 
The enterprise business covers the distribution of fuel to retail outlets in urban and 
rural areas, airport refueling and filling in refineries as well.  The workplace safety 
condition indicates the health of a company as well as the competence and 
commitment of the management.  Caltex is a petrol filling station retail outlet 
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organization operating in many countries around the world.  According to [19], the 
total personnel on board recorded was 3,022.  The recorded total treated injury 
frequency rate (TTIFR) for employees was 21 in the year 2002 and 16 in the year 
2003; whereas, for contractors, the TTIFR was 30 in the year 2002 and 12 in the year 











 Caltex’s Total Treated Injury Frequency Rate for the Year 2002 & 2003 
Local and global issues also have a significant impact on the operation and 
maintenance of PFS’s.  Local issues are normally covered in a country’s byelaws, 
rules and regulations, whereas global issues are mainly addressed through 
international laws.  Global issues have an impact on occupational accident trends in 
developed and developing countries.  The process of globalization depends upon 
many factors.  They include changes in the market, production, finance and 
communication [40].  Occupational health & safety (OHS) practice is growing very 
rapidly in all industrial areas.  PFS operating companies are also giving more attention 
to adhering to OHS rules at their outlets.  Human behaviour intervention to reduce 
occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions was studied by [41] and it was 
concluded that people associated with the workplace and from inside and outside of 
the organization can contribute to accident prevention. 
No approach was found during this study that can combine unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions to improve safety performances at the workplace.  It was mentioned by 
[42] that more accidents were recorded due to the negligence of human.  It was also 
reported that the severity of accidents caused by human negligence was high.  The 
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weak technical structure of an organization was studied by [38, 43, 44] and reported 
to be a main attribute of accident  occurrences. 
Integration of people with the outlet facilities creates a homogeneous safety 
culture for a short time period in a regular sequence.  However, it varies from place to 
place as PFS’s are located in urban and rural areas.  Road configuration, people’s 
visits for re-fuelling, variety of vehicles, local area surroundings, natural conditions, 
environmental configuration, infrastructure facilities, urban development etc are 
totally different from one retail outlet to another.  The factors that can create unsafe 
and disastrous situations are also the results of that safety culture.  The importance of 
addressing cultural aspects has been highlighted by recent well publicized major loss 
events such as [35, 36, 45] and the inquiry into the Ladbroke Grove rail accident [32].  
The studies conducted by [31, 33, 46, 47] demonstrated a relationship between 
organizational culture and safety performance.  The studies highlighted that 
organizational culture has spawned an increased interest in the identification of 
methods that allow the measurement of organizational culture. 
2.5.1. Effects of PFS’s on Human Health 
Automobile refuelling is one of the main causes of benzene vapour production.  It has 
severe health effects on workers and staff.  It was published in Environmental 
Protection in February 2011, that in Spain, it is relatively common to come across 
petrol filling stations closer to houses, schools, shopping centers and hospitals 
especially in urban areas.  Effects of the contamination at the petrol stations that was 
potentially harmful to health can be noted in buildings less than 100 meters from the 
service stations.  "Some airborne organic compounds – such as benzene, which 
increases the risk of cancer – have been recorded at petrol stations at levels above the 
average levels for urban areas where traffic was the primary source of emission”.  The 
immediate surroundings of a PFS contain emissions from evaporated vehicle fuels.  A 
minimum of 50 meters distance should be maintained between PFS’s and housing, 
and 100 meters for hospitals, health centers, schools and old people’s homes [17].  
Figure 2.6 shows a PFS that was located in the close vicinity of residential buildings. 
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Figure 2.6: Operation of PFS in Immediate Vicinity of Houses and Commercial 
Building [17] 
The cases reported during operation and maintenance of petrol filling stations 
related to damaging and tilting of petrol filling station roof due to high winds 
pressure.  A Figure 2.7 illustrating a damaged rooftop at a gasoline station along the 
main highway of Cauayan town after Typhoon Megi hit Isabela province in 
Philppines. 
 
Figure 2.7: The Roof of a Petrol Station gets Damaged by Typhoon Megi in 
Isabela Province, Northern Philippines. (19th October, 2010) 
Petrol filling stations have hazardous effects on workers as well as occupants 
residing closer to them.  High volatile organic carbon (VOC) levels were recorded 
among the occupant workers exposed to gasoline vapour emissions and motor vehicle 
exhausts for a long duration.  A study conducted by [48] demonstrated that PFS 
workers were exposed to higher VOC levels than workers who were not in direct 
contact with the VOCs.  The health risk assessment conducted showed that PFS’s 
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have a lifetime cancer risk due to the high level of benzene and 1-3 butadiene.  The 
VOCs associated with gasoline vapor emissions and motor vehicle exhaust, were 
pollutants of concern because of their toxicity that was reported in studies conducted 
by [49, 50].  Other studies conducted on occupational exposure to the VOCs from 
gasoline vapour emissions were [51, 52].  These studies reported that the workers 
were exposed to highly elevated VOC levels as compared with ambient levels by 
inhalation, ingestion, and dermal contact.  VOCs remain as gases when emitted into 
the air.  The VOCs were not subject to appreciable deposition to soil, surface waters, 
or plants.  Therefore, human exposure does not occur to any appreciable extent via 
ingestion or dermal exposure.  Significant exposure to these volatile organic toxicants 
emitted into the air only occurs through the inhalation pathway [53], and has therefore 
gained the attention of researchers.  Currently, [54]  has classified benzene as a human 
carcinogen and 1-3-butadiene, chloroform, richloroethylene and 1-4 dioxane have 
been classified as possible human carcinogens.  Benzene has significant risks to the 
health of workers and occupants.  The impact of benzene on the working staff can be 
minimized with the use of a vapor recovery system.  It was reported by [48] that gas 
service stations should consider the use of vapor recovery systems, which are 
mandatory in many other countries, and strict measures to control the gasoline 
emission during the gasoline transmission to storage and transport trucks. 
2.5.2. Effects of PFS’s on the Environment 
Petrol filling stations have harmful effects on the environment, i.e., land, air and 
water.  Guidelines provided by [55, 56] are related to water system protection from 
underground storage tank leakage, vicinity area protection from PFS fires, explosion 
hazards, the proper land use selection and minimizing disturbances to access road 
selection due to in-out activity.  Table 2.6 highlights the distance criteria for different 
objectives related to PFS’s. 
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Table 2.6: Distance Criteria Related to Different Objectives 
Objective Criteria Indicator 
Water system protection 
from underground storage 
tanks leaking. 
Safe the groundwater 
At least 300 ft from 
groundwater 
Safe the seawater 
At least 3.250 ft from 
saline water 
Safe the river and lake 
At least 500 ft from river 
and lake 
Safe the private well 
At least 250 ft from 
artesis well 
Vicinity area protection 
from petrol filling station’s 
fire and explosion hazard 
Minimizing impact for 
the residential 
properties 
At least 500 ft from 
residential properties 
Minimizing impact for 
the nearest hospital and 
school 
At least 100 ft from 
hospital and school 
Avoiding electro static 
environment 
At least 150 ft from High 
Voltage Area 
Proper land use selection 
Land availability 
At least 12.000 ft2 on 
vacant land 
Safety  UST’s 
construction 





Minimizing disturbance to 
access road selection due to 
in-out activity 
Distance to intersection 
At least 250 ft from 
intersection 
Distance to road 
At least 40 ft from road 
property boundaries 
Distance to grade 
crossing 
At least 820 ft from grade 
crossing 
Source: [55, 56] 
Petrol can give rise to health problems.  It can be dangerous with excessive skin 
contact, aspiration, ingestion or vapor inhalation [57].  The sources of pollution 
released from petrol filling stations contaminate air, soil, and water [8].  Figure 2.8 




Figure 2.8: Typical Flow Diagram of Fuel Leakage and Spill during PFS 
Operation 
2.5.3. Soil Contamination 
Leakages from underground storage tanks and directly from PFS’s are the two main 
sources of seepage of fuel into the soil.  In cases of spillage, part of the fuel 
evaporates but most of it sinks into the soil.  The degree of contamination depends 
upon the soil characteristics.  If the soil is fine, fuel can be retained in the soil.  That 
sites are termed as contaminated sites but it can be removed.  The soil can be treated 
by using a bioremediation process and other practices as well.  When the soil texture 
is medium or coarse, it would be more hazardous as among the spaces in the soil, the 
pollutants migrate down towards the water table and mix with the ground water 
aquifer.  The significant sources of soil contamination were tank leakages at PFS’s, 
spills on motorways and uncontrolled petrol waste disposal [16].  Different processes 
related to soil and groundwater contamination are depicted in Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9: Effects of Petrol Retail Outlet on Soil, Ground Water Aquifer and 
Surroundings [16] 
2.5.4. Water Contamination 
Petrol, diesel and kerosene oil are aromatic hydrocarbons.  These compounds are 
termed as BTEX (benzene, ethyl benzene, toluene and xylene) [30].  Aromatic 
hydrocarbons are hazardous to health.  Their mixing with water is harmful to human 
beings, flora and fauna.  Normally, the potential source of these aromatic 
hydrocarbons into water bodies is from leakages of underground storage tanks, spills 
from fuel transportation lorries, leakages from fuel supply pipelines,  chemical 
industries, petrochemical industries, oil and gas fields, evaporation ponds, and petrol 
filling stations.  At PFS’s there are three potential sources that contribute to the 
release of aromatic hydrocarbons into the environment.  Leakages of petrol and other 
hydrocarbons from vehicles during filling operations, minor and major leakages 
during filling of underground storage tanks by tank lorries and leakages from 
underground tanks are the potential sources of aromatic hydrocarbons into the 
environment.  During washing and cleaning of PFS’s, the drainage water disposed of 
directly into the municipal drainage system without any treatment.  During a 3.5 year 
data collection period from more than 2500 retail outlets, no septic tank was found at 
any fuel station.  As the municipal wastewater normally discharges to the rivers or 
ponds after only minor treatment, these aromatic compounds reach water bodies and 
affect aquatic life.  In addition, these compounds pollute the natural environment by 
penetrating into the atmosphere from where they are distributed via snow and rain 
into the soil, surface and ground water as well [58].  The degree of the contamination 
is represented in Figure 2.10 below.  The pollutant concentration is measured in ppb 
(parts per billion). 
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Figure 2.10: Concentration of the Pollutant in Groundwater Depending on Distance 
from Source of the Pollution [58] 
2.6. Theories of Accident Causation 
Unsafe acts and unsafe conditions cause dangerous cases at workplaces and are the 
potential cause of occurrences of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases.  
A study conducted by [59] in 1959, he proposed his findings through Figure 2.11 and 
illustrated that approximately 88% of all accidents are happened because of unsafe 
acts of people, 10% by surrounding unsafe conditions, and 2% by the act of God. 
 
Figure 2.11: Accident-Cause Classification (Total Number of Accidents = 531) 
Figure in Brackets Denotes Number of Accidents (Henrich. 1959) 
A strong relationship exists among the root causes of dangerous cases.  Dangerous 
cases posse’s tendency to cause one fatality case to multiple fatalities.  But on the 
other side dangerous cases may cause accident, incident and near miss cases.  An 
occurrence of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases is depends upon the 
severity of dangerous cases.  A study conducted by [60] in 1950 to determine the 
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relationship among major or lost time injury, minor injuries and no injury accidents.  
He indicated that 300 no injury cases (near miss) will give rise to 29 minor injuries 
and 1 lost time or major injury case.  He proposed an accident causation triangle as 
shown in Figure 2.12. 
 
Figure 2.12: Heinrich Accident Causation Triangle 
Another study was conducted by Bird in 1969 to further explore the causes of 
dangerous cases.  Bird’s research work added one more step in the accident causation 
triangle with some modifications [27].  He splits the triangle into four components.  
According to Bird, 1 serious or disabling injury case is followed by 10 minor injuries, 
30 property damage accidents and 600 incidents with no visible injuries or damages.  
Figure 2.13 shows the Bird’s approach to address accident causation. 
 
Figure 2.13: Bird’s Approach to Address Accident Causation 
Further research was conducted by Tye & Pearson in 1974 to explore the 
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main components [27]. The description of the Tye & Pearson triangle is shown in 
Figure 2.14. 
 
Figure 2.14: Tye & Pearson Study (1974) Variations on Accident Ratio Approach 
The accident causation triangles proposed by Heinrich in 1950, Bird in 1969 and 
Tye & Pearson in 1974 vary from study to study but the basic principle remains the 
same.  It was often a matter of chance whether dangerous events caused ill health, 
injury or damage.  The "no-injury” incidents and "near misses" in each case has the 
potential to become an event with more serious consequences.  However, not all near 
misses involve risks which might have caused fatal or serious injury.  What all the 
cases do indicate is a failure of control.  The "near misses" at the base of the accident 
triangles offer preventative opportunities.  If action can be taken at this level, the 
chances of more serious injuries occurring will be greatly reduced. 
2.7. Hazard Contributing Factors for Petrol Filling Stations 
Petrol filling stations (PFS’s) are normally located within a close vicinity of an urban 
environment.  The significance of the PFS is also important along the 
highway/roadside to facilitate customer vehicles for fuelling.  Various hazards are 
present during the operation and maintenance of the PFS.  These hazards cause 
fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases within urban and rural 
environments.  The situation becomes more problematic if public places such as 
shopping centers, hospitals, schools, commercial areas and water bodies are available.  
There are many factors that contribute to create hazardous situations during the 
operation and maintenance of the PFS.  During the data collection period it was found 
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(HK), transportation hazard (TH), slips, trips and falls (STF), carelessness (C), fire 
risks (FR), electrical fault (EF), miscellaneous cases (MC) and medical treatment 
cases (MTC).  These hazards are caused due to unsafe acts and unsafe conditions 
(UAUC).  Reduction in occurrences of UAUC cases can be improved with 
modifications of human behaviour.  Researchers proposed safety instruments that 
incorporate human behavioural change for reduction in accident/incident causation.  
The noticeable improvements can observed with the change from of human unsafe 
behaviour to safe behaviour.  Studies conducted by [61-63] found that the higher the 
safe performance the lower the accident rate. 
Hazard contributing factors (HCFs) were found to be different at different 
operating facilities.  HCFs were primarily classified into 8 main categorizes, i.e., 
housekeeping (HK), transportation hazard (TH), slips, trips and falls (STF), 
carelessness (C), fire risks (FR), electrical faults (EF), miscellaneous cases (MC) and 
medical treatment cases (MTC).  These HCFs have a significant impact on humans, 
the environment and company assets.  During the study, it was found that data 
collected from PFS’s varies from one PFS to another PFS.  It was due to the 
differences in safety conditions, size and location, safety advisor observation 
approach, management commitment, fuel storage capacities, composition and the 
number of vehicles visiting the PFS.  The distribution of hazard contributing factors 
can be carried out in different ways to identify the potential hazards.  As normally, the 
health and safety professionals have so much data and it is difficult to find which 
hazard is more prominent in a particular period, the different ways of hazard 
classification are useful to target particular hazards in a specific period. 
The hazards can be classified on:  Monthly Distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors  Quarterly Distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors  Seasonal Distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors 
2.7.1. Monthly Distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors 
Monthly distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors (HCF) is an important tool to see 
the flow pattern of HCF.  It helps to understand the variation in nature and variety of 
hazards on monthly interval.  Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) committee 
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meetings in companies normally organized either on monthly or quarterly basis.  The 
results of monthly and quarterly distribution of HCFs are useful to present the HSE 
statistics in these meetings and discuss solutions for prevention of occurrences in 
future.  Annual HSE plans also discussed and reviewed on monthly basis in 
organizations.  It was reported in [64] that teams meetings held on monthly basis and 
all officers participates, internal and external reports prepared on the health and safety 
service progress and measured against action plan and targets.  In a study conducted 
by [65] the risk classification results ranging from low, medium to high risk were also 
collected on monthly duration and reported to safety professionals to review status 
and progress of health and environment matters.  The monthly classification was also 
reported beneficial by [66, 67] as normally newsletters, HSE articles and review 
literature published on monthly duration; it contains HSE comparative studies and 
records.  Therefore, by analyzing activities on monthly duration also helpful to 
compare actual results with past studies. 
2.7.2. Quarterly Distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors 
The distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors (HCFs) on quarterly basis is equally 
important as monthly distribution.  The monthly and quarterly distribution of 
activities has various similarities such as risk assessment analysis, HSE committee 
meeting scheduling, and to measure progress of annual HSE targets and plans.  The 
analysis and review of data in various legislations also required quarterly review [68].  
A quarterly distribution of activities is very viable to show flow patter on large 
amount of data.  The HSE statistics between the year 1997 and 2010 was presented on 
quarterly basis in [69].  It was reported by [65] that risk analysis on quarterly basis 
was found successful to improve unsafe acts and unsafe condition occurrences. 
2.7.3. Seasonal Distribution of Hazard Contributing Factors 
The seasonal classification of Hazard Contributing Factors introduced with reference 
to this study found very successful to analyze the data.  A study conducted by [70] to 
measure lost time injuries among professional and youth players on seasonal basis.  
The data for the study was collected over the period 1994 and 1997.  The injury 
frequency in youth players found to increase in second half of the season and it 
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decreased for professional players.  The seasonal distribution of data is normally used 
for large epidemiological studies.  The variation in numbers of workers at 
construction site was studied by [71].  In his study work he identified seasonal 
variation of workers as the potential cause for occurrences of HSE non-compliances.  
Natural events such as hurricane and high wind during operation and maintenance of 
PFS were found one significant parameter.  It also includes the fogs, mists and dusty 
environment that especially very important during fuel transportation operation.  This 
aspects is mainly important for tank lorries.  The significance of seasonal variations in 
climatically conditions was studied by [72] and noticeable fluctuations were reported.  
During the study a noticeable similarities in hazard contributing factors was recorded 
each year on seasonal basis.  
2.8. Hazard Categorization 
Hazard classification can be defined as “the process of distribution of data with 
reference to certain bench mark”.  Researchers termed them different names such as 
hazard categorization, hazard identification etc.  For PFS, the terminology introduced 
here is named as “hazard contributing factors”.  Many activities and processes are in 
progress within close vicinity of a PFS.  They include the arrival and departure of 
various kinds of vehicles at the PFS to buy fuel, filling of underground storage tanks, 
processing of various electrical components, shift operation and customer dealings at 
the retail stores.  Due to the availability of flammable and hazardous materials every 
process generates a variety of hazards.  In addition, fuel station components are 
unique as compared to other facilities.  Every component creates different hazards for 
the smooth operation of the PFS.  The proposed contributing factors was developed 
by using 3.5 years of data collection and introduced a new approach for the hazard 
distribution pattern for a PFS. 
2.8.1. Housekeeping (HK) 
Good housekeeping practices are the key to a safe workplace.  To keep the workplace 
well organized is everyone’s responsibility.  Housekeeping encompasses cleanliness 
of facility, materials, tools & equipment, vehicles and the elimination of non essential 
materials and hazardous conditions.  There are many advantages of good 
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housekeeping, such as good housekeeping practices minimize the environmental 
impact of the activities, reduce the costs incurred due to slips, trips and falls, and other 
incident; moreover, it prevents fire incidents, maintains a pleasant and good work 
place etc.  PFS’s are located in rural and urban areas.  In rural areas they have 
normally wide spaces as compared to urban areas.  A growth of trees was found close 
to the boundary wall around a PFS.  The growth of trees creates major hurdles during 
storm and thunderstorm seasons.  The standard of housekeeping was found to be 
unsatisfactory to control this risk at PFS’s.  Good housekeeping practices help to 
prevent fires, tripping and contact hazards.  Incidents reported during operation and 
maintenance of petrol filling station related to housekeeping include slips, trips and 
falls, articles dropping from above, slipping on greasy, wet or dirty surfaces, knocking 
into poorly stacked or misplaced materials and fire hazards. 
Due to bad housekeeping practices, a scrap material was found unattended outside 
the scrap yard; moreover, an un-orderly pile of scrap material was placed in an open 
area adjacent to the PFS which is shown in Figure 2.15.  The blowing of heavy winds 
was found to be quite common and a dominant hazardous factor for PFS’s that were 
located in open areas.  Cases have been reported in which due to high wind pressure, 
trees have fallen on the ground and created hindrances in movement of vehicles and 
have blocked the passage.  It was also noticed that due to heavy winds blowing, the 
trees swing and touch the high voltage electricity cables.  It may cause disastrous 
circumstances due to the generation of electromagnetic waves.  Moreover, it was 
found that earthing cables were randomly placed on the ground. Figure 2.16 shows 
the laying of the earthing cables at the PFS.  Emergency exits in offices and store 
areas were found to be blocked with unnecessary materials. Figure 2.17 shows that 
staff members were sitting close to emergency exit points.  Unsatisfactory water 
drainage systems were also observed at the PFS. Figure 2.18 shows the electrical 
trenches full of water that could cause electrical sparks and short circuiting. 
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Figure 2.15: Retail Scrap and Inventory 
in Large Quantity at PFS. 
 
Figure 2.16: Spillage Marks in Power 
Generation Room. 
 
Figure 2.17: Access to Manual Call Point 
found Blocked. 
 
Figure 2.18: Cable Trench was found 
Filled with Water. 
Fire hazard exists where housekeeping is poor.  It can be caused by oil-soaked 
rags and clothing, igniting from spontaneous combustion, piles of paper and other 
packaging materials being allowed to accumulate.  A good housekeeping can be 
maintained at facility by considering; 
• Good floor surface 
• Kept clean and free of loose material 
• Free of oil, grease, etc 
• Floors are free of scrap & unnecessary articles 
• Free of obstructions 
• Safe and free passage to fire-fighting equipment and fire exits 
• Safe and free access to staff 
• Clearly defined 
• Equipments are free from unnecessary dripping of oil or grease 
• Area around machines cleaned and free of rags, paper, etc 
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• First-aid facilities and equipment fully stocked and in clean condition 
• Properly piled and arranged 
• Kept at designated areas 
• Inspected and maintained at regular intervals 
• Tool rooms and racks must be cleaned 
2.8.2. Transportation Hazard (TH) 
TH can be classified into two main categories, i.e., onsite and offsite.  Onsite TH 
consists of hazards that are associated with the movement of T/Ls, other company 
vehicles and private/public modes of transportation within the PFS facility.  While the 
offsite TH is comprised of hazards related to the mode of transportation outside the 
PFS facility.  Onsite hazards that were recorded which involved T/Ls include collision 
with dispenser units, private vehicles, filling gantries, piping systems and with other 
T/Ls during the PFS operation.  Offsite hazards that involved T/Ls were mostly 
collision with private vehicles.  Offsite hazards include many factors such as a 
driver’s perception, condition of T/Ls, road configuration and conditions, traffic 
congestion on road and the transportation route.  Another important feature of fuel 
transportation via tankers is that they possess higher VOC loss into the atmosphere 
[73, 74].  Pedestrian injury pattern in Ghana was studied in a study [75] the cause of 
occurrence of pedestrian fatality was reported being hit by heavy vehicles, speeding, 
and roadside activities.  The study also illustrated that by reducing vehicles speeds in 
settlements, providing medians on road, installing street lighting in settlement and 
minimizing roadside activities are helpful to reduce pedestrian fatalities. 
Most of the accident cases related to these heavy vehicle collisions are published 
in newspapers. However, very few records have been found in company documents.  
Most fuel companies don’t even maintain the records.  If they maintain their records, 
they only keep them in their files.  They don’t extract the information from this data 
for further improvements.  
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EME 427681309 11210 15159 14252505 269989 285148 90400 
FSE 193354716 2111 14519 13650601 170166 184685 56976 
CHN 740792400 180 97542 91706292 334138 431680 111879 
IND 473300000 179 46928 44120055 355863 402791 119153 
OAI 457166678 1247 80567 75746706 269541 350107 90250 
SSA 273414298 15 57771 54314626 364554 422322 122062 
LAC 222632385 2196 31165 29300625 107180 138345 35887 
MEC 128010251 929 14296 13441062 73687 87984 24673 
Total 2916352037 18067 357948 336532471 1945115 2303063 651279 
EU-27 205431242 4422 7460 7013545 159485 166945 73989 
Legend: world bank regions 
EME=established market economies 
FSE=Former socialist economies in 
Europe 
IND = India 
CHN = China 
OAI = Other Asia and Islands 
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean 
MEC = Middle Eastern Crescent 
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The safety record in developing and developed countries has considerable variations.  
More than 85% fatalities and 90% of disability-adjusted life years lost from traffic 
accidents occur in developing countries [76-78]. Table 2.7 shows the safety statistical 
records in different countries [28]. 
PFS operating companies have a vital role in the transportation network to provide 
the smooth operation of their business activities.  Tank Lorries (T/Ls) during their 
operation and their maintenance at PFS’s possess various kinds of hazards on allied 
facilities and staff.  It was found that road accidents have the highest occupational risk 
in the retail outlet operations followed by fires, cleaning, electrical hazards, storms, 
filling operations, loading and unloading, slips, trips and falls and minor injuries.  
Occurrences of road accidents involving T/Ls are quite common.  PFS operating 
companies have a vital role in the transportation network to provide a smooth 
operation of their business activities.  PFS’s are commonly located in the vicinity of 
populated areas to facilitate vehicle fuelling operations.  They pose significant risks to 
people, property and the environment [30].  There are three modes of fuel 
transportation, i.e., railways, pipelines and road networks.  Occurrences of accidents 
via railways are quite controlled, safe and functional but relatively slow as compared 
to transportation of fuel via road links and pipe networks.  Transportation of fuel via 
T/Ls is mostly used during fuel transportation everywhere in the world.  Occurrences 
of accidents related to this mode are also quite common.  Although all three modes of 
fuel transportation have their own failure modes, transportation of fuel via road 
networks consists of many dependent variables.  It involves many factors such as 
conditions of vehicles, driver’s attitude & education level, company safety culture, 
road conditions, time of journey, allowable speed limits, climatic conditions, traffic 
congestion on the road etc.  Every factor needs careful attention to reduce the risk 
down to an acceptable level. 
During this study period, many accidents were reported during fuel transportation.  
In one accident, two T/Ls during overtaking on highways rolled over along the road.  
Both TLs drivers died on the spot, fuel spilled on the ground and the T/Ls were ruined 
completely.  Figure 2.19 shows the T/Ls conditions at the scene. 
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Figure 2.19: During Overtaking on Highways T/Ls Rolled Down from Road.  Driver Died 
on Scene 
In another accident, two T/Ls rolled over off the road and went down the 
embankment.  The T/Ls were damaged completely and all the fuel was lost as it 
spilled out and seeped into the ground.  Figure 2.20 shows the picture of the T/Ls at 
the accident spot. 
 
Figure 2.20: T/Ls Rolled Over Off the Road.  Fuel Spilled and T/Ls Fully Damaged 
In July 2009, another case was reported in which a 48 year old man, his wife and 
2 sons were killed when a truck towing a container-counted trailer overturned and 
crushed their stationary car.  In the month of September 2009, in the daily “Dawn” 
newspaper, two accident cases were reported due to T/Ls.  In the first accident, 3 
persons were killed when a fast moving trailer truck rammed into their car.  In the 
second accident, four people died when a fast moving oil tanker carrying diesel 
overturned and crushed a car on the national highway near Gulshan-e-Hadeed.  The 
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truck driver pressed on the brakes but due to the momentum and the weight of the 
heavy vehicle, it overturned and fell on the car.  There were serious damages caused 
to the oil tanker.  The tank punctured and hundreds of liters of diesel drained from it.  
The investigation report highlighted that the tie-rod of the oil tanker had snapped.  
The detached tie rod of the heavy vehicle exposed the weak or ill-maintained structure 
of these vehicles carrying flammable materials.  Fatalities and oil spills on roads were 
the major losses. 
Use of compressed natural gas (CNG) as a fuel for vehicles is common.  In many 
countries such as Argentina, Italy, Pakistan, Brazil, USA, India, New Zealand, and 
Malaysia it has been used as a fuel for last several years.  CNG is compressed into a 
cylinder normally at a very high pressure of usually 3000-3600 psi.  It is equally used 
for cars and buses.  CNG cylinder burst cases have been reported due to improper 
maintenance and servicing.  The normal life period of a CNG cylinder is 5 years.  
After 5 year duration, the gas cylinder requires testing and inspection.  Due to the 
ignorance and carelessness, people normally don’t carry out an inspection of their 
cylinders.  An accident happened due to a cylinder bursting causing 4 fatalities.  
Figure 2.21 shows the damages resulting from a CNG cylinder burst at a retail outlet. 
 
Figure 2.21: Car CNG Cylinder Bursts  
Accidents reported while transferring fuel through pipelines are fewer in number 
as compared to during the transportation of fuel via T/Ls but whenever they do 
happen, they cause huge infrastructure loss, fire, fatalities, and major and minor 
injuries.  It was reported in another newspaper, “Star”, from Malaysia, that on the 21st 
of December 2010,27 people were killed in a pipeline blast.  The explosion took place 
 46 
in San Martin Texelucan, Mexico.  The accident was caused by thieves trying to 
siphon off fuel from the Petroleos Mexicanos (Premex) pipeline.  The fuel spilled out 
of control because of the high degree of pressure.  52 people were reported injured 
and 116 homes completely destroy by the blaze.  Hundreds of people were evacuated.  
Administrative authorities were worried that the fuel may have spilled into the nearby 
Atoyac river.  The blast broke windows and burned cars in a 3km radius.  Locals 
reported that thieves operate drilling machinery and sell stolen fuel to truck drivers 
along the road passing through the region.  Petroleos Mexicanos (Premex) highlighted 
in their report that the blast was caused by “fire on two pipelines”; the fuel supply was 
immediately cut off to those pipelines.  It was also highlighted by authorities that the 
theft of fuel from Mexican oil pipelines causes an average loss of US $800 mil (RM 
2.51 bil) per year. 
An incident was reported on December 18, 2008 in “The Nation”.  A major oil 
pipeline of Parco (Pak Arab Refinery Ltd) burst and oil started gushing out when 
workers were busy working on the pipeline.  During the work, the pipeline was struck 
hard and oil started to spill out from the opening with immense pressure.  The oil 
made its way into houses and spread onto the streets.  The oil spill caused major 
damages to the environment.  Figure 2.22 illustrates the spot and time of the pipeline 
burst. 
 
Figure 2.22: Pipeline of Parco Burst in Korangi Karachi.   
Marketing and media plays an important role in petrol fuel retail outlet businesses.  
Accident occurrences pose a significant impact to a company’s reputation and causes 
business losses.  The safety of personnel, customers and the public must be achieved 
during operation and maintenance at petrol fuel outlets as a first priority [79].  
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According to the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) loss prevention 
fundamentals “loss control may contribute more to profit than an organization’s best”.  
It is required for the salesman of a business to sell an additional $1,667,000 in 
products to pay the costs of $50,000 in annual losses from injury, illness, damage or 
theft, assuming an average profit on sales of 3% [27].  Table 2.8 shows the number of 
dollars in sales required to pay for different amounts of costs for accident losses, i.e., 
if an organization’s profit margin is 5%, it would have o make sales of $500, 000 to 
pay for $25, 000 worth of losses.  With a 1% margin, $10, 000, 000 of sales would be 
necessary to pay for $100, 000 of the costs involved with accidents. 
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Table 2.8: Sales Profits vs. Incident Costs.  Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM), Loss Prevention Fundamentals 
IN TIMES OF KEEN COMPETITION AND LOW PROFIT MARGINS, LOSS CONTROL MAY CONTRIBUTE 
MORE TO PROFIT THAN AN ORGANIZATION’S BEST SALESMAN 
The amount of sales required to pay for losses will vary with the profit margin. 
YEARLY INCIDENT COSTS 
PROFIT MARGIN 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 
1,000 100, 000 50, 000 33, 000 25, 000 20, 000 
5,000 500, 000 250, 000 167, 000 125, 000 100, 000 
10,000 1, 000, 000 500, 000 333, 000 250, 000 200, 000 
25, 000 2,500, 000 1,250, 000 833, 000 625, 000 500, 000 
50, 000 5,000, 000 2,500, 000 1,667, 000 1,250, 000 1, 000, 000 
100, 000 15, 000, 000 5, 000, 000 3,333, 000 2,500, 000 2, 000, 000 
150, 000 15, 000, 000 7,500, 000 5, 000, 000 3,750, 000 3, 000, 000 
200, 000 20, 000, 000 10, 000, 000 6,666, 000 5, 000, 000 4, 000, 000 
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Transportation accidents involving releases of liquefied petroleum gases and other 
petroleum products cause substantial damage to the population, environment and 
properties adjacent to an accident scene [80]. 
According to  [81], 15 percent of all accidental deaths (≈12,000/year); this is the 
second leading cause behind motor vehicles. 
2.8.3. Slips, Trips and Falls (STF) 
Slips, trips and falls (STF) were recorded as major causes of medical treatment cases 
and lost time injury cases.  Due to STFs, injuries were reported on the legs, arms and 
heads of the workers.  Carelessness was identified as the root cause in most of the 
cases.  It was also reported that tools falling down during working at heights caused 
injuries to the workers and pedestrians passing nearby. Falls of workers during 
cleaning from heights result in higher severity of injuries than during other kinds of 
work.  Since PFS’s are considered to be small facilities, less consideration was 
observed during working at heights.  Wooden ladders were found to be in a dangerous 
state, using the equipment in this condition could result in a serious injury.  The 
overall condition of ladders was to be found not satisfactory.  Slippery conditions in 
the working area at filling gantries were due to minor leakages of oil.  It significantly 
contributed to the cause of STF cases.  Workers’ cases of slipping were reported 
while climbing up to the T/Ls after filling operations; major and minor injuries on 
legs and arms were reported.  Major and minor injuries were also reported by the 
workers due to falls from the roof.  An STF case was reported due the workers’ 
carelessness and faults in the design.  Figure 2.23 shows the gap in the design.  It 
indicates that there is a permanent gap in the design and is a repeated cause of 
occurrences of STFs.  According to  [81], STFs make up the majority of general 




Figure 2.23: Diesel Dozing Pipe has become a Trip Hazard 
2.8.4. Carelessness (C) 
Contractors and clients have activities that can create major and minor injuries during 
operations.  The number of minor incidents reported in [29] were 130 excluding the 
incidents by contractors.  The major cause identified was carelessness.  Occurrences 
of these accidents and incidents show that there was less impact from the available 
theories proposed by various researchers and working groups to reduce occurrences of 
cases related to carelessness.  With an appropriate approach and scrutinizing of the 
main causes of accidents; incidents, unsafe acts and unsafe conditions can be 
improved significantly.  With the application of a behaviour based safety approach 
and identification of at risk behaviours, safety conditions can be improved [82, 83].  
Carelessness happens because of taking the lazy way out.  The supervisor or safety 
inspector cannot eliminate the chances of carelessness from workers but they can 
remind them and supervise closely the work that they do.  Events related to 
carelessness cases were recorded due to workers;  
1. Not following work instructions 
2. Not following the set of disciplinary rules and regulations 
3. Not using safe working methods 
4. Not paying attention to the job they are carrying out or to the operating 
equipment 
5. Using personnel protective equipment improperly 
6. Not possessing the aptitude for the complete scope of the work layout plan 
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7. Possessing insufficient skills required for the work they are performing 
8. Not possessing knowledge of the limits and strength of the material being 
used 
9. Not using tools and equipment properly 
10. Eye’s not being on the task at hand 
11. Not possessing a good safety attitude 
Carelessness was found to be one of the main elements contributing to hazards 
during the operation and maintenance of petrol filling stations.  Various cases were 
observed related to carelessness at PFS’s.  Such as unsatisfactory use of personnel 
protective equipment (PPE), improper use of tools and equipment (conditions of tools 
recorded as deteriorated), inadequate use of signages and instructions, missing 
signages at desirable locations, use of cell phone in tank zone, not using seat belts 
while driving, emergency number plates with outdated contact numbers, insufficient 
medical supplies in first-aid box, sudden application of brakes on transportation 
lorries and other vehicles.  Due to carelessness on the part of the driver, T/L have 
collided with other allied facilities at PFS’s such as fire water monitors, dispenser 
units, islands and boundary walls. 
2.8.5. Fire Risks (FR) 
Three main elements are needed to produce fire .i.e. fuel, oxygen and ignition source 
[84].  The first element to produce fire at PFS is petrol (fuel) which is available 24 
hours at petrol filling station.  Fuel has the potential to create fires [85].  The fuel 
hazard fire assessment is an important input for fire management plans.  From 1993 to 
2004, approximately 243 incidents related to fires breaking out were reported at petrol 
filling stations around the world [86].  Static electricity is produced by the build-up of 
electrons on weak electrical conductors or insulating materials [87].  It creates 
explosion or serious injury to a person.  Electrostatic charges were found to be the 
root cause of fire occurrences at PFS’s.  Every year in the USA alone, about 150-200 
fires occur due to static-electricity-caused ignition of gasoline vapors [88].  
Electrostatic charges have interaction with weather, clothing, and car seat material as 
well as getting in and out of a car [89].  Most of the incidents occur under low-
humidity conditions; consequently, they are more prevalent in cold weather.  It was 
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reported by [3] that a vapour concentration of suspended fuel volatiles depends upon 
the weather conditions but near surface fuels always burn in an any fire scenario even 
in situations of lower intensity.  A disproportionate fraction of these incidents (55% of 
the incidents where the ignition details are known) have involved an individual who 
re-enters and re-exits the vehicle during the fueling operation [90].  Static-prone seats 
in vehicles allow a high charge to be built up on a person moving in or out of the seat 
[91].  Although only 5–8 kV values are typically generated by an individual during a 
single action of getting out of a car, the individual sometimes can produce over 15 
kV.  Other studies have shown that the charging of an individual to around 6 kV can 
suffice to produce an incentive spark [92].  In terms of responsibility of the individual 
doing the refuelling, the American Petroleum Institute issued a widely-publicized 
press release on February 3, 2000, “Do not get back into your vehicle during 
refuelling”.  The press release also emphasized that if for some reason the person does 
have to re-enter the vehicle, “Discharge the static electricity built-up when you get out 
by touching the outside metal portion of your vehicle, away from the filling point, 
before attempting to remove the nozzle” [93]. 
The vehicles arrives at PFS were found to be of different kinds.  It includes buses, 
cars, motorcycles, rikshaws, trucks and etc to take fuel.  They make a homogeneous 
work environment for a short time period at PFS.  It could be hazardous if the arrived 
vehicles contain hazardous materials such as chemicals and gas cylinders.  No vehicle 
checking system was noticed at PFS.  Another dangerous aspect is that some of the 
components at PFS were in direct contact with the customers.  Therefore, it can be 
viewed that a homogeneous safety culture due to customers and facility components 
generated at PFS.  A Figure 2.24 below shows that a truck arrived at PFS contains 
numbers of CNG cylinders.  With minor negligence during truck filling operation any 
unwanted scenario can occur.   
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Figure 2.24: A Truck Arrived at PFS Contains CNG Gas Cylinders. 
Petrol is a major hydrocarbon fuel; it is a mixture consisting mainly of hexane, 
octane and heptane which is extremely flammable.  It is able to give off vapours at 
temperatures as low as minus 40oC that when mixed with air, can give rise to fire and 
explosions [94].  Many fire case accidents were reported in many studies such as [20, 
95].  According to these studies, the sources of fire at petrol filling stations are open 
flames, electrical operating components and static electricity.  The fire’s cause severe 
injuries, loss of life and damage or destruction of the petrol filling station site as well 
as major impact on the surrounding infrastructure.  These studies also suggested that 
there is a need to give sufficient distance between petrol filling stations located at 
residential sites or other sensitive facilities.  It is equally important to give distance 
between the PFS’s and high voltage overhead lines. 
Fires and explosions cases at PFS resulted in heavy losses to the operating 
companies.  The cases were recorded due to availability of petrol and LPG.  The 
highest numbers of fires and explosion cases were recorded in tanks [18].  Table 2.9 
and Table 2.10 below shows the number of fire and explosions cases reported in 
tanks, pipes, fuel pumps and other PFS associated facilities. 
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Release of hazardous 
materials 
62 33 27 14 4 7 8 44 199 
Fires 1 1 5 2 0 4 4 3 20 
Explosions 6 3 1 1 0 5 0 2 18 
0thers (near accidents) 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total number of 
accidents 
62 33 29 14 4 7 9 44 202 
Table 2.10: Accidents Recorded Due to LPG [18] 
Typologies (not mutually 
exclusive) 
Origin 


















































Release of hazardous materials 1 2 6 4 12 
Fires 0 1 0 3 3 
Explosions 0 0 0 1 1 
Other (near accidents) 0 1 0 0 1 
Total number of accidents 1 3 6 4 13 
In 2002, there were three fires, each causing damage exceeding $2,000, as 
compared to only one in 2003 as reported by [19].  The number of minor fires 
reported has increased since 2001.  This increase is attributed to a larger number of 
small fires reported by the marketing business and not increases in the reported fires 
at the refineries.  Figure 2.25 shows the graphical representation of fire occurrence 
cases during the years 2002 & 2003. 
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Figure 2.25: Fire Incidents at Caltex 
During this study period fire incidents were reported during the operation and 
maintenance of PFS’s.  Photographs of the few fire incidents cases are illustrated in 




Figure 2.26:    T/Ls Caught Fire on Road 
During Transportation of Fuel. 
 
 
Figure 2.27:     T/Ls Caught Fire at 
Parking Yard.  
 
 
Figure 2.28:     T/L Rolled Over from Road and Caught Fire. 
2.8.6. Electrical Fault (EF) 
Electricity is a source of energy but when it accidently brought into contact with 
people permits release of energy which may result in serious damage or loss of life.  
When electricity comes in contact with other components it may produce heat and 
sparks.  The principal hazards associated with electricity are electric shock, electric 
burns, electrical fires and explosions, arcing, portable electrical equipment [87].  
Electrical equipment was found to be one of the major causes of fires and 
explosions during the operation and maintenance of PFS.  A PFS is a hazardous 
facility and needs special care in the design and installation of its electrical systems 
which must remain safe and secure throughout the life span of the station so as not to 
cause explosions or other untoward incidents.  Pictorial representation of various 
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weaknesses in electrical components that leads to recorded electrical faults cases are 




Figure 2.29: Cable Trays were not 
Properly Covered. 
 
Figure 2.30: Unsafe Electrical 
Connections in Power Generation 
Room. 
 
Figure 2.31: Electric Cables Trench 
was found Uncovered.  Cables found 
Irregular. 
 
Figure 2.32: Uncovered Electrical 
Cable Trench in Power Generation 
Room. 
 
Figure 2.33: Uncovered Electrical 
Trench. 
 
Figure 2.34: Unsafe Electric Heaters 
being used at PFSs. 
 
 59 
2.8.7. Miscellaneous Cases (MC) 
Miscellaneous cases are comprised of hazard contributing factors falling under the 
following classifications:  Oil spillages  Water leakages  Snakebite cases  Minor damages  Maintenance issues  Robbery  Theft  Natural disasters/wind storms  Law and order situations 
Due to the lack of safety awareness by the staff, many unsafe practices were 
noted, including the failure to clear oil spillages, unsafe manual handling practices 
and the storage of fuel samples in unmarked mineral water bottles.  This indicated 
poor supervision and lack of training.  A safe and environmentally friendly disposal 
was required to clean out spillage and leakages.  The worker was found to be careless 
when dealing with these leakages and was unaware of the need to take action when 
small spillages of lubricating oil, liquid hydrocarbons, liquid chemicals or hazardous 
toxic chemicals (liquid or solid) occurred.  The spillage of waste generated must be 
disposed of in the correct manner.  It is the responsibility of the person/department 
supervising the operation to categorize the component waste product and organize 
them to be contained and disposed of in line with the guidelines.  Where small 
spillages occur, the affected area should be cordoned off and an absorbent such as 
sand should be spread liberally over the spillage.  Once all the spillage has been 
absorbed into the absorbent media, it should be collected in suitable containers, 
labelled and disposed of in accordance with the laid down guidelines.  Before 
attempting to handle the spillage, the nature of the chemical should be checked and 
the guidelines set out by the supplier followed.  Protective clothing as directed in the 
vendor’s guidelines must be provided.  Once the chemical has been collected and 
stored as directed, the disposal guidelines should be adhered to.  A thorough washing 
of the area with clean water should be carried out once the clean-up has been 
completed.  The dispersant should be used with discretion for environmental reasons.  
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Fuel spillages and explosion cases reported by [96] due to defects, leakages and 
incompatibility of pipes, coupling and other equipment used at PFS.  The use of un-
compatible couplings was observed and could be a potential cause of spillages.  
Figure 2.35 shows the use of sub-standard couplings during a facility operation.  
Drippings of fuel from the dispenser nozzles were found at various facilities.  They 
contaminated the ground and could be the cause of a fire eruption.  Figure 2.36 
indicates the dripping of fuel during the facility operation. 
 
 
Figure 2.35: Use of Non-standardized 
Couplings at PFS. 
 
 
Figure 2.36: Spillage at Additive 
Dosing Point 
2.8.8. Medical Treatment Cases (MTC) 
Medical Treatment Cases were reported in all eight Hazard Contributing Factors.  The 
MTCs caused injuries or sickness to a person, due to that effect a patient requires 
treatment more than first aid and he needs to consult from a professional physician or 
a medical doctor  Severe cases were reported during the transportation of fuel from 
the distribution centre to the PFSs.  The gantry used for filling of the T/Ls was 
observed to be very narrow and 20% of the MTCs were reported at that particular 
position.  Injuries were reported on the head, arms and legs.  First aid treatment to the 
workers was provided at the retail outlet on an immediate basis while in case of any 
serious injury, the patient was shifted to the nearby hospital.  According to [81], STFs 
were of the most frequent types of reported injuries.  MTCs contribute to 25% of 
insurance claims in each fiscal year. 
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2.9. Risk and Safety Analysis Models 
Risk is the multiplicative product of severity and likelihood of hazardous event.  The 
workers takes risks in their assigned jobs depending upon their risk perception, safety 
rules & procedures and management [97].  The risk level of different hazardous 
activities prioritized by using risk assessment methods provides viable knowledge to 
safety professionals to set company goals and objectives [98].  Issues related to 
occupational health and safety are quite common in the downstream of oil and gas 
industries.  These include fire, falls, electrocutions, vehicle accidents, robbery and 
snakebites.  The level of risk of these hazards varies according to location and 
country.  PFS’s are commonly located in the vicinity of populated areas to facilitate 
refuelling operations.  They pose a significant risk to people, property and the 
environment [86].  Although PFS’s are not costly infrastructures, due to possessing 
flammable and hazardous materials they acquire attention.  The construction cost of 
PFS that constructed in 1998 and 1999 were ranges between 1.4 million to 4.0 million 
Pakistani rupees as indicated by [34].  The variation of the cost depends upon the 
various parameters, such as: is the PFS located in an urban or rural area, is it a 
covered area, availability of other components, is there a provision for allied facilities 
and etc.  It was noticed that major and minor accident and incident cases were not 
independent of each other.  They were, instead, interrelated with one another.  Many 
risk assessment models were studied during this research but no base data was found.  
If the risks are calculated by using the risk assessment criteria developed for the 
construction industry in the petroleum sector and vice versa, it will not give suitable 
risk values because the working environment in the construction industry is totally 
different compared to the petroleum sector.  The choice of the most relevant risk 
assessment method is mandatory to calculate the accurate risk. 
Risk management is one of the main components of the health and safety (H & S) 
management system.  There are various ways to calculate the risks associated with 
various work trades.  Many researchers have suggested different methods to 
determine risks based on some specific parameters.  The importance of a risk 
evaluation can be viewed easily by observing that many companies make it a part of 
its health and safety policy.  This is the responsibility of the company to conduct its 
operational activities in a manner that minimizes HSE risks.  Protecting the health and 
safety of employees, contractors, customers and the community at large in the 
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environment in which the group activities are being conducting is vital.  Any 
company with active involvement of all employees and contractors can manage HSE 
risks to prevent accident, injuries and occupational illnesses. 
Various risk assessment models proposed by different researchers were reviewed 
during the study period.  The detail descriptions of three most widely in practice risk 
and safety analysis models are discussed in detail below.  These were As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), Risk Matrix Criterion and Risk Ranking Criterion. 
2.9.1. As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
ALARP is a documented and well established process for performing detailed risk 
assessment.  It is necessary to perform detailed risk assessment in compliance to the 
standard code of practices, and also to satisfy the concerns of the buyers [24].  
ALARP assures the protection of the company’s people, assets, reputation and 
protection of the environment that the company operates in.  This risk assessment 
criterion is used for identification of hazardous activities. During the risk analysis 
process, the appropriate consequence and probability were assigned to the respective 
hazards.  The risk analysis by ALARP is covered in section 1.4.1.  The detail 
description of some components is described below; 
2.9.1.1. Consequence of Hazard (Top Event) - Consequence on People  
A consequence of Hazard on people in ALARP can be described as a rating of “0” 
(zero); this rating severity on people indicates no injury.  The rating of “1” reflects a 
slight injury or health effect.  It includes first aid and MTC.  Under this rating there is 
no affect on the work performance or cause of a disability.  The rating of “2” indicates 
a minor injury or health effect.  This ranking includes lost time incidents and injury 
(LTII) cases.  It affects work performance, e.g., restriction to certain activities 
(restricted work cases) or required to take a few days rest to recover like with food 
poisoning and skin irritation.  The “3” rating (major injury) includes permanent 
disability.  Activities under this group cause prolonged leave, e.g., unlimited absence 
from work, irreversible health loss, chronic back injuries etc.  The rating of “4” 
defines those activities that can cause single fatality or permanent total disability.  It 
can be caused by an accident or occupational illness (cancer).  The rating of “5” is 
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considered to be the main cause producing multiple fatalities.  It can happen due to an 
accident or occupational illness. 
2.1.2.1 Consequences on Asset 
According to ALARP consequences on Assets are divided into 6 broad categories .i.e. 
no damage, slight damage, minor damage, local damage, major damage and extensive 
damage.  This division is based upon the cost assigned to different incidents and 
accidents by the company.  The cost increases from no damage to extensive damage 
in ranking.  This cost to the individual rating normally varies from organization to 
organization. 
2.1.2.2 Consequences on the “Environment” 
The consequences on the environment are categorized into 6 main groups.  Ratings 
are assigned from “0” to “5” and the effects on the environment are no impact, slight 
impact, minor impact, localized impact, major and massive impact, respectively.  The 
rating of “0” (zero) indicates no effect on the environment.  The rating of “1” shows a 
slight impact; it can cause local environmental damage.  It affects the environment 
within the boundary/fence or within the system.  It causes negligible financial 
consequences.  Minor impact causes contamination, violation of statutory laws and 
local complaints.  There is no permanent /long lasting effect on the environment.  The 
rating of “2” indicates a minor impact on the environment.  A localized impact has a 
rating of “3” and covers limited loss of discharges/fuel, repeated violation of statutory 
byelaws, and affects the community and neighbourhood.  Major affects on the 
environment have a rating of “4” and defines a severe damage to the environment.  
Under this category, a company is restricted and must take maximum measures to 
restore the contaminated environment to its original state.  Massive impacts have a 
rating of “5” and include persistent severe environmental damage over a large area, 
and commercial, recreational or natural loss.  The rating of “5” also indicates a major 
economic loss to the company, repeated high violations of statutory byelaws or 
prescribed limits. 
2.1.2.3 Consequences on Reputation 
The consequences on the reputation of a company with reference to ALARP is 
described as; no impact reflects that there is no harm on the company reputation due 
to that particular accident or incident.  A slight impact rating shows that public 
awareness may exist, but there is no public concern about the organization with its 
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activity.  A limited impact defines that there is some local public concern.  A 
considerable impact indicates that there is regional public concern.  An extensive 
impact results in adverse highlights being given attention in the local media and there 
is an adverse stance by the local government and/or action groups.  A major national 
impact defines the effects on national public concern, and a major international affect 
describes the national/international policies with a potentially severe impact on access 
to new areas, grants of licenses and/or tax legislation. 
2.9.2. Risk Matrix Criterion 
The risk matrix evaluation method is widely used in upstream oil and gas sectors in 
Pakistan to determine risks.  The description of hazards analysis with reference to risk 
matrix criterion is described in section 1.4.2.  Some literatures present likelihood as a 
frequency or probability.  Table 1.4 shows the risk matrix criterion to calculate the 
risk score associated with hazardous activities.  Table 1.4 is divided into 5 rows and 5 
columns.  Likelihood is represented on the X-axis and severity is represented on the 
Y-axis.  Likelihood is divided into four categories, i.e., extremely likely (E), often 
likely (F), unlikely (G) and very unlikely (H).  A number value, i.e. (10), (08), (06) or 
(04) is assigned to each category, respectively.  Severity is also divided into four main 
categories, i.e. death or permanent disability or extreme damage to equipment or 
property, long term illness or serious injury or major damage to property or 
equipment, medical treatment with several days off work or minor damage to 
equipment or property, and first aid needed or negligible property damage.  A number 
is assigned to measure the impact as (A) 10, (B) 08, (C) 06 and (D) 04.   
During risk analysis, a severity and likelihood value is assigned to the hazardous 
event.  With multiplication of the severity and likelihood values, a risk score value is 
calculated and put up, respectively in Table 1.4.  Finally, the risk evaluation needs to 
be carried out according to Table 1.5 
2.9.3. Risk Ranking Criterion 
The methodology for hazard analysis with reference to risk ranking criterion is 
described in section 1.4.3. 
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2.10. Gaps in Safety and Risk Analysis Models 
Risk determination is one of the main components of the health & safety management 
system (HSMS) and checking, review & corrective action process.  Development of 
risk assessment approaches is quite new and rapidly growing field.  Various risk 
assessment approaches are in implementation in different organizations.  In this study 
the three most widely used risk assessment approaches were chosen and studied in 
detail.  With reference to each risk assessment approach the gaps were identified and 
elaborated below: 
1. The choice for selection of appropriate risk assessment model for specific 
operation is not defined by risk assessment methods. 
2. ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) can involve increased levels of 
expenditures for more processes [99]. 
3. No base data is available for the development of risk assessment models. 
4. Companies are required to update the models with respect to time due to the 
value addition/process modification in the plant. 
5. Different risk assessment models are in implementation for various operations 
in a plant.  No guidelines are available for the use of combination of risk 
assessment approaches. 
6. Methodology to measure the accuracy of risk assessment is not described in 
risk assessment approaches. 
7. Organizations should get expert opinions in the selection of the appropriate 
risk assessment model, as many organizations are using risk determination 
methods of their own choice.    
8. These models only focus/prioritize the major accidents and fatality cases. 
They promote the reduction of major cases while for minor cases they 
recommend that they be considered at a later time. 
9. The criteria of hazard prioritization vary in each criterion. 
10. The risk assessment criteria (RAC) do not provide guidance for which risk 
assessment method (RAM) should be used in certain specific condition. 
11. Some RAC show the action required/action needed to be taken while some do 
not. 
12. The RAC show the action required but the control measures are missing. 
13. For specific industrial risks, a specific risk assessment method required. 
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14. With the use of inappropriate RAC, other risks are sometimes increased.  The 
net safety is decreased. 
15. The RAC do not provide guidance as to how much of the risk can be reduced 
in each zone.  To eliminate the risk level from certain regions, it requires lots 
of resources and manpower. There should be an acceptable level/minimum 
level of risk in each zone.  Once this level is achieved, the professionals can 
move ahead. 
16. A criterion for reaching decisions is not clearly provided by RAM. 
17. By using unsuitable RAC, they export the hazard from one process to another 
and make them more dangerous.  The hazard is merely exported not removed 
completely. 
18. By using a risk ranking criterion, it shows the timescale urgency.  This is 
difficult to meet in some circumstances.  The hazards/risks under a high 
ranking require immediate attention/action on the same day which is 
practically impossible. 
19. The assigned value of severity depends upon the individual experience and 
their subjective judgment. 
20. To a young and less experienced HSE officer, it is difficult to make a correct 
judgment, as most of the time assigning values of severity is shifted to the 
young staff members.  This leads to chances of misinterpretations. 
2.11. Legislations 
At petrol filling stations, the movement of vehicles and people is extensive; therefore, 
regulations and conditions may vary but the overall goal of all authorities is to make 
them safer.  Before the installation of a fuel station, the owner is required to take 
approval from the licensing authority.  These authorities vary from country to country.  
Licensing conditions help to control many hazards associated with petrol filling 
station but to make petrol filling station safe, still a gap exists.  Risk to PFS from 
activities such as vehicle movement, hazardous substances, manual handling, slips, 
trips and falls, fire risk, electricity, violence to staff and a compressed gas system is 
not covered in licensing conditions.  Following legislations were in implementation at 
the PFS by the operating company:  Workmen’s compensation act 1923 
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 Factories Act 1934  Electricity Act 1910,1937  Boiler Act 1923 and Boilers & Pressure Vessel Ordinance 2002  Petroleum Act 1934, 1985  Gas Cylinder Rules 1998  Employment of Children Act 1991  Hazardous Occupation Rules 1963   Environmental Protection Act 1997  IEE and EIA Regulations 2000  NEQS   OHSAS 18001  ILO Standards, Conventions, Recommendations & Codes of Practice  OSHA Standards  HSE Executive UK 
2.12. Safety Measures Monitoring at Petrol Filling Stations 
No audit protocol is available to evaluate the effectiveness of PFS safety.  Although 
companies apply various safety audits and control measures, the improvement in the 
safety statistics have not been significant.  Auditing companies also use 
environmental management systems to address local safety measures and fulfil the 
requirements of regulatory byelaws.  This is also in line with [37] as the 
environmental management system focuses on compliance with federal, state and 
local requirements and is helpful to reduce adverse environmental impacts.  Every 
auditing firm has its own standard protocol, auditing methodology and safety 
measurement instrument.  These systems vary from country to country, organization 
to organization and place to place.  In response to enhanced safety measures at PFS’s 
and to make them safer, there is a need for a particular SMS.  SMS’s provide an 
authentic and standard methodology to benchmark the safety audit process.  They are 
equally helpful to the safety professionals to predict the upcoming hazards at their 
PFS.  The development of specific safety management system guidelines for 
individual industries is also highlighted in [100]. 
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An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is a very essential tool for identifying 
in place and the after-effects of a project on the environment and people.  As per 
estate byelaws in a study of the country, an EIA was conducted on all the projects 
such as agricultural, airports, drainage and irrigation, housing and etc.  Construction 
of PFS’s were covered under the petroleum area.  But, it is alarming to note that when 
conducting the EIA the PFS had been excluded [101].  The clause under petroleum 
can be read as follows “Construction of product depots for the storage of petrol, gas or 
diesel (excluding service stations) which are located within 3 kilometers of any 
commercial, industrial or recreational areas and which have a combined storage 
facility of 60,000 barrels or more”.  Although the storage of fuel at PFS’s is  not 
60,000 barrels individually, as they are located close to one another, if there is a  case 
of any explosion occurring due to mishandling at one station it is equally hazardous / 
dangerous for another.  Moreover, the scenario is much more problematic if any oil 
refinery, industry or a home operating a small manufacturing company, chemical 
laboratory or chemical storage yard is located nearby. 
The loose SMS and shortcomings in the standard operating protocols create 
hurdles in safety improvement [102].  During this study, when the contractors were 
asked about safety conditions of their PFS, they were found to be satisfied whilst the 
safety auditors thought otherwise.  The application of the SMS model to achieve good 
safety performances at construction sites were found to be very successful.  It was 
mentioned in the studies conducted by [103, 104] that with successful implementation 
of the SMS models, accidents could be prevail dominantly.  Application of SMS’s in 
the construction industry was reported as very viable to reduce occurrences of unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions.  A study was conducted by [105] illustrating that in 
construction projects, the best time to influence safety is at the top concept and design 
phase.  He summarized his study work in the form of graphical representation.  Figure 
2.37 illustrates the time/safety influence curve.  It can be viewed in Figure 2.37 that 
the safety consideration at the construction project reduced as the project moved 
towards the start up. 
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Figure 2.37: Time/Safety Influence Curve 
In  the  same study conducted by [105], the progress of the occupational health 
and safety matters during the project life cycle is represented.  It can be seen from 
Figure 2.38 that the maximum occupational health and safety (OHS) milestones can 
be achieved in the project execution phase due to the follow up of plans. 
 
Figure 2.38: Occupational Safety and Health Matters Progress 
During the operation phase the PFS stores and sells flammable and hazardous 
materials.  Places used for the storage of flammable liquids are considered as 
hazardous workplaces; the place becomes more dangerous if the nearby movement of 
people and vehicles is frequent.  At PFS’s, the movement of vehicles and people are 
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extensively round the clock; therefore, safety aspects need more attention.  Normally, 
before installation of a PFS, the owner is required to get approval from the licensing 
authority.  The rules, regulations and conditions related to these authorities vary from 
country to country.  License conditions may control the hazards associated with a PFS 
[106] but at the PFS, the hazard pattern may change during the course of time due to 
nearby infrastructure development. 
TOTAL has more than 200 retail outlet stations all over Pakistan.  It was reported 
in [107] that TOTAL experienced 21 fatalities, especially related to transportation by 
road. In 2009, TOTAL experienced a succession of unusual and distressing serious 
accidents in France.  Investigations were conducted to understand the specific 
circumstances of each accident and to learn from them to avoid future occurrences.  It 
was reported that 9 fatalities occurred during site operations, 8 fatalities in the product 
transportation by road, 2 fatalities in the employees travelling by road and 2 fatalities 
during a seminar activity.  It was also reported that during the years 2007, 2008 and 
2009, TOTAL achieved 454,671,000 hours without any lost time injury case.   
Table 2.11 shows the accident statistics of TOTAL for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.   
Table 2.11: Accident Statistics of TOTAL [107] 
Description Unit 2007 2008 2009 
Lost time injury rate (total +contractor 
employees) - LTR 
No 2.4 2.1 1.9 
Of which: Exploration & Production  0.8 0.6 0.6 
Gas & Power  1.8 2.1 1.00 
Refining & Marketing  2.58 2.5 2.4 
Chemicals  4.17 3.6 3.1 
Total recordable injury rate (total + contractor 
employee) – TRIR No 4.2 3.6 3.1 
Of which: exploration & Production  2.4 2.2 1.9 
Gas & Power  2.7 2.1 1.8 
Refining & Marketing  3.2 2.9 2.9 
Chemicals  7.7 6.5 5 
Fatalities No 15 8 21 
Fatalities per million worked (Total + 
Contractor employees) 
 0.034 0.018 0.046 
Safety management plans in organizations are monitored with application of 
safety management system.   A safety management system is a process put in place in 
an organization by the employer to minimize the hazards and risks associated with the 
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operational activities.  Accidents are caused either due to unsafe acts by the workers 
or unsafe working environments/conditions.  According to [60], the main cause of 
occurrences of accidents is the unsafe acts carried out by workers.  Workers can be 
trained by providing job specific trainings, refresher courses and health and safety 
awareness programs.  The safety management system in place within organizations 
varies in their components.  Some organizations include training as a part of a safety 
management system whereas some don’t consider it as an essential element.  Safety 
management systems including the education, training, and employee selection and 
supervision so that unsafe acts can be eliminated were highlighted by [108] .  Safety 
statistics can be improved significantly by removing hazards from the workplace.  In a 
study conducted by [109] emphasized the importance of a safe work place approach 
to minimize the occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions.  It was also 
highlighted that significant safety improvements at the workplace can be achieved by 
creating an accident free work environment. 
Further studies and literature review that have been conducted demonstrated that 
workers’ unsafe acts during the operation stage can create more hazards and put 
processes at risk.  Studies have proposed different safety management systems with 
various sub components.  Identification, assessment and controlling risks to workers 
in all work related activities are found in the core process of a health and safety 
management system.  According to [110], a safety management system (SMS) 
comprises a safety policy, planning, implementation, measurement & evaluation, and 
management review.  The result of the management review is an input to the safety 
policy and as such this provides a continual improvement of the safety performance. 
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Figure 2.39:  Safety Management System Framework 
The flow diagram of the SMS proposed by [110] is depicted in Figure 2.39.  Each 
component requirement is fulfilled with further break up into standard operating 
procedures, guidelines and work instructions. 
According to [111], there are six steps in a health and safety management system.  
Each industrial sector puts emphasis on different components of the safety 
management system in detail.  A SMS framework proposed by Health and Safety 
Management System (HSG65) is shown in Figure 2.40.  Some components need a 
detail break up and importance to include them while the others only require 










Figure 2.40: Health and Safety Management System (HSG65) Framework 
Safety management systems are under implementation in many oil & gas 
companies in Pakistan for the smooth flow of matters pertaining to occupational 
health and safety.  It supports the four major components of the business: 
performance, process, plant and people.  These four components are further split into 
eight parameters with desired outcomes.  Figure 2.41 shows the required deliverables 
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Figure 2.41: Safety Management System Components with Associated Deliverables 
 75 
Safety aspects require significant attention especially on those facilities that have 
storage of flammable and hazardous materials.  The value of safety aspects is much 
more viable if handling of hazardous materials by untrained persons is high. 
A petrol filling station is a hazardous facility and it needs special care in its 
design, construction and installations as well as in the maintenance of its components 
so that they remain safe and secure throughout the life span of the station and do not 
cause explosions or other untoward incidents.  It is necessary to develop such 
strategies that can help to reduce injury cases.  Petrol filling stations are available very 
common everywhere in the cities and remote areas; however, the associated hazards 
to these are very unique and specific.  It requires proper attention and the utmost 
vigilance during operations.  A variety of vehicles come for fuelling.  The operation 
of the fuel pump stations not only contain onsite hazards but also hazards during 
transportation of the fuel.  Many countries exercise a tremendous road exposure in the 
transportation of petroleum products.  The safety standards implemented not only 
pertain to the site but are also viable during transportation.  Most of the standards 
pertaining to this industry are extremely outdated and hardly enforced and 
implemented (standards are simply non-existent). 
Past safety studies have investigated various methods to improve safety statistics 
but accidents are still occurring it shows the failure of control in existing measures.  
Petrol filling station are considered to be high risk hazardous places within a city 
environment.  Fire, falls, vehicle accidents, electrocutions, robberies and snakebites 
are the most commonly occurring hazardous conditions at petrol filling station.  Very 
few safety statistics have been found related to PFS accidents.  Many accidents that 
happen in daily routines related to PFS activities are reported in newspapers only.  
Even many PFS owners don’t develop safety records of the accidents.  The major 
cause of accidents during PFS operations happens during transportation of the fuel.   
In response to enhancing safety measures at PFS’s and to make them safer, there is a 
need for a particular SMS.  This study introduces an instrument which can be used to 
measure the effectiveness of safety conditions at petrol filling station.  It is equally 
helpful to the safety professionals to predict the upcoming hazards at their particular 
PFS.  The level of risk of these hazards varies according to location and country.  To 
control these hazards, there is a need for a specific approach for PFS’s. 
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Safety management system is another form of checking and corrective action of 
safety measures.  Application of the safety measures monitoring to reduce 
occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions was found to be very successful.  
Accidents and explosion cases occurred at PFS’s due to the negligence of the workers.   
In addition, studies conducted related to PFS’s to date, have given consideration to the 
location and the number of PFS requirements within an urban environment.  To 
eliminate problems associated due to the availability of PFS’s, there is a need to 
consider other parameters apart from location only.  Moreover, the right site selection 
approach is workable only for those PFS’s that are under the planning stage.  But 
most PFS’s that have already been constructed contain no solution except to give 
safety considerations during the operation and maintenance stage to avoid occurrences 
of unwanted scenarios. 
No study was found during the literature review that focused on the causes of the 
occurrences of accident and incident cases that make PFS’s unsafe.  The studies 
focused on a safe location and placement of PFS’s  [112].  A safe site for a PFS is one 
of the ways that helps to reduce occurrences of unwanted scenarios but it is not the 
only approach.  There are many potential hazards associated with PFS’s that have 
been highlighted by many researchers in their studies on a case to case basis.  The one 
way to make a PFS safe is with the availability of a checking and corrective action 
approach.  Although various safety audits and control measures are available for 
implementation, the improvement in safety standards is not significant.  No 
comprehensive checklist of attributes was found that can help to manage safety 
matters at the PFS. 
2.13. Checking and Review Plan 
Petro Filling Stations can be considered as small refinery within city and rural areas.  
Fire hazards, static electricity, and air pollution induced by aromatic organic 
compounds are major causes of accident/incident occurrences at petrol filling station. 
There are other hazards abounding in fuel station operations which make them unsafe.  
Activities such as carelessness, maintenance, housekeeping, slips, trips and falls, 
transportation hazards, major and minor injuries, robberies and snakebites all have a 
potential to create unsafe conditions.  The level of risk of these hazards varies 
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according to the location and country.  To control these hazards, there is a need for a 
specific checking, review and corrective action plan for petrol filling stations.  SMS’s 
have been developed to reduce occurrences of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near 
miss cases but these are still occurring continuously.  It shows either a failure of or 
weaknesses in the SMS.  It’s a good approach but lengthy and detailed.  Therefore, in 
this study a specific checking and corrective action plan for PFS was developed, 
tested and proposed for further implementation.  It is a seven step process and based 
upon HSE non-compliances.  It helps to identify risky behaviour related to fuel station 
operations and helps to make them safer.  It incorporates the determination of risk 
with the help of an improved safety and risk assessment model. 
2.14. Mitigation Strategies 
Mitigation strategies are consists of trainings, refresher training courses, safety 
briefings, tool box talks, meeting with employees and any other form of education 
that conducts for workers education.  These programs are short duration training 
programs that organize by safety professionals.  The training program can be organize 
by internal safety professionals or outside safety experts.  Topics covered for these 
trainings are related to company’s work activities.  Task oriented workers are selected 
for participation in training programs.  The occupational safety and health training 
programs effectiveness in reducing work related accident, incident and near miss 
cases were reported by [113].  The enhancement of workers knowledge related to 
workplace hazards, changes in workers behaviour to ensure compliance to promote 
safe work practices and risk reduction of occupational injuries are the potential 
benefits of training and development was also investigated by [114].  During study 
various safety programs and training courses were organized to improve the unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions so that the chances for occurrences of fatalities, accident, 
incident near miss cases can be reduced significantly.  More importantly as the PFS 
also located within an urban and rural environment and little negligence may result to 
cause any catastrophic event, therefore to educate workforce at PFS is necessary.  
With application of mitigation strategies during operation and maintenance of PFS 
noticeable reductions in HSE non-compliances were recorded. 
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2.15. Research Work Application 
The research conducted in this study has potential application.  Although for study the 
data collected from PFSs located in Pakistan but the designed research objectives and 
targets have broader application perspectives.  It was noticed that especially in 
developing countries like Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia 
and etc the conditions of PFSs have similarities.  In addition to economical 
conditions, government rules & regulations, country law and order situation was also 
same.  Therefore, if the data collected from one country for research and development 
and identification of associated hazards, it can be equally useful for other countries as 
well.  The results may differ slightly but have significant meaningful impact for other 
countries.  Therefore, the research outcomes and contribution to the body of 
knowledge with reference to this research is not only viable for Pakistan and Malaysia 
but equally important for developing countries too.  The data from Pakistan was used 
for this study work because it was easy to gather.  If data may start to collect from 
Malaysia then it may become impossible to achieve the set objectives with reference 
to the research work in stipulated time frame. 
The HSE non-compliances classification system with reference to hazards 
contributing factors and occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases 
can be applied on PFSs everywhere in the world.  The development of risk and safety 
analysis model by using statistical tool SPSS (Statistical Package of Social Sciences v 
18.0) or any other mathematical model with application of proposed 
approach/methodology can be developed and applied successfully.  This strategy is 
not only useful for PFSs but can be equally applied in other industrial sectors.  The 
development of safety triangle for PFSs is equally important in broader context 
especially for PFSs operating companies and safety professionals.  It gives an 
approximate idea for the occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss 
cases occurrences.  Various statistical tools such as exponential smoothing for hazard 
forecasting, analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and classification system is equally 
beneficial for industries. 
Therefore it can be noticed that the proposed research work is equally important 
pertaining to its application in various countries.  It is hope that in any country 
successful results with application of this research work can be achieved and 
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occurrences of fatality, accident, incident an near miss cases can be reduced 
significantly. 
2.16. Summary of the Chapter 
The literature review for the proposed research work was studied from the year 1958 
to 2011.  Various hazards to the PFS during operation and maintenance stage were 
reviewed in detail.  The literature review was consisted of international journals, 
books, conference papers, masters and PhD theses, company’s reports, national and 
international code of practices, legislations and newspapers.  The safety records 
related to the PFS in developing countries found significantly good as compared to 
the developing countries.  Transportation hazards, environmental pollution, hazards to 
the workers health, carelessness, leakages of underground storage tanks, fire hazards 
and risk to the PFS surrounding area were found to be the potential hazards associated 
to the PFS.  It was also recorded that the PFS operating companies were ISO 14001 
and OHSAS 18001 certified but the accidents were happening at their retail outlets.  
The significant contributory cause for the occurrences of these accidents was 
identified as the use of inappropriate risk assessment approach.  Based upon the 
current literature review and with identification of potential hazards at PFS the data 
pertaining to HSE non-compliances was collected from petrol filling stations located 
in various cities of Pakistan.  Various hazards were recorded to be occurring 
continuously.  Noticeably, the hazards related to transportation of fuel.  Based upon 
these HSE non-compliances an improved safety and risk analysis model for PFS was 





CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction 
The study is comprised of 3.5 years of data that was collected from 2500 petrol filling 
stations located in various cities of Pakistan.  The duration of the data collection was 
from July 2007 to December 2010.  The site layout, location, road configuration, 
available facilities, underground fuel storage capacity, and climatological conditions 
were found to be different from one petrol filling station to another.   Figure 3.1 
shows the map of the study area with identification of PFS location cities. 
 
Figure 3.1:  Map of the Study Area Showing the Location of Different Cities 
Containing PFS 
Health safety and environment (HSE) non-compliances during operation and 
maintenance of petrol filling stations were recorded.  A total number of 3,216  
HSE non-compliances were recorded.  PFS’s were found to be equally important for 
urban and rural areas.  Within an urban environment, the PFS’s were found to be 
closer to residential areas, schools, colleges, hospitals, commercial areas, and 
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shopping complexes as well as along the adjacent sites of roads, parks, and public 
open areas.  In rural areas, PFS’s were found along the highways adjacent to 
roadsides, in open areas closer to fields etc.  PFS’s located in rural areas were found 
to be of larger sizes and underground fuel storage capacity as compared to PFS’s that 
are located within urban areas.  During this study it was also found that PFS’s also 
located closer to water bodies within urban and rural areas.  The arrival and departure 
of private vehicles, cars, motorcycles, buses, containers, and trailers to take fuel is the 
normal routine operation at PFS’s.  These vehicles arrive at PFS for a short duration 
period and create a homogeneous safety culture.  It becomes more hazardous if the 
visiting vehicle may contain combustible or explosive materials.  With minor 
negligence any catastrophic event may occur.  Therefore, PFS needs more safety 
attention towards inside facility existing hazards as well as hazards that may be arise 
due to external factors.  During study period many cases reported in which customer’s 
vehicles collided with vehicles taking fuel at PFS and allied facility components.  The 
movement of T/Ls to fuel underground fuel storage tanks is another important 
consideration. 
In this study, 3.5 years qualitative data of HSE non-compliances was collected 
from 2500 PFS located in various cities in Pakistan.  The data was collected with the 
assistance of HSE representatives at PFS.  The PFS where HSE representative was not 
available focal persons were assigned the data collection responsibility.  These  
HSE non-compliances were categorized into three main distributions, i.e. hazard 
contributing factors and to cause fatality, accident, incident & near miss cases and 
their impacts on environment, people and company assets.  The third classification 
.i.e. distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon their impacts on environment, 
people and company assets is not covered in this scope of study.  The significant 
numbers of HSE non-compliances recorded were due to various factors during 
operation and maintenance of PFS. The HSE non-compliances were classified into 
two categories i.e. hazards contributing factors and occurrences of fatality (F), 
accident (A), incident (I) and near miss (NM) cases.  The hazards contributing factors 
were then further classified into 8 categorize.  These were Housekeeping (HK), 
Transportation Hazard (TH), Slips, Trips and Falls (STF), Carelessness (C), Fire Risk 
(FR), Electrical Faults (EF), Miscellaneous Cases (MC) and Medical Treatment Cases 
(MTC).  A monthly, quarterly and seasonal categorization of HSE non-compliances 
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was carried out to see the hazard occurrences flow pattern for the two categories.  The 
risk assessment of the hazards was carried out and prioritized by using three different 
widely used risk assessment methods.  These were, as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP), risk matrix criterion and risk ranking criterion.  Gaps were identified and 
finally data was evaluated by using new developed risk and safety analysis model for 
PFS.  The hazard prioritization results by using each risk assessment model were 
found different.  The use of appropriate risk assessment model to prioritize hazard is 
very important.  With the use of irrelevant risk assessment model the hazard is merely 
shifts within the system but not eliminate.  Therefore, availability of base data for 
development of risk assessment model is needed.  The year 2009 data was analyzed 
by using above mentioned three widely used risk assessment models.  Different result 
of hazards prioritization was recorded.  It shows the gaps in risk assessment 
approaches already in practice.  Critical analysis was done and gaps were identified in 
existing risk assessment methods.  No base data was found with reference to 
development of risk assessment models.  No guidelines available regarding the choice 
of risk assessment model.  The criteria to reach the decision was also found missing in 
risk assessment criteria’s.  Based upon data collected a new statistical safety and risk 
assessment model was developed with reference to statistical association among the 
hazard contributing factors.  The proposed safety and risk assessment model was 
based upon seasonal occurrences of hazard contributing factors.  The model was 
validated and finally, hazards were prioritized and mitigation strategies were proposed 
to control the occurrences of these hazards. 
3.2. Classification of HSE Non-Compliances 
A petrol filling station is the only source of fuel supply to automobiles.  It stores and 
sells flammable and hazardous material within urban and remote areas.  Many studies 
conducted as highlighted in literature reviews have demonstrated that researchers 
have considered the effects of hazardous substances on human health and the 
surrounding area significantly.  There are other hazards such as fire hazards, static 
electricity, fuel tank explosions, transportation hazards, air pollution evoked by 
aromatic organic compounds, effects of the PFS’s on the surroundings and loss to 
human life and other hazardous effects that could arise were not highlighted in the 
studies pertaining to PFS’s. These HSE non-compliances can be caused either due to 
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unsafe acts or unsafe conditions.  To make PFS’s safe it is necessary to address the 
unsafe acts and unsafe conditions that make them unsafe.  During the 3.5 years study 
period, 2500 PFS’s were monitored that were located in different areas of Pakistan.  
Due to them being at various locations, i.e., urban and rural areas, along primary and 
secondary highways and in the close vicinity of populated areas, any catastrophic 
event could arise due to minor human errors or mishandling.  It has been highlighted 
in many studies that PFS’s are not safe and contain harmful effects that have the 
tendency to cause catastrophic scenarios. 
The recorded HSE non-compliances were compared with the following set 




Table 3.1: Criteria for HSE Non-Compliances 
1- Housekeeping (HK) 
Clean surfaces free from oil and moistures.  
No garbage and no scattered material. 
2- Transportation Hazards (TH) 
Accident free movement of Tank Lorries 
from oil depot to the PFS.  No speed 
violations.  Private vehicles safe entry and 
exit from PFS. 
3- Slips, trips and falls (STF) 
Workable safe conditions of equipment and 
tools.  Work area free from obstacles and 
uneven surfaces.  Follow standard operating 
procedures during working. 
4- Carelessness (C) 
Work performance by employees according 
to standard operating procedure and 
company’s guidelines during working hours.  




Fire Risks (FR) 
 
Safe handling of fuel.  Safe disposal and 
cleaning of spilled product.  Follow good 
HK practices.  No smoking.  Safe 
underground storage tank (UGST) filling 
operation.  Good condition of fire fighting 
equipment.  Safe use of electrical appliances 
and electric heaters. 
6- Electrical Faults (EF) 
Acceptable condition of electrical 
appliances.  Electrical sparks, improper 
earthing of T/Ls during (UGST) filling 
operation.  Use of unstandardized electrical 
components. 
7- Miscellaneous Cases (MC) 
Oil spillages, water leakages, snakebite 
cases, minor damages, maintenance issues, 
robbery, theft, natural disasters/wind storms, 
law and order situations. 
8- Medical Treatment Cases 
(MTC) 
Workers medical complaints.  Reporting of 
major and minor injury cases. 
The HSE non-compliances recorded were classified by using three different ways.  
In the 1st classification, the HSE non-compliances recorded were divided into 8 main 
hazard contributing factors.  These were: 
1. Housekeeping (HK) 
2. Transportation Hazards (TH) 
3. Slips, trips and falls (STF) 
4. Carelessness (C) 
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5. Fire Risks (FR) 
6. Electrical Faults (EF) 
7. Miscellaneous Cases (MC) 
8. Medical Treatment Cases (MTC) 
In the 2nd classification, the recorded HSE non-compliances were studied with 
reference to cause fatality (F), accident (A), incident (I) and near miss (NM) cases.  It 
was recorded that the occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases 
were due to the hazard contributing factors.   
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows a pyramid of the distribution of HSE non-compliances.  In 
Figure 3.2, fatalities are represented by F, accident cases by A, incidents by I, and 
near miss cases by NM. 
In the 3rd classification the impacts of HSE non-compliances were studied 
according to their impacts on environment, people and company assets. 
3.2.1. Hazard Contributing Factors (HCF) Occurrences Pattern 
Hazard contributing factors have the tendency to create unwanted scenarios during the 






Figure 3.2: Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances based upon Fatality, 
Accident, Incident and Near Miss Cases 
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occurrence frequency of HCFs.  During the study period it was recorded that the 
frequency of HCFs was not constant.  The occurrence frequency of HCFs depends 
upon many factors such as the safety conditions at PFS, surrounding area condition, 
law and order situation, at risk behaviours of employees, unsafe conditions, 
management commitment, safety culture and employee aptitude.  Hazard occurrence 
patterns fluctuate on a monthly, quarterly and seasonal basis.  Variations in the 
number of HSE non-compliances can be seen by observing the data collected during 
the study period.  In the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the numbers of recorded 
HSE non-compliances were 674, 1203, 902 and 437, respectively.  The data collected 
was studied on a monthly, quarterly and seasonal basis. 
3.2.2. Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss Cases Occurrences Pattern 
The recorded HSE non-compliances were categorized according to cause fatality, 
accident, incident and near miss cases.  Monthly, quarterly and seasonal flow of 
fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases occurrences was studied in detail. 
3.2.3. Impacts on Environment, People and Company Assets 
In 3rd classification the HSE non-compliances were studied in detail based upon their 
impacts on environment, people and company assets.  This section was not covered 
completely in this study. 
A detailed study of the HSE non-compliances was carried out with reference to 
their combination as well.  The impact of 8 hazard categories was carried out with 
reference to cause fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  The significance of 
the 8 hazard categories was reviewed as to their causing of harmful effects on the 
environment, humans and property.  Finally, the effects of fatality, accident, incident 
and near miss events were studied as to their creation of harmful effects on the 
environment, humans and property. 
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3.3. Monthly, Quarterly and Seasonal Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances  
Monthly, quarterly and seasonal distribution of all three proposed classifications of 
HSE non-compliances were carried out.  The trend of monthly, quarterly and seasonal 
distribution was studied in detail and root cause for their occurrences was identified.   
3.3.1. Analysis of Activities 
An analysis of the activities was carried out by using Microsoft office 2010 and the 
statistical package of social sciences (SPSS) version 18.0. 
3.3.2. Statistical Association among HCFs 
A statistical association among two classifications .i.e. Hazard Contributing Factors 
and fatality, accident, incident & near miss cases was performed by using the 
statistical package of social sciences (SPSS) version 18.0.  It was found that hazards 
were not independent; they were interdependent with each other.  A test of the 
correlation and multiple regression analysis was performed.  The correlation is the 
degree of similarity or difference between the variables.  A statistical association or 
correlation was noticed among the hazards.  The correlation can be positive or 
negative.  The Pearson correlation was performed on the data.  The range of the 
Pearson correlation is from -1 to +1.  The correlation coefficient is ‘unit free’; it is 
used to compare the degree of association between variables.   
3.4. Risk and Safety Analysis Models 
Risk assessment models helps to determine the risk associated with the work related 
activities. They help to identify the risky activities that have the potential to cause 
harm to workers, the environment and company assets.  The risk and safety analysis 
models analyzed past HSE non-compliance and were used to minimize them in the 
future.  They also help in forecasting safety requirements and guidance to take the 
necessary measures to prevent losses.  Many risk assessment criteria are being 
implemented in many organizations.  Only the use of a relevant risk assessment 
method to evaluate risk is helpful to identify the associated hazards at a workplace.  
Use of an irrelevant risk assessment model will not be helpful in the elimination of the 
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risks.  Furthermore, it may just shift the hazards from one zone to another and the 
risks remain in the system and ultimately the net safety of the system remains same. 
Hence, in this study, a safety and risk assessment model for the PFS was 
developed using the 3.5 years of HSE non-compliance data collected from the 
different petrol filling stations located at various cities in Pakistan.  Analysis of the 
HSE non-compliances was carried out and the risks associated with them was 
evaluated and prioritized.  The monthly and quarterly classifications based upon 
hazard contributing factors and an occurrence of fatality, accident, incident and near 
miss cases was used.  A variation in results was noticed.  A seasonal classification 
was also used for development of safety and risk assessment model.  The study data 
for 3.5 years duration was categorized according to four seasons and analyzed.  A 
Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) approach was used.  The MRA was performed 
by using statistical package of social sciences (SPSS) version 18.0.  Further detail of 
risk assessment model development is presented in the following sections.  A 
generalized flow diagram used for risk identification, assessment and evaluation is 
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Figure 3.3: Risk and Safety Analysis Model Development Framework
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Figure 3.3 illustrates a framework for the safety and risk assessment model for the 
PFS.  The risk assessment process starts with the hazard identification process at the 
PFS.  After identification of hazards it requires to carry out hazard segregation.  For 
the development of safety and risk assessment model the hazards were segregated into 
8 principal hazards contributing factors.  These were Housekeeping (HK), 
Transportation Hazard (TH), Slips, trips and falls (STF), Carelessness (C), Fire risk 
(FR), Electrical Fault (EF), Miscellaneous Cases (MC) and Medical Treatment Cases 
(MTC).  In 3rd step the consequence and likelihood analysis was carried out and risk 
was calculated.  The risk assessment further followed by risk prioritization, 
development of risk reduction measures and residual risk management, if necessary.   
The methodologies adopted for the development of each risk assessment model 
are presented in the following sections. 
3.4.1. Risk and Safety Analysis Model Based upon HCFs 
A risk and safety analysis model (RSAM) was developed based upon  
HSE Non- Compliances distributed into 8 HCFs.  The 8 categorized HCFs were: 
1. Housekeeping (HK) 
2. Transportation Hazards (TH) 
3. Slips, Trips and Falls (STF) 
4. Carelessness (C) 
5. Fire Risks 
6. Electrical Faults (EF) 
7. Miscellaneous Cases (MC)  
8. Medical Treatment Cases (MTC) 
The safety and risk assessment model was developed by using the Multiple 
Regression Analysis (MRA) approach.  The MRA was performed by using the 
Statistical Package of Social Sciences version 18.0 (SPSS 18.0).  MRA process is use 
to determine the relationship among the variables [115, 116].  The use of the MRA 
determines the proportion of risk associated to the dependent variable with the 
independent variables.  To calculate the un-standardized and standardized co-efficient 
for HK, the HK was kept as a dependent variable and the remaining seven HCFs as 
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independent variables.  The un-standardized and standardized co-efficients for TH 
were determined by keeping TH as the dependent variable and the remaining seven 
HCFs as independent variables.  In a similar manner, the un-standardized and 
standardized co-efficients for STF, C, FR, EF, MC, and MTC were calculated by 
keeping the respective HCF dependent and the other seven HCFs as independent 
variables.  The severity of each HCF was calculated by using the following equation: 
SHK = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF) + βC(C) +   
βFR(FR) + βEF(EF) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)                       (3.1) 
STH = Un-standardized Co-efficient + SHK(HK)+ βSTF(STF) + βC(C) +  
βFR(FR) + βEF(EF) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)                       (3.2) 
SSTF = Un-standardized Co-efficient + SHK(HK)+ βTH(TH) + βC(C) +  
βFR(FR) + βEF(EF) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)                      (3.3) 
SC = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βHK(HK) + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF)  
+ βFR(FR) + βEF(EF) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)                      (3.4) 
SEF = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF) + βC(C) +  
  βFR(FR) + βHK(HK) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)           (3.5) 
SFR = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βHK(HK) + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF)  
+ βC(C)  + βEF(EF) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)                      (3.6) 
SMC = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βHK(HK) + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF)  
+ βC(C)  + βEF(EF) + βFR(FR) + βMTC(MTC)                       (3.7) 
SMTC = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βHK(HK) + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF)  
+ βC(C)  + βEF(EF) + βFR(FR) + βMC(MC)                       (3.8) 
Where, 
SHK = Severity level of Housekeeping 
STH = Severity level of Transportation Hazard 
SSTF = Severity level of Slips, trips and falls 
Sc = Severity level of Carelessness 
SEF = Severity level of Electrical Faults 
SFR = Severity level of Fire Risk 
SMC = Severity level of Miscellaneous Cases 
SMTC = Severity level of Medical Treatment Cases 
βHK =  Standardized coefficient for Housekeeping 
βTH = Standardized co-efficient for Transportation Hazard 
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βSTF = Standardized co-efficient for Slips, trips and falls 
βC = Standardized co-efficient for Carelessness 
βEF = Standardized co-efficient for Electrical Faults 
βFR = Standardized co-efficient for Fire Risk 
βMC = Standardized co-efficient for Miscellaneous Cases 
βMTC = Standardized co-efficient for Medical Treatment Cases 
After calculating the “Severity” of each HCF, the likelihood of the respective 
HCFs was calculated.  The likelihood was calculated by dividing the respective 
HCFs’ occurrences by the total number of occurrences during that particular year. The 
risk associated with each individual HCF was calculated by multiplying the severity 
and likelihood.  Finally, it was ranked based upon the risk score. 
3.4.2. Risk and Safety Analysis Model Based upon F, A, I and NM Cases 
The risk and safety analysis model was developed based upon HSE non-compliances 
distributed into 4 categories.  These were: 
1. Fatality (F) Cases 
2. Accident (A) Cases 
3. Incident (I)  Cases 
4. Near Miss (NM) Cases 
A Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) was performed by using the Statistical 
Package of Social Sciences version 18.0 (SPSS 18.0).  To calculate the un-
standardized and standardized co-efficient for Fatality, F was kept as the dependent 
variable and the remaining three variables, i.e., A, I and NM were kept as the 
independent variables.  The un-standardized and standardized co-efficient for the A, I 
and NM cases were also calculated by keeping the respective variable as dependent 
and the remaining three as independent variables.  
The severity of each variable was calculated by using the following equation: 
SF     =  Un-standardized Co-efficient + βA(A) + βI(I) + βNM(NM) (3.9) 
SA   =  Un-standardized Co-efficient + βF(F) + βI(I) + βNM(NM) (3.10) 
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SI   =    Un-standardized Co-efficient+βA(A) + βF(F) + βNM(NM) (3.11) 
SNM = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βA(A) + βF(F) + βI(I) (3.12) 
Where, 
F = Fatality 
A = Accident 
I = Incident 
NM = Near Miss 
βF = Standardized co-efficient for Fatality 
βA = Standardized co-efficient for Accident 
βI = Standardized co-efficient for Incident 
βNM = Standardized co-efficient for Near Miss 
SF = Severity of Fatality 
SA = Severity of Accident 
SI = Severity of Incident 
SNM = Severity of Near Miss 
RF =  Risk of Fatality occurrence 
RA =  Risk of Accident occurrence 
RI =  Risk of Incident occurrence 
RNM =  Risk of Near Miss occurrence 
After calculating the “Severity” for the variables, i.e., fatality, accident, incident 
and near miss cases, the likelihood of each variable was calculated.  The likelihood 
was calculated by dividing the respective variable occurrences by the total number of 
occurrences during that particular year. 
The risk associated with each individual variable was calculated by multiplying 
the severity and likelihood.  Finally, it was ranked based upon the risk score. 
3.4.3. Risk and Safety Analysis Model Based upon Seasonal Occurrences of 
HCFs 
The risk and safety analysis model prepared based upon monthly occurrences of 
hazard contributing factors and fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  The 
results obtained were compared and fewer relevancies among the results in each year 
were noticed.  It was due to significant fluctuations of HSE non-compliances each 
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year on monthly basis.  The noticeable fluctuations were also observed in quarterly 
distribution of HSE non-compliances.  Therefore, to develop the safety and risk 
assessment model by using monthly and quarterly distribution of data was not found 
the right choice.  The risk assessment models developed by using monthly distribution 
of HSE non-compliances may give better results by using large sets of data.  So that It 
can be tested and validate.  The development of safety and risk assessment model 
based upon monthly and quarterly distribution of HSE non-compliances may be 
successful in other industrial sectors.  The final model developed should be test and 
after validation may be use for further implementation. 
A less fluctuations were observed in seasonal distribution as compared to monthly 
and quarterly distribution of HSE non-compliances.  A similar flow was observed in 
four seasons of each year.  By considering this aspect the results of seasonal 
distribution of HSE non-compliances were used for development of safety and risk 
assessment model.  A methodology used for the development of risk and safety 
analysis model based upon monthly distribution was also used for development of 
safety and risk analysis model based upon seasonal distribution of HSE non-
compliances.  A Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) approach was used.  A MRA 
was performed by using Statistical Package of Social Sciences version 18.0 (SPSS 
18.0).  For the year 2007, the un-standardized and standardized co-efficient for S1 
was calculated by keeping S1 as dependent variable and the remaining two seasons 
.i.e. S3 and S4, as independent variables.  The un-standardized and standardized  
co-efficient for S3 was determined by keeping S3 as dependent variable and the 
remaining two seasons S1 and S4 as independent variable.  Finally, the  
un-standardized and standardized co-efficient for S4 was determined by keeping S4 as 
dependent variable and S1 and S3 as independent variable. 
In a similar manner, the un-standardized and standardized co-efficient for each 
season S1, S2, S3 and S4 for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 was calculated by keeping 
respective season dependent and other three seasons as independent variables in each 
year. 
As the data collected for the year 2007 was consisted of six months duration 
period and it was categorized into 3 season’s .i.e. S1, S3 and S4.  Therefore, to 
calculate severity for the year 2007 following equations were used; 
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SS1   = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS3 (S3) + βS4 (S4)                      (3.13) 
SS3   = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS1 (S1) + βS4 (S4)                      (3.14) 
SS4   = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS3 (S3) + βS1 (S1)                     (3.15) 
A twelve months data for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 was used and it was 
distributed among four seasons .i.e. S1, S2, S3 and S4.  Therefore following equations 
were used to calculate the severity; 
SS1    = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS3 (S3) + βS4 (S4) + βS2 (S2)   (3.16) 
SS2     = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS3 (S3) + βS4 (S4) + βS1 (S1)   (3.17) 
SS3     = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS1 (S1) + βS2 (S2) + βS4 (S4)   (3.18) 
SS4    = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS1 (S1) + βS2 (S2) + βS3 (S3)   (3.19) 
Where, 
SS1 = Severity level of Season 1 (Cold Season) 
SS2 = Severity level of Season 2 (Hot Season) 
SS3 = Severity level of Season 3 (Warm Season) 
SS4 = Severity level of Season 4 (Monsoon Season) 
βS1 =  Standardized coefficient for Season 1 (Cold Season) 
βS2 = Standardized coefficient for Season 2 (Hot Season) 
βS3 = Standardized coefficient for Season 3 (Warm Season) 
βS4 = Standardized coefficient for Season 4 (Monsoon  
Season) 
After calculating the “Severity” of each season, the likelihood of respective 
seasons were calculated.  Likelihood was calculated by dividing the respective season 
occurrences by the total numbers of occurrences during that particular year.  A risk 
associated with each individual season was calculated by multiplying severity and 
likelihood.  Finally, it was ranked based upon the risk score. 
3.5. Methodology for Development of Checking and Review Process Based upon 
HSE Non-Compliances 
The proposed safety measurement checking and review process based upon HSE non-
compliances was developed during study period.  The study period was comprised of 
the data collection period from July 2007 to December 2010.  A generalized checking 
and review process based upon HSE non-compliances was implemented in year 2009 
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and 2010.  The framework for checking and review process based upon HSE non-
compliances model is presented in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4: Flow Diagram of Checking and Review Process Based upon HSE 
Non-Compliances 
The checking and review process developed in this study consisted of seven steps.  
These were: 
1. Data Collection  
2. HSE Non-compliances Classification 
3. Analysis of HSE Non-Compliances 
4. Risk & Safety Analysis Model Development 
5. HSE Committee Review Meetings 
6. Hierarchy of Control 
7. Mitigation Strategies 
3.5.1. Data Collection 
Data collection pertaining to HSE non-compliances was formulated first step for the 
development of checking and review process.  Focal persons were assigned the 
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responsibility of data collection at respective PFS.  A qualitative form of data was 
collected.  Dedicated personnel’s (HSE focal persons) were nominated at PFSs to 
record the HSE non-compliances occurrences.  Training programs and workshops 
were arranged at head office as well as at PFSs sites to educated HSE focal persons 
pertaining to data collection process.  The data related to HSE non-compliances was 
collected with reference to Table 3.1.  The data was collected from 2500 PFSs.  The 
PFSs were monitored 24 hours a day and 7 days a week during 3.5 years data 
collection period.  Data collected pertaining to HSE non-compliances was sent to 
HSE representative at head office on weekly basis.  Continuous support was provided 
to HSE focal persons during data collection process by the head office  
HSE representative.  Head office HSE representative also visited PFSs sites time to 
time to further strengthen the data collection process. 
3.5.2. HSE Non-Compliances Classification 
After data collection the categorization of HSE non-compliances were carried out 
based upon HCFs and occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.   
3.5.3. Analysis of HSE Non-Compliances 
HSE non-compliances were classified into monthly, quarterly and seasonal 
distributions.  Graphical representations were plotted.  A test of correlation and 
multiple regression analysis was performed by using statistical package of social 
sciences (SPSS v 18.0) to see the significance level of HSE non-compliances. 
3.5.4. Risk & Safety Analysis Model Development 
A detailed methodology for development of risk and safety analysis model was 
described in section 3.4. 
3.5.5. HSE Committee Review Meetings 
The HSE committee review meetings normally organized on quarterly basis.  A 
company that operates fields, HSE review meetings arranged on fields on quarterly 
basis and annual HSE review committee meeting arranged in head office only in first 
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quarter of the year.  The topics discussed in four HSE review meetings in fields were 
considered as agenda for this annual HSE review committee meeting.  Unscheduled 
meetings may be called at any time on the direction of chairman.  These meetings 
provide a platform for the exchange of new ideas with open discussion, evaluation of 
the inputs from concerned departmental heads and assess the opportunities for 
continual improvement in HSE management system.  In HSE committee meetings the 
review of HSE activities were carried out.  Adequacy, effectiveness and progress of 
activities were measured with reference to annual HSE objective and targets.  
Management committee staff and departmental heads confirm the implementation and 
effectiveness of ongoing HSE checking and review process.   Following topics were 
reviewed and discussed in HSE committee meetings: 
 Review the minutes with current status of HSE management system review, 
conducted last year  HSE policies, objectives & targets  Internal and external HSE audits  Environmental aspects and impact analysis   Internal and external communication, induction and training  Hazard identification and risk assessment  Accident/incident statistics  Recommendations for improvements in HSE management system  Any other HSE issue with the permission of Chair person 
3.5.6. Hierarchy of Control 
Prior to the proposed mitigation strategies consideration was given to reduce the risks 
according to the following hierarchy [117];  Reduce / Eliminate Hazard  Substitution of hazardous activity  Engineering controls  Administrative controls / Signage(s)  Use of Personnel Protective Equipment 
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3.6. Mitigation Strategies 
Training and short duration courses related to workers were found very helpful to 
reduce the occurrences of unsafe acts by the workers.  It was recorded that many 
accidents were the results of unawareness by the workers of how to perform the 
assigned task.  Mitigation strategies were comprised of training programs, short 
training courses, refresher courses and other forms of knowledge sharing sessions that 
were normally provided by the organizations to the workers to improve work 
productivity.  These programs were designed according to the job requirements.  
Training was normally provided by the in house concerned departments and outside 
training and consultancy bodies. 
3.6.1. Methodologies for Development of Mitigation Strategies 
Six months of data were collected related to HSE non-compliances from PFS’s.  The 
first three months of data related to HSE non-compliances were taken by the PFS’s 
operating company.  The data was analyzed and areas for major improvements were 
highlighted.  To reduce HSE non-compliances in specific areas, mitigation strategies 
were developed.  These mitigation strategies were based upon literature review, case 
studies and expert opinions.  After setting out these mitigation strategies, briefings 
were given to the management committee to take approval for the practical 
application.  Three months of data collection with application of these strategies was 
requested and granted by the management committee.  During a one month duration 
period, the initial description/contents of the mitigation strategies were elaborated to 
the management.  Goals and objectives of the programs were defined for the 
management.  Briefings were also given to all stakeholders, contractors and client 
personnel about the application of the strategies to improve safety statistics in the 
head office as well.  The areas of improvement highlighted were carelessness, 
electrical faults, use of hand brakes, mechanical problems, housekeeping and 
maintenance issues.  Analysis results of HSE non-compliances for the data provided 
by the management were presented and deficiencies highlighted to all the groups.  
Mitigation strategies were elaborated and desirable outcomes were introduced to the 
client and contractor personnel.  After providing briefings, the management put 
forward their apprehensions that the same message may be conveyed to all the staff 
members at all sites.  This was to make sure that the workers aware about the safety 
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improvement program.  The time allotted to cover all of the training material 
awareness sessions at their specific petrol filling station was four weeks.  Off and on 
site visits to see the strategies applied in daily routines were also scheduled.  The flow 
diagram of mitigation strategies application process is shown in Figure 3.5 below. 
 
 
90 persons from non-management and 233 persons from management were 
trained.  The staff selected for the training consisted of all disciplines.  Priority was 
given to training focal persons of specific sites.  Consideration was also given to those 
persons who dealt with safety related matters at their sites. 
3.6.2. HSE Alerts 
The following Alerts were issued during three months of the data collection period 
with the application of mitigation strategies: 
  
Site Visits/Inspections   




Results and Plan for Next Stage 
  
1 Month Time to Incorporate in 
Routine   
Data Collection (HSE Non- 
Compliances) 
Highlight areas of 
Improvements   
  





Figure 3.5:  Mitigation Strategies Application Process Flow Diagram 
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• Preventing Slip/trips and falls 
• Health guidelines in Ramadan 
• Tips for good Foot Health. 
• Computer Safety 
• Flu 
• Safety Measures in Fog 
• Driver and Vehicle Safety 
During the data collection period, HSE alerts were used as a safety reminder to 
the staff.  These alerts covered the most important causes of unsafe act occurrences.  
Employees were continuously alerted about these so that they could incorporate these 
safe practices in their normal daily working situations. 
3.7. Development of Safety Triangle for Petrol Filling Stations 
The occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases were found 
interdependent and it was noticed that they possessed a strong relationship with each 
other.  With the help of this study, the data was categorized into fatality, accident, 
incident and near miss cases; then, a safety triangle for PFSs was developed.  The 
safety triangle was prepared by taking the weighted average of fatality, accident, 
incident and near miss occurrences for the 3.5 years of study data. 
3.8. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
In this section, the AHP has been proposed to prioritize the hazard contributing 
factors (HCFs) to support the HSE professionals in their decision making.  It aims to 
rank the HCFs.  In the AHP, the HCFs are presented in a hierarchical structure and the 
decision maker is guided throughout a subsequent series of pair wise comparisons to 
express the relative strength of the elements in the hierarchy.  In general, the hierarchy 
structure encompasses three levels; the top level represents the HCFs, and the lowest 
level has the duration in which the HSE non-compliances occurred.  The intermediate 
level contains the evaluated criteria under which each HCF was evaluated.  Figure 3.6 
depicts the structure of the AHP model. 
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Figure 3.6: AHP Model 
There are many ways to obtain a preference: the measurement scale proposed by 
[118] was used in many studies.  Table 3.2 illustrates a glimpse of the decision 
maker’s judgment and preference of the criteria with pair wise comparisons.  This 
measurement scale enables the HSE professionals to determine the significance level 
among the criteria.  This measure scale includes 1-9 scale points, each point 
represents a different degree of preference.  
Table 3.2: AHP Measure Scale 
Value Preference 
1 Equal Importance 
3 Moderate Importance 
5 Strong Moderate Importance 
7 Very strong Moderate Importance 
9 Extreme Moderate Importance 
2,4,6,8 For comparison between the above values 
            Source: [118] 
By using the measure scale and comparing each HCF to another, the original 
matrix of the criteria will be composed.  The data used in the original matrix of the 
criteria produced an accurate estimate of the criteria weights.  The weights provide a 
2007 2008 2009 2010 







measure of the relative strength and importance of each criterion.  The whole process 
can be broken down into the following steps: 
1. Compute the total values in each column 
2. Divide each single value by its column total 
3. Calculate the averages of each row 
The final scores obtained for each HCF across each criterion was determined by 
multiplying the weight of each criterion with the weight of each HCF.  The HCF that 
got the highest score was suggested as the most significant HCF. 
3.9. Forecasting of Upcoming Hazards 
The exponential smoothing method was used to forecast the future occurrences of 
fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  The data for the years 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010 was used to forecast the number of fatality, accident, incident and near 
miss cases for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
The equation for an exponential smoothing forecast is:  
  Ft = (1   –   α) Ft – 1  +   α A t – 1      [119]                    (3.20) 
     Where; 
Ft = Exponentially smoothed forecast for period t 
F t-1 = Exponentially smoothed forecast made for the prior period 
At-1 = Actual demand in the prior period  
α = Exponential smoothing constant 
The equation states that the new forecast is equal to the old forecast plus a portion 
of the error (the difference between what actually occurred and the previous forecast). 
3.10. Data used for the Study 
The data for the study work was consisted of 3.5 years period (July 2007 to December 
2010).  The data for the year 2011 was received in mid of the year 2012.  The data 
collection activity was remained continuous at PFSs but head office HSE 
representatives were busy in company auditing process in first quarter of the year 
2012.  Therefore available 3.5 years period data (July 2007 to December 2010) was 
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used to meet the study objectives and targets.  The results of study were published in 
international journals and conferences in the year 2011.  PhD dissertation write up 
was started in the end of year 2011 and submitted for PhD viva in second quarter of 
the year 2012.  It was not possible to include data for the year 2011 in this study due 
to time limitations.  The study results were compared with the year 2011 and 
successful results were noticed. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the hazard contributing factors, risk and safety analysis 
models, mitigation strategies and the checking and review process will be presented.  
The chapter will also discuss the adverse effects of petrol filling stations within an 
urban and rural environment.  The study was conducted based upon 3.5 years of data 
collected from 2,500 petrol filling station retail outlets located in different areas of 
Pakistan.  Retail outlets were spread all around the country and monitored from July 
2007 to December 2010. 
The results of study will be presented and discussed in this chapter according to 
the following flow; 
 Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon Hazard Contributing 
Classification (HCF)  Statistical Analysis of HCFs  Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon Fatalities, Accidents, 
Incident and Near Miss Cases  Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon their impacts on People, 
Environment and Company Assets  Statistical Analysis for Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss Causation  Relationship among HCFs and occurrences of Fatalities, Accident, Incident 
and Near Miss Cases  Quarterly Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon HCFs  Quarterly Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon Fatality, 
Accident, Incident and Near Miss cases  Seasonal Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon HCFs 
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 Seasonal Distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon Occurrences of 
Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss cases  Risk Evaluation for Risk and Safety Analysis Models  Validation for Safety and Risk Analysis Model developed based upon 
seasonal occurrences of Hazard Contributing Factors.  Mitigation Strategies Results and Discussion  Checking and Review Process Results Based upon HSE non-compliances.  Safety Triangle for Petrol Filling Station  Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Evaluation Results  Forecasting of Hazards for the Year 2011, 2012 and 2013 
4.2. Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances based upon Hazard Contributing 
Factors (HCFs) Classification 
This section will cover the detailed description of the monthly hazard classification 
for the year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  Causes of HSE non-compliances 
occurrences for each year will be highlighted and discussed in this section.  The data 
collected was from July 2007 to December 2010.  For the year 2007, 6 months of data 
(July to Dec) were used- whereas, for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, 12 months of 
data were used for the study (Appendix A).  3,216 HSE non-compliances were 
recorded during the operation and maintenance of the petrol filling stations.  The data 
collected based upon their impact to cause harmful effects to the personnel, 
environment and company assets were classified into 8 groups.  These were 
housekeeping (HK), transportation hazard (TH), slips trips and falls (STF), 
carelessness (C), fire risks (FR), electrical faults (EF), miscellaneous cases (MC) and 
medical treatment cases (MTC).  Each HCF component was studied in detail and the 
causes of the occurrences of HSE non-compliances pertaining to them will be 
described in the following section. 
4.2.1. Housekeeping (HK) 
HSE non-compliances related to HK practices were collected during the 3.5 year data 
collection period.  A total of 156 non-compliances were recorded due to HK practices.  
The monthly hazard contributing patterns for HK from July 2007 to December 2010 
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are shown in Figure 4.1.  It can be observed in Figure 4.1 that during the 3.5 year data 
collection period, in the month of August 2007, the highest number of non-
compliances was recorded with 22 cases.  In the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the 
total HK yearly non-compliances recorded were 54, 55, 42 and 5, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1: Annual Trend of HK for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
Multiple causes of HSE non-compliances were recorded throughout the data 
collection period.  It can be observed in Figure 4.1 that the HK non-compliance 
pattern for the 3.5 year data collection period was not constant, it was fluctuating.  
This was due to the variation in safety measures at the different PFS’s.  Recurrence 
causes were also observed in different months.  The identified root causes were due 
to: 
1- Slippery surfaces were identified at gantry, stairs, washrooms and in office 
block areas. 
2- The growth of grass and wild bushes was observed on the tank pad in the tank 
zone and at the main gate.   
3- Excessive growth of tree branches was also observed in the surroundings of 
the PFS’s especially in the rural areas.  It was recorded that the tree branches 



























































4- Due to poor HK practices, bee hives were observed behind office blocks, fire 
boxes, electrical panels and under stairs. 
5- There were cases reported in which staff members observed snakes and 
scorpions in the facility.  First aid treatment cases were reported due to 
snakebite cases.  Scorpion sting cases was also reported. 
6- Garbage, empty cartons, and unused materials were observed on the drive 
way. 
7- Metal wire pieces were found near the boundary wall and at the lube ware-
house, earthing cables were found at the unloading bay, and old electrical 
poles and foundations were strewn in the tank zone.  Oil soaked cotton waste 
was found near the T/L filling gantry. 
8- Live electrical cables were also observed to be lying on the floor during the 
PFS operation that could be a potential cause of sparks and occurrences of fire.   
9- The storm water drainage system was found to be blocked. 
10- Unsatisfactory HK practices were recorded in handling fire-fighting 
equipments.  Hose pipes were found scattered on the platform of the 
decantation area. 
Snakebite cases were reported significantly to those petrol filling stations that 
were located in rural areas.  Since the smell of petrol vapours can spread easily far 
apart in rural areas due to high winds and open spaces.  It is the possibility that it may 
attract the snakes.  Therefore, staff awareness and first aid treatment response training 
programs are essentially needed especially to those PFS that are located in rural areas.  
Trenches around periphery of PFS to minimize the entrance of snakes is 
recommended.  However, from Figure 4.1, it can be observed that a significant 
reduction in HK non-compliance was observed in the year 2010 due to improvements 
in the HK practices. 
4.2.2. Transportation Hazard (TH) 
A total of 739 HSE non-compliances were reported due to TH throughout the 3.5 
years data collection period.  The monthly hazard contributing patterns for TH from 




Figure 4.2: Annual Trend of TH for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
In the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the number of HSE non-compliances 
recorded due to TH was 128, 255, 191 and 165, respectively.  TH contributed 23% in 
the overall hazard contributing factors that occurred during the 3.5 year duration.  It 
can be observed in Figure 4.2, that there were noticeable fluctuations in the TH 
pattern. 
The number of HSE non-compliances pertaining to TH was found to increase 
from the year 2007 to 2008.  It was noticed that for the year 2009 and 2010 the HSE 
non-compliances significantly reduced due to the driver’s safe attitude, organizing of 
driving safety programs, facility design modifications and refresher courses. 
It can be observed that, in 2007, the hazard contributing pattern was very unstable.  
In July 2007, the number of HSE non-compliances under TH was 18 and then 
increased to 30 in August.  It then reduced to 20, 15 and 11, in the months of 
September, October and November, respectively.  However, the number of HSE non-
compliances rose to 34 cases in December.  It was noticed that the PFS operation has 
extensive movement of T/Ls.  Therefore, unsafe practices recorded within and outside 









































































cases recorded were due to the collision of T/Ls with other private vehicles during the 
transportation of fuel.  The collision of T/Ls resulted in severe damages to private 
vehicles.  Accident investigations of TH cases were not carried out in detail; hence, 
the root causes were not identified.  However, it was observed that TH cases occurred 
due to the driver’s negligence, road configuration, vehicle conditions and the adjacent 
vehicles drivers’ attitude. 
It can be observed in Figure 4.2 that the TH patterns for the year 2008 were 
unstable.  The total number of non-compliances pertaining to TH cases recorded in 
the year 2008 was 255.  Even though there was a drop in the number of cases in the 
months of February and June, there was an increasing trend in the number of cases for 
the whole year.  There were 93 major accidents that occurred due to the collisions of 
T/Ls within and outside the facilities.  Brake failures, tyre bursts and 
mechanical/maintenance problems were identified as potential causes of TH hazards 
during the year 2008.  Two fatality cases were reported related to TH during the year 
2008.  The first fatality causing event occurred on 28th February 2008, two persons 
were reported dead.  A customer’s car using a compressed natural gas (CNG) cylinder 
burst during the filling operation.  The second event occurred on 13th April 2008 when 
a T/L entering into the facility hit the worker near the gantry.  The worker died at the 
scene. 
A reduction in the number of HSE non-compliances due to TH was observed in 
Figure 4.2 for the year 2009.  The total number of non-compliances related to TH 
during the year 2009 was 191.  The number of cases that contributed to the result in a 
significant loss to the company assets was 75.  During the 12 months data collection 
period, the highest and lowest HSE non-compliances due to TH were found to be 31 
and 1, respectively. 
During the year 2010, the total HSE non-compliances recorded were 437 in which 
165 (37.7%) cases were recorded due to TH.  The number of HSE non-compliances 
throughout 2010 seemed to be approximately stable.  However, it can be observed in 
Figure 4.2 that in July the number of HSE non-compliances increased to 28.  In 
November and December the number of HSE non-compliances dropped drastically to 
1 and 2, respectively. 
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The causes of most of the HSE non-compliances in TH were found to be similar 
in all 3.5 years of the data collection period.  The identified potential causes of TH 
cases were as follows: 
1. The unsatisfactory maintenance of company vehicles was the potential cause 
of the TH cases.  Most accidents occurred due to failures in the vehicles 
interlocking system and axle break down. 
2. T/Ls were found to be over speeding within and outside the PFS facilities 
while private vehicles were found to be over speeding within the facilities.  
Collisions of T/Ls with facility elements such as dispenser units, 
infrastructure, main gate, boundary wall, swing ladder, I-land beams of 
gantry, safety signs, filling gantry, service hydrants and dispensing units also 
occurred. 
3. Most of the T/Ls were found to have deteriorated tyres. 
4. Workers were found to be careless towards T/Ls.  It was observed that some 
drivers of the T/Ls were sleeping beneath the T/Ls.  Cleaners were driving 
the T/Ls or found to be cleaning the T/Ls’ tyres under the T/Ls. 
5. Weather conditions contributed to the non-compliances related to TH cases 
at PFSs.  Poor visibility and skidding of T/Ls on the road was found to be a 
potential concern.   
6. T/Ls hijacked due to weak security measures during fuel transportation to 
retail outlets via road networks.  Product was spilled by opening the T/Ls’ 
valves and wasted. 
7. Traffic sign violations were noted within and outside the facilities by T/Ls. 
8. The T/Ls’ movement damages to PFS components such as canopies, islands, 
and gantries, and collision with other vehicles were identified under 
potential TH non-compliances.  Other heavy vehicles that visited PFS’s such 
as trucks, trailers, and buses also collided with other vehicles and associated 
components.  The root cause identified was an improper facility design 
especially regarding the T/Ls’ turning radii. 
9. Overtaking of T/Ls during fuel transportation was also observed as one of 
the causes. 
10. In cold and monsoon season the accidents were recorded due to poor 
visibility conditions. 
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The allowable speed limit was set at only 5km/hr.  Moreover, incomplete accident 
investigation may be the potential cause of TH recurrences.  Transportation accidents 
caused damages to T/Ls, company vehicles, infrastructure and private vehicles. 
4.2.3. Sips, Trips and Falls (STF) 
Slips, trips and falls were the third highest HCF in HSE non-compliances during the 
3.5 year data collection period.  A total of 137, 215, 202 and 49 cases were reported 
due to slips, trips and falls during the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively.  
Figure 4.3 shows the graphical representation of slips, trips and falls for 3.5 years. 
 
Figure 4.3: Annual Trend of STF for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
STF cases occurred due to tripping of workers and falling of equipment & 
material from higher levels.   The fluctuations in STF cases during the year 2007 can 
be viewed in Figure 4.3.  The highest and lowest cases recorded during the year 2007 
were 41 and 10, respectively.  It can be observed that the number of STFs dropped 
gradually from Aug. to Nov. 2007.  Generally, an increment in STF cases during the 
year 2008 can be seen in Figure 4.3.  However, the number increased again to 24 
cases in Dec. 2007.  The average number of slips, trips and falls recorded were 



































































month of April.  In 2008, the peaks of STF cases recorded were 27, 34, 30 and 28 
during the months of March, Sept., Nov. and Dec., respectively. 
In the year 2009, a total number of 202 HSE non-compliances pertaining to STF 
cases were reported.  In 2009, there seemed to be an increase in the STF cases from 
Jan. to March.  In the month of March 53 cases were recorded and this was the 
highest throughout the 3.5 year study period.  However, a drop in the STF pattern in 
2009 from March to May was observed in Figure 4.3.  The number of STF cases 
during the year 2010 was low.  Throughout the year only 49 cases were reported.  The 
highest STF of 18 cases was reported in the month of March.  A gradual reduction in 
STF cases was observed from March to May.  No STF cases were reported in the 
months of Aug., Sept., Oct. and Nov.  Only one non-compliance case was reported in 
the month of Dec. 
Multiple causes of STF cases were recorded throughout the period.  The main 
contributing factors for the occurrences of the STF cases were: 
1. Fall cases were due to falling of materials, equipment or workers from stairs, 
ladders, platforms, loading docks, truck roofs, jumping of workers from one 
T/L to another T/L or to the fuel gantry.   
2. There was a collapse of a roof/ceiling of an office area to the ground.  It 
caused damages to computers and other accessories.   However, no injury was 
reported to the staff members. 
3. Working tools fall on workers.  These include flanges, gate valves, valve pit 
covers and roof plates.  
4. Workers working with damaged equipment/tools that were not fit to be used 
for repairing and maintenance work.  
5. Slippery surfaces were observed within the facilities.  Significantly slippery 
surfaces were found on top of T/Ls. 
6. Trees were fallen due to heavy winds, rains and storms. 
7. Insufficient equipment for material transportation during routine and 
maintenance operations caused ergonomic problems.   
8. Falling of workers from heights and from same level during construction work 
was noted. 
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9. Material falling from forklift.  It included chutes, GI (Galvanized Iron) sheets, 
product information sign sheets, valve pit covers and pallets. 
10. Workers accidentally fell into tank during welding operation. 
11. Some workers had their foot trapped in the damaged T/L ladders. 
4.2.4. Carelessness (C) 
Carelessness (C) cases happened due to the unsafe practices of the workers during the 
PFS operation.    Figure 4.4 shows the graphical patter of HSE non-compliances due 
to carelessness for the 3.5 year data collection period.  Carelessness caused increased 
slip, trip and fall cases which consequently resulted in the increase of medical 
treatment cases.  During the 6 month period (July-Dec.) in the year 2007, 87 non-
compliances were recorded.  An increment in carelessness cases can be seen in  
Figure 4.4 for the year 2008.  A total number of 224 cases were reported related to 
carelessness out of 1,203 HCFs during the year 2008.  Carelessness contributed 
18.6% in the year 2008.  The highest and lowest cases pertaining to carelessness 
recorded were 40 and 3, in November and May, respectively.   However, a reduction 
in carelessness cases was observed for the years 2009 and 2010.  One fatality case 
was reported on 5th September 2009.  A worker fell down due to carelessness from the 
high speed diesel (HSD) filling point.  He was filling the T/L.  Dizziness was 
identified as the root cause of his fall.  In the years 2009 and 2010, 97 and 41 
carelessness cases were reported, respectively.  On 9th October 2010 one fatality case 
was reported.  A driver of a T/L who was waiting outside the terminal premise was 
crushed to death by another T/L when he was sleeping beneath the T/L. 
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Figure 4.4: Annual Trend of C for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
Cases recorded related to carelessness consist of a variety of causes such as: 
1. Failure of an employee to use appropriate personal protective equipment 
(PPEs) during the work. 
2. Use of cell phones during fuel transfer from a T/L to an underground storage 
tank. 
3. Improper supervision and standing/sitting on T/L during movement. 
4. Cleaners and drivers found sleeping under the T/L shade. 
5. Workers walking on fuel supply pipe lines. 
6. Inadequate medicine in the first aid box. 
7. Fire extinguishers were found to be expired during inspection and the 
decanting hose pipes were found lying around improperly.  The water level in 
the fire water tank was found not up to the optimum level.  
8. Due to carelessness, a spillage of fuel case was reported at the tank wagon 
gantry; 60 litres of petrol spilled.  In another case, a T/L hit the angle iron of 
decantation bay.  It caused the rupturing of the tank and flowing out of the 
product.   
9. During a distillation test, the distillation flask was broken and caused the 






































































10. Broken loading arms of T/L filling points due to driver negligence. 
11. Collision of T/Ls with the angle iron of the decantation bay.  Rupturing of the 
tank and spillage of fuel from T/Ls were reported. 
12.   A T/L was driven by a cleaner. 
13. A private car, after refueling rushed away while the nozzle of the dispensing 
unit was still in the vehicle tank.  
14. It was observed that a T/L driver started the T/L with earthing clamp still 
attached. 
15. Medical treatment record of workers was not maintained.    
16. Improper maintenance of fire-fighting equipment. 
17. Electrician found working on electric panel with energized board. 
Carelessness cases mainly occurred due to at-risk behaviour and workers unsafe 
work practices.  The at risk behaviour of workers can be significantly reduced with 
the help of the e-ARBAIS [82] model.  Improvements can also be observed with 
worker training programs and the application of mitigation strategies.  The following 
of safe work practices, standard operating procedures and work instructions by 
workers would be helpful to significantly reduce the occurrences of HSE non-
compliances pertaining to carelessness. 
4.2.5. Fire Risk (FR) 
Occurrences of fire cases during the operation and maintenance of the PFS’s creates 
explosions and heavy losses to the PFS operating company.  PFS’s normally contain 
large amounts of hazardous and flammable material for sell.  The arrival and 
departure of T/Ls to fill the underground storage tanks are quite common activities 
throughout the PFS operational hours.  The chances of a fire become increased when 
underground storage tank filling is in process.  Fire cases were reported in which T/Ls 
caught fire due to carelessness, theft and terrorists attacks at PFS’s.  The fire cases 
reported during the 3.5 year data collection period were 79.  Fire cases got the 7th 
ranking among HCFs.  Although it contributed only 2.45% during the whole 3.5 year 
period, the severity is the maximum among the 8 HCFs.  The majority of fire cases 
that were recorded during the data collection period affected the sells operation, 
damaged infrastructure, affected the company’s reputation and caused heavy monitory 
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losses to the company.  Figure 4.5 shows the graphical representation of the fire 
hazard during the 3.5 year data collection period.  Normally, the quantity of the 
product at the underground storage tanks (UGST) ranges between 60,000 litres to 
80,000 litres.  PFS’s are located within an urban environment, along the road, in 
congested areas and in residential areas.  Most of the PFS’s were found very close to 
one another on adjacent road sides.  The distance between them was even less than 1 
km.  Therefore the occurrence of fire at PFS has the tendency to generate more losses 
as the other PFS is located nearby so the fuel capacities of both PFS combine together 
and may create any catastrophic event. 
 
Figure 4.5:     Annual Trend of FR for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
It can be observed from Figure 4.5 that total of 7 cases were reported due to the 
occurrences of fires during 6 months of the year 2007.  Among them 3 fire cases were 
reported in the month of August.  No fire case was reported in the month of July.  In 
September, October, November and December 1 case was reported in each month.  In 
the year 2008, 17 fire induced cases were reported.  It contributed only 1.4% of all the 
HCFs throughout the year 2008 but contained the highest severity level.  In January, 
February and December, every month 3 fire eruption cases were reported.  No fire 




































































During the year 2009, 16 cases were reported pertaining to fire.  In both the 
months of January and October, 3 cases were reported, each.  3 cases were also 
reported in both months of April and June, each.  No fire case was reported in the 
month of February or August.  Whereas, 1 fire case was recorded in the months of 
March, May, July, September, November and December, respectively.  It can be 
observed in Figure 4.5 that a maximum of 15 cases were reported during the 3.5 year 
data collection phase in the month of April 2010.  A total 39 cases were recorded in 
the year 2010.  Fatalities occurring due to the fire cases were 7 during the year 2010.  
Weak security measures and disturbed law & order situations were identified as the 
potential causes of fatality cases and fire eruptions.  In the month of April 2010, 
armed persons did continuous firing on T/Ls.  11 T/Ls were caught on fire and fully 
burnt.  In the same month during a robbery incident at a PFS, 4 police officers died, 4 
T/Ls were completely burnt and heavy losses occurred to the retail outlet. 
Fire incident cases created major and minor losses to the company.  During the 
operation and maintenance of the PFS’s, the causes of fire eruption cases occurrences 
at the PFS’s were due to; 
1. A fire broke out in the change-over switch and distribution board due to rain 
storms causing short circuiting was reporting.   
2. Generation of fire cases were also reported during aircraft fuelling at the 
terminal.  The fires were extinguished with sand.   
3. PFS’s sell compressed natural gas (CNG).  A CNG blast took place at a retail 
outlet.  As a result, the walls of the distribution room, doors, electrical fixtures, 
slogan wall skin, and the canopy false ceiling was completely damaged.  Two 
employees got severe injuries.  Gas leakage from the CNG supply system was 
identified as the root cause. 
4. A fire broke out in a T/L, while it was parked at a filling gantry.  The root 
cause of fire eruption was identified as creation of minor spark during filling 
operation. 
5. During normal operation, smoke was observed from the generator in the 
power house and the lighting tower.  Fire was generated due to the entrance of 
water inside the lighting tower.  Minor fire eruptions and sparks in production 
cases were reported due to twisted electrical cables, bracket fan couplings, 
 121 
short circuiting and circuit breakers. They were found to be of poor quality 
and not consistent with the relevant system.      
6. Use of unsafe electrical heaters was also reported to be the cause of electrical 
fires.   
7. Within one facility, a dispensing unit, main circuit board and water cooler 
caught fire.   
8. Fire cases were also reported during the filling of T/Ls.  While filling the 4th 
chamber of a T/L at a filling point, when the driver inserted the loading arm 
into the chamber, after filing 79 litres of the product, a fire broke out inside the 
chamber.   
9. Bad housekeeping practices inside and around the PFS also generated fires.  
Wild grass and shrubs caught fire close to the PFS boundary wall.  The fire 
was extinguished by staff immediately with the help of sand buckets, fire 
extinguishers and other fire-fighting equipment.  Cotton waste in the gantry 
parking area caught fire. 
10. An oil soaked cloth of a worker caught fire from an electrical heater.  Burn 
marks were reported on the worker’s body.   
11. During the decantation of 20,000 litres in a T/L, a flame was seen.  Initially 
the fire was extinguished but the driver tried to take the T/L out without 
detaching the hose pipe and the fire again broke out and got out of control. 
12. A fire erupted in a monolith tower.  The monolith circuit breaker tripped off 
and smoke was generated. 
Some causes of fire occurrences could be controlled but some were difficult, as 
they occurred due to external factors.  Inside facilities, fire generation events can be 
minimized with competent personal and appropriate fire-fighting equipments. 
Fire events recorded due to external factors were due to: 
1. A passenger train passed through a railway siding at Track No.1.  A flame 
appeared from the engine, bushes near the passenger track caught on fire. 
2. A T/L was hijacked on a super highway.  It was taken to an unknown place 
in an attempt to steal the product.  While stealing the product T/L caught 
fire. 
3. Natural conditions have also caused fire generation events during the 
operation and maintenance (O & M) of PFS’s.  Due to thunder storms and, 
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lighting volatile fumes caught fire but the fire was extinguished by the 
rainfall.   
4. A car engine, rickshaw and a motor cycle caught fire during refuelling. 
5. Two events were reported due to rocket fire.  A rocket was fired by 
terrorists at a PFS.  Underground storage tanks (UGSTs) are normally 
located closer to the boundary wall; the rocket was fired through the 
boundary wall into the UGST.  It caused a 6 inch diameter hole in the 
boundary wall.  Fuel leaked and contaminated the ground.  An UGST 
caught fire but the  fire was extinguished by the staff immediately. 
6. Fuel storage tanks are also located above the ground level.  In another 
event, a rocket launcher was fired into an above ground fuel storage tank.  
A hole appeared in the tank but  only a minor fire erupted as the tank was 
empty.   
7. A fire erupted in a timber market adjacent to a PFS.  Due to the excessive 
heat the following damages were reported:  8 blue bars burnt   Distribution units melted  Product plates of monolith tower burnt  Spreaders, waste bins, bucket and green segments burnt 
8. A T/L caught fire during fuel transportation.  A cleaner and the driver were 
severely burnt.  
9. T/Ls caught fire due to the nonstop firing by armed persons.  11 cases 
were reported during the year 2010. 
10. A fire occurred due to the burning of tyres at the roof of a repair and 
maintenance shop at a PFS. 
An accident was reported on 23rd April 2010 in which a T/L was exploded at a 
welding shop.  As a result of the explosion, five pedestrian fatalities and four major 
injuries were reported.  The incident took place at a gas welding shop.  During the 
welding of a T/L cover, when the welder ignited a torch, due to the fuel availability in 
the T/L, it caught fire and the T/L exploded.  Security measures within and outside 
PFS facilities were identified as one of the potential causes of fire occurrences.  
During fuel transportation, the T/Ls were completely burnt and within the facility, 
apart from T/L burning cases, other PFS elements such as dispenser units and canopy 
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were also burnt.  The occurrence of the PFS and T/L burning cases were more 
hazardous at those PFS’s that were located closer to the residential areas,  especially 
to those PFS’s that operate closer to schools, hospitals and shopping centres.  In case 
of fire events, there is a potential tendency of huge losses to the people’s lives and 
surrounding infrastructure.  Unstable law and order situation, poor housekeeping 
practices, bad conditions of electrical appliances and carelessness were identified as 
the root causes of fire eruption cases.  Regular monthly fire fighting drills in 
collaboration with local and government fire fighting authorities are recommended to 
reduce the occurrences of fire eruption cases at PFSs.  The government and local fire 
fighting authorities should be provide various route maps to reach the PFS within a 
shortest time period to respond to any emergency case.  If the PFS are located closer 
to each other in congested areas the fire hydrant shall be provided by the fire fighting 
authorities along the road.  So, that in case of any unwanted event the hose pipes can 
be connected directly to these hydrants immediately for fire fighting. 
4.2.6. Electrical Fault (EF) 
Electrical Faults cases during operation and maintenance of PFSs were reported 
due to defects in the electrical components, accessories and appliances.  Electrical 
faults cases were reported to be major and minor in nature.  Fluctuations in the 
electrical fault cases during the 3.5 year data collection period can be observed in 
Figure 4.6.  In the year 2007, during the six month data collection period from July to 
December, 34 cases were reported due to electrical faults.   The total number of 
electrical fault cases decreased in the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 with 97, 69 and 18 
cases reported, respectively. 
In the year 2007, the number of cases reported due to electrical faults was 7, 8 and 
4 during the months of July, August and September, respectively.  However, from 
October to December 5 cases were identified monthly. 
Considerable fluctuations in electrical fault cases can be observed in Figure 4.6 
for the year 2008.  A total of 97 cases reported were related to electrical faults in the 
year 2008.  It contributed to 8% in the HCFs for the year.   It can be observed that the 
number of electrical fault cases fluctuated throughout the year and reached to 9 cases. 
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Figure 4.6: Annual Trend of EF for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
However, there was a sudden increment in electrical fault cases in Jan. 2009 to 18 
cases.  However, with some minor fluctuations in some months, the trend of electrical 
faults seemed to reduce till the end of the year.  The drop in the electrical fault cases 
continued to be recorded in the year 2010.  During the year 2010, 18 cases were 
reported.  One fatality case was reported due to electric shock during cleaning of a 
signboard. 
The root causes of electrical fault cases were identified as follows: 
1. Damage was found in internal parts of the main master switch of the battery 
and stabilizer jacks. 
2. Short circuits, poor electrical appliance conditions and voltage fluctuations in 
the 800 watt turbine used for filling the main water tank, sockets, power plug 
of biometric machine, transformer coil, magnetic contactor of the HSD motor 
and a case where the winding of the water pump motor was burnt.   
3. Overheating of the single pole 220 Volt supply breaker caused the light pole to 
be burnt.  Bad wiring conditions generated sparks in the motor.   








































































5. Defects in the electrical components of the uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) system of the closed circuit television (CCTV) went out of order, and 
while refuelling the refueller, the polyurethane tube burst.   
6. An improper earthing current was found in the pole. 
7. The spark arrestor of the T/L was found to be missing. 
8. The power supply of the dispenser unit, air conditioner wiring, electrical 
sockets, distribution fuses and electrical heaters were reported burnt. 
9. Electrical short circuiting cases were reported due to the heating up of power 
plugs and switch gears.  Electrical fixtures such as tube lights and bulbs were 
burnt in the canopy and laboratory due to the usage of incompatible wiring 
and fixtures. 
Electrical effects posed a higher tendency to generate fire.  The availability of 
volatile organic compounds in the PFS environment can cause a fire to erupt on a 
large scale and create a catastrophic loss to humans, property and the environment.  
The root causes of cases were identified as the poor condition of electrical appliances 
and electrical wiring.  Electrical appliances include electrical heaters, air conditioners, 
distribution control panel boards, disconnect switches, circuit breakers, and motor 
control centres.  The condition of the electrical equipment can be improved and can 
significantly reduce electrical fault cases with the appropriate planning and 
scheduling.  Some cases were reported due to natural conditions such as blinking of 
lights at PFS’s and the causation of fire in blue bars and company electrical signages.  
These cases are beyond the control of human beings but they can be minimized by 
using good quality electrical appliances.  Another cause of electrical sparks is the use 
of an incompatible electrical lighting system within the facility.  A normal lighting 
system is not suitable as volatile organic compounds may generate ignitable fumes.  
During the PFS inspection, it was recorded that at many PFS’s, the normal electrical 
systems were found not to be in good condition.  Scheduled inspections and close 
monitoring of the electrical equipment may be worthwhile to reduce electrical fault 
cases during the operation and maintenance of the PFS’s.  The severity of the 
electrical fault cases could be minor or major.  Minor cases are mostly from minor 
sparks of electrical faults and fire.  On a major scale, it has the potency to cause fatal 
electrical shocks. 
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4.2.7. Miscellaneous Cases (MC) 
Oil spillages, water leakages, snakebite cases, minor/major damages, maintenance 
issues, robbery, theft, natural disasters/wind storms and law & order situations were 
grouped under miscellaneous cases (MC).  A graphical representation of the 3.5 year 
data collection period of MC on an annual basis is represented in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7: Annual Trends of MC for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
Noticeable increments and decrements in MC can be observed in Figure 4.7 
during each year.  Throughout the data collection period, 716 cases pertaining to MC 
were reported.  They contributed to 22.3 % of the HCFs for the data collection period.  
Overall, MC was found to be the 2nd most occurring cases in the HCFs.  During six 
month duration of the year 2007, 158 non-compliances were reported.  Whereas, for 
the year 2008, 2009 and 2010, the number of non-compliances reported were 279, 198 
and 81, respectively. 
For the six month duration of the year 2007, the MC flow pattern was not 
constant.  On average, 26 cases related to MC were recorded each month.  The 
maximum and minimum number of cases reported was 36 and 20, in the months of 






































































A sudden reduction in non-compliances can be observed from December 2007 to 
January 2008.  In Figure 4.7, it can be noticed that the overall hazard contributing 
pattern progressed continuously.  It increased from the beginning of the year till 
November 2008.  The maximum number of non-compliances reported was 53 in the 
month of November.  However, in the month of December, it fell abruptly to 30 
cases.  It can be observed in Figure 4.7 that in the year 2008 highest non-compliances 
were recorded in comparison to the years 2009 and 2010. 
For the year 2009 a gradual reduction in MC was observed in Figure 4.7.  From 
January to December, the non-compliances decreased linearly at a constant rate.  The 
maximum of 36 and the minimum of 1 non-compliance MC was reported during the 
year. 
Slight fluctuations were observed in Figure 4.7 in non-compliances patterns for 
the year 2010.  No non-compliance was recorded in the month of November or 
December.  On average, 7 cases were recorded monthly.  The lowest number of non-
compliances was reported in the year 2010 in comparison to the years 2008 and 2009.  
It might have been due to the successful implementation of control measures to 
reduce occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe conditions during the operation and 
maintenance of the PFS’s. 
The non-compliances under MC were recorded due to: 
1. Worn out of refuellers and buffer couplings at high speed diesel (HSD) filling 
points and oil leakage cases were reported.  Leakages were also reported due 
to pin holes in the mechanical seals of pumps, loose couplings and packaging 
deterioration of gate valves. 
2. The loading arm used to fill oil in T/Ls found to leak. 
3. The gasket packing of the T/L valves recorded to be completely worn out 
which caused the spillage of the product during the filling of the T/L 
compartment. 
4. Leakages in the delivery valve which caused 15 litres of spillage of the 
product.   
5. The poppet seal of the hose coupling found to have leaked during aircraft 
refuelling. 
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6. Crack development at the bottom of the foam mobile unit; l0 leakage cases 
were recorded. 
7. The use of incompatible couplings were recorded during filling of UGST. 
8. The air release valve of T/Ls found to leak. 
9. Thunder storms/cyclones causing falling of signboards, trees, dispenser units 
and the breaking of window glass. 
10. The joints of stairs and swing ladders found to be damaged.   
11. Tyre hub studs found in deteriorated conditions. 
12. Walkway steps, roof sheets of T/Ls, boundary wall barbed wires and splash 
trays found in deteriorated conditions. 
13. Decantation hose found damaged and emergency fuel shut off system of the 
refuelling not working appropriately. 
14. HSD splashes by a worker during connecting the tank wagon hose pipe with 
the product transferring pipe. 
15. Intruders entered into the facility and taking away valuable items from the 
PFS. 
16. A bomb blast incident was reported on 25th October 2010 in front of a PFS.  It 
caused damage to spreaders, IN/Out signs, company name plate, company 
signboard tower and C-store signage. 
17. Snatching case reported in which three snatchers entered into the retail outlet 
and took cash and the mobile phones of the retail outlet staff. 
18. A rally passing by in front of the retail outlet; some angry people entered into 
the fuel station and damaged a display board of the distribution unit, spreaders 
and lube signs.   
19. A filling operator being just saved from a bullet, which was fired by a nearby 
person outside the facility.  The bullet just passed close to the filling operator; 
fortunately the operator was saved. 
20. A bomb blast occurred at the Marriott Hotel Islamabad; glasses of shop & 
office blocks were broken at the two retail outlets. 
21. A tank was over flown and 86 liters of oil was spilled. 
22. Leakages observed from the pneumatic valves, aircraft couplings and pipes.  A 
trestle wheel was also reported broken during refuelling of an aircraft. 
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23. On site leakages reported due to improper maintenance and equipment 
handling at the loading arm of the gantry from skin valves, deadman pipe of 
the refueller and the pump shaft coupling valve. 
24. Cases of trees falling on vehicles and transformers being reported. 
25. The falling of trees due to hurricanes and heavy storms on barbed wires at 
boundary walls and inside the facilities’ walkways also reported. 
Occurrences of robberies cases were also reported at PFS’s.  Major and minor 
injuries to staff were reported during these events.  Major injuries/burns were also 
reported due to compressed natural gas (CNG) explosions in office blocks.  Product 
leakages from T/Ls during fuel transportation were also reported.  The occurrences of 
miscellaneous cases could be controlled with appropriate scheduled inspections and 
close monitoring. 
4.2.8. Medical Treatment Cases (MTC) 
The occurrences of major and minor injuries during the operation and maintenance of 
petrol filling station generate lost time injury events or absence of workers from the 
workplace.  Ultimately, it affected the safety statistics of the operating company.  
Medical treatment cases include injury cases on face, eyes, head, neck, arms, hands, 
legs, feet, trunk, back and in internal body parts.  Most of the major and minor injury 
cases were recorded during normal routine fuel station operational hours.  Apart from 
these, a strong correlation of medical treatment cases noticed with transportation 
hazards, slips, trips and fall, carelessness and housekeeping practices. 
The fluctuations in MTC can be observed in Figure 4.8.  Hazard contributing 
factors recorded during the 3.5 year data collection period pertaining to MTC 
contributed to approximately 7.9%.  In the six month duration period of the year 
2007, 69 MTC were recorded.  For the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, the number of 
MTC due to unsafe acts and unsafe conditions was 61, 87 and 39, respectively.  The 
maximum number of MTC was recorded in the year 2009 but the year 2007 could be 




Figure 4.8: Annual Trends of MTC for 3.5 Years Data Collection Period 
The highest and lowest number of MTC recorded in the months of August and 
September was 15 and 8 cases, respectively. 
Medical treatment cases reported during the year 2008 were mainly due to slips, 
trips and falls, carelessness and transportation hazards.  A total of 61 MTC were 
recorded in the year 2008.  A maximum of 16 cases were reported in the month of 
November.  During January, February and May, no MTC were recorded. 
It can be observed in Figure 4.8 that the number of occurrences of MTC in the 
year 2009 was significantly high.  Noticeable fluctuations can be observed in the first 
four months of the year.  A maximum number of 21 cases due to MTC was observed 
in the month of March.  The MTC cases from May to September were found to be 
slightly unstable.  A slight increase in cases was recorded in the month of October and 
then it reduced gradually to 1 case in the month of January. 
The number of MTC reported in the year 2010 was not significantly high as 
compared to the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.  Only 39 cases were reported during the 





































































The MTC recorded were due to: 
1. Breathing problems  reported due to prolonged working hours at PFS’s under 
VOCs.  Stomach pain was reported due to food poisoning by the workers.   
2. Cases pertaining to raise of workers blood pressure levels, unconsciousness, 
nausea; low blood pressure, lung problems and severe head pain were also 
reported. 
3. Workers’ trips and slips, where they sustained major and minor injuries on 
their legs, hands and arms. 
4. Minor MTC which included insect attacks on workers during shift hours were 
reported.  Although workers with severe bites were taken to the nearby 
hospital.  Allergies and swelling observed on affected body parts.  The 
affected body parts were face, legs and hands.   
5. HSD and paint drops splashed into workers eyes.  Severe pain and irritation 
were reported.  Eyes were washed and eye ointment was applied.  
Carelessness was found to be the root cause. 
6. Various office places in the PFS’s found to be ergonomically unfit.  Workers 
also complained of back pain due to ergonomically unfit workplace. 
7. Workers slipped due to unsatisfactory housekeeping conditions at T/Ls stairs 
and in the wash room.  Workers sustained major and minor injuries. 
8. Workers’ dizziness and unconsciousness cases reported due to volatile organic 
carbons. 
9. While robbery incident at PFS, injuries on the cashier’s leg and other body 
parts were reported. 
Minor injuries were handled with first aid treatment that was available at the site 
while for the major injuries, the patients were taken to the nearby hospital.  One 
fatality was reported on 11th November 2008.  Heart attack was identified as the root 
cause of the patient’s death.  In another event, a driver became unconscious due to 
severe pain in his chest; he was taken to the hospital.  The cause of chest pain was 
confirmed as heart attack by the doctors.  MTC also occurred either due to unsafe acts 
or due to unsafe conditions at the workplace.   
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4.3. Statistical Analysis of Hazard Contributing Factors 
A test of correlation was performed on the data collected during the study period.  The 
test was performed to determine the dependency of the HCFs on each other.  The 
statistical analyses of the monthly HCFs were performed using a statistical package of 
social sciences (SPSS) version 18.0.  However, for the year 2007, the test of 
correlation was performed using only six months of data (July to December).  All 
correlation analyses results were presented as a correlation matrix for the data 
collection period.  Pearson’s correlation was performed among the 8 HCFs.  The 
correlation matrix contained 8 rows and 8 columns.  The1st row and 1st column 
represented the HCFs.  Each cell showed the correlation among the variables in the 
rows and the respective columns and contained 3 values: the correlation coefficient, 
level of significance and N, number of months.  The results of the correlation tests for 
the 3.5 year study period, i.e., for the year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are presented in 
the following sections.  
4.3.1. Correlation within the HCFs for the year 2007 
A test of correlation within the HCFs for the year 2007 was conducted and presented 
in the correlation matrix in Table 4.1.  It can be observed that there is a strong 
correlation existing among HK, STF and C.   
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Table 4.1:  Correlation Matrix for the Year 2007 






1        
Sig. (2-tailed) .        






.488 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .326 .       






.865(*) .698 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .026 .123 .      






.811 .055 .498 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .050 .918 .314 .     






.717 .473 .536 .805 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .109 .344 .273 .053 .    






.666 .309 .797 .472 .450    
Sig. (2-tailed) .148 .552 .058 .344 .370    






.590 .184 .728 .247 -.077 .619 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .217 .727 .101 .637 .885 .190 .  






.485 .509 .788 .183 .334 .922(**) .546 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .329 .302 .063 .729 .517 .009 .262 . 
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation of HK with STF and C was found to be 0.865 and 0.811, with a 
significance value of 0.026 and 0.050, respectively.  This indicates that STF and C 
non compliances were mainly contributed by HK.  TH was found not to be correlated 
to any of the other 7 variables (level of significance >0.05).  FR has a correlation 
value of 0.805 with a significance level of 0.053 with C.   It was found that EF 
correlates to MTC and STF, with a correlation co-efficient of 0.797 and 0.922, with a 
significance value of 0.058 and 0.009, respectively. 
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4.3.2. Correlation within the HCFs for the year 2008 
A test of correlation was performed for the year 2008.  A total number of 1,203 HCFs 
were analyzed.  The results of the correlation are represented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix for the Year 2008 






1        
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.        






.761(**) 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.004 .       






.176 .441 1      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.584 .151 .      






.629(*) .626(*) .554 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.028 .030 .062 .     






.221 .152 .064 .25 1    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.490 .638 .843 .42 .    





.320 .533 .682(*) .57 -.29 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.311 .074 .014 .05 .35 .   




.746(**) .700(*) .560 .9(**) .16 .656(*) 1  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.005 .011 .058 .00 .61 .021 .  




.652(*) .726(**) .629(*) .7(**) .24 .629(*) .777(**) 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.022 .008 .029 .00 .44 .029 .003 . 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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It can be observed in Table 4.2 that HK has strong correlation with TH, C, MC, 
and MTC.  The correlation level of HK with these 4 HCFs was considerably high.  
The correlation of HK with TH, C, MC and MTC was found to be 0.761, 0.629, 0.761 
and 0.652, respectively.  It indicates that a significant number of HCFs recorded 
during the year 2008 occurred due to TH, C, MC and MTC.  It can be viewed that C 
was significantly correlated with HK, TH, EF, MC and MTC.  Perfect significance 
was found between C and MC.  The cases recorded pertaining to FR during 2008 was 
found to be less in correlation and significance level with the remaining 7 variables.   
The variables STF, C, MC and MTC were recorded in high correlation and 
significance level with EF.  It can also be observed in Table 4.2 that MC and MTC 
have low values of correlation co-efficient and significance levels with FR; although, 
MC and MTC have high co-efficient of correlation and significance levels with the 
remaining 7 variables. 
4.3.3. Correlation within the HCFs for the year 2009 
A test of correlation was performed among 902 HCFs recorded during the year 2009.  
The results of the correlation matrix are presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix for the Year 2009 






1        
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.        






.471 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.122 .       






.164 .835(**) 1      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.611 .001 .      






.782(**) .827(**) .557 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.003 .001 .060 .     






.727(**) .237 -.060 .537 1    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.007 .457 .853 .072 .    






.490 .834(**) .788(**) .805(**) .424 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.106 .001 .002 .002 .169 .   






.378 .946(**) .827(**) .713(**) .128 .843(**) 1  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.225 .000 .001 .009 .691 .001 .  






.328 .843(**) .868(**) .696(*) .219 .864(**) .787(**) 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.298 .001 .000 .012 .494 .000 .002 . 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
It can be observed that during the year 2009, HK was found in significant 
correlation with C and FR.  HK was recorded in correlation with C and FR with 
values of 0.782 and 0.727, respectively.  TH was found in correlation with STF cases, 
C cases, EF cases, MC and MTC with values of 0.835, 0.827, 0.834, 0.946, and 0.843, 
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respectively.  TH was found in perfect correlation with MC.  It can also be seen in 
Table 4.3 that STF was highly correlated with a good significance level with TH, EF, 
MC and MTC.  Perfect correlation can be observed between EF and MTC. 
4.3.4. Correlation within the HCFs for the year 2010 
A test of correlation for the year 2010 was performed on 437 HCFs.  The correlation 
matrix for the year 2010 is represented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4:  Correlation Matrix for the Year 2010 




1        
Sig. (2-tailed)         




-.075 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .817        




.186 .154 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .562 .632       




.166 .090 .755** 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .606 .782 .005      




.095 .191 .238 .596* 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .770 .553 .456 .041     




-.178 .665* .400 .335 .104 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .580 .018 .197 .288 .747    




.242 .099 .846** .850** .318 .293 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .759 .001 .000 .314 .355   




.192 .028 -.068 -.231 -.379 .245 .095 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .550 .932 .834 .470 .224 .442 .769  
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
A perfect correlation between MC and C can be observed in Table 4.4 with co-
efficient of correlation of 0.850.  It showed that during the year 2010, mainly MTC 
occurred due to C.  The lower value of the correlation co-efficient indicated that 
during the year 2010, the HCFs were found less inter-related with each other in 
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comparison to the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.  It was due to the improvement in 
workers unsafe behaviour and management supervision. 
A summary of the correlation tests for the 3.5 year study, i.e., for the years 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5:  Summary Table for Test of Correlation for the Study Period 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HK STF, C 
TH, C, MC, 
MTC 
C, FR  
TH  
HK, C, MC, 
MTC 


















FR C, MC  HK C 
EF STF, MTC 
TH, STF, C, 
MC, MTC 





STF, C, EF, 
MTC 
TH, STF, C, 
EF, MTC 
STF, C 
MTC STF, EF 
HK, TH, 
STF, C, EF, 
MC 
TH, STF, C, 
EF, MC 
 
Table 4.1, Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 can be summarized with the help of 
Table 4.5.  It can be seen in Table 4.5 that during the six month duration of the year 
2007, HCFs were found to be less dependent upon each other.  In the years 2008 and 
2009, the dependency among the HCFs increased due to a significant number of  
HSE non-compliance occurrences.  In the year 2010, again the dependency among the 
HCFs was reduced due to improvements in working conditions and good management 
supervision.  In the year 2010, a significant number of HCFs were reported 
particularly to that HCF category.  Improvement in that area can be achieved with 
specifically designed safety training programs, worker education and standard 
operating procedures.   
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4.4. Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances based upon F, A, I and NM Cases 
Occurrences of HSE non-compliances reported during the operation and maintenance 
of PFS’s were categorized into four categories: fatality, accident, incident and near 
miss cases. 
4.4.1. Fatality Causation 
The number of fatality cases recorded during the 3.5 year data collection period for 
the study was plotted in Figure 4.9.  In Figure 4.9, it was observed that 9 fatality cases 
were reported throughout the period.  No fatality case was reported during the six 
month duration period for the year 2007.  During the year 2008, 4 fatality cases were 
reported in the months of February, April, September, and November, respectively.  
During the year 2009, 1 fatality case was reported in the month of July.  In the year 
2010, the occurrences of fatality cases were found again to increase with 1 fatality 
case each in the months of April, July, August and October. 
 
Figure 4.9: Annual Trends of Fatality Cases Occurrences for 3.5 Years Data 
Collection Period 
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4.4.2. Accident Causation 
An accident was defined as “unexpected happenings that may cause loss or injuries to 
people who are not at fault for causing the injuries”.  Significant fluctuations in 
accident occurrences during the 3.5 year data collection period were plotted in  
Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10: Annual Trends of Accident Cases Occurrences for 3.5 Years Data 
Collection Period 
In Figure 4.10, it was observed that a total number of 428 accident cases were 
recorded during this study period.  In the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, the 
number of accident cases recorded was at 48, 91, 101, and 188, respectively.  Various 
causes of the accident occurrences were identified. 
In the year 2007, 48 accident cases were recorded due to transportation hazards 
(TH).   The highest number of accident cases was reported in the month of July with 
23 cases.  In the year 2008, 91 accident cases were reported due to TH, FR and MC.  
The accident cases reported were mainly due to TH.  In each month of August and 
October, 1 accident case was reported due to FR.  Also, 1 accident case was reported 
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For the year 2009, 101 accident cases were recorded.  Accident cases mainly 
occurred due to TH.  During the year 2009, 93 accident cases were recorded due to 
TH.  1 accident was reported due to FR.  The number of accident cases reported due 
to EF and MTC, was 4 and 3, respectively. 
In the year 2010, 188 accident cases were reported.  In the month of July, the 
highest number of accident cases reported was 38.  Multiple causes of accident 
occurrences were noticed in the year 2010.  TH remains to be the significant 
contributory factor for accident causation during the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
Other contributory factors were C, FR, MC and MTC.  During the year 2010, 139, 4, 
21, 3, 9 and 12 cases were recorded due to TH, C, FR, EF, MC and MTC, 
respectively. 
4.4.3. Incident Causation 
An incident can be defined as “An undesired event which, under slightly different 
circumstances, could have resulted in harm to people or loss of process”.  The number 
of incident cases recorded during the 3.5 year data collection period for this study was 
plotted in Figure 4.11.  In Figure 4.11, it can be observed that the incident occurrences 
pattern was unstable throughout the data collection period.  During the 3.5 year study 
period, 975 incident cases were reported.  It contributed to 30.3% of the overall 
hazardous events recorded.  During the six month duration of the year 2007, 239 
incident cases were reported.  A total number of 352, 238 and 146 incident cases were 
reported in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively. 
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Figure 4.11: Annual Trends of Incident Cases Occurrences for 3.5 Years Data 
Collection Period 
In the year 2007, 239 incident cases were reported.  These cases were reported for 
the six month duration period.  The flow pattern of incident occurrences can be 
observed in Figure 4.11. The highest, 57, and the lowest, 34 number of incident cases 
were reported in the month of August and December, respectively.  Multiple causes of 
incident occurrences were noticed.  Incident cases pertaining to MTC were 65 and 
were the highest.  It shows that the occurrences of major and minor injuries to 
workers causing the incident cases were of high significance.  STF and MC were also 
found to be high in causing incident cases.  A total of 104 incident cases were 
recorded due to STF and MC.  STF and MC each caused 52 cases.  The number of 
incident cases reported pertaining to TH were 40.  The number of incident cases 
reported was 10, 9, 6 and 5 due to EF, C, FR and HK, respectively.  Noticeably, 6 
incidents pertaining to FR were recorded during the six month duration.  It shows a 
high tendency of any catastrophic incident due to FR at PFS’s to possess a high 
potential.  Minor negligence could be the cause of multiple injuries to workers, as 
well as accidents and fatalities.  The FR also has the tendency to cause significant loss 
























































A total number of 353 incident cases were reported during the year 2008.  The 
highest was 58 and the lowest was 11 incident cases reported in the months of 
September and June, respectively.  Incident cases occurred in all 8 HCFs with 
multiple causes.  The dominant incident cases were caused due to STF and MC.  
During 2008, 76 and 73 incident cases occurred due to STF and MC, respectively.  
Carelessness also contributed significantly to cause incident cases.  A total number of 
61 incident cases occurred due to C during the year.  The importance of TH to cause 
incident cases remained significant during the year.  It was found that incidents 
pertaining to TH happened within the facility and outside the facility.  The number of 
incident cases recorded due to TH was 56.  No incident cases were found to be due to 
HK practices.  FR and EF also contributed to cause incident cases.  The number of 
incident cases related to FR was12 and EF was16 as recorded during the year. 
In the year 2009, 238 incident cases were reported.  The highest number of 58 
cases was recorded in the month of March.   Every month on an average basis, 20 
cases were reported.  The lowest number of 6 cases was recorded in the month of 
December.  Various root causes for incident occurrences were noticed.  The incident 
cases mainly occurred due to MTC, STF, TH, MC, C, FR and EF.  No incident case 
was reported due to HK practices.  A significant number of incident cases occurred 
due to MTC and STF.  The number of incident cases reported were 81 and 68 due to 
MTC and STF, respectively.  The number of incident cases reported due to TH, MC, 
C, FR and EF were 27, 26, 16, 15 and 13, respectively. 
In the year 2010, 149 incident cases were reported.  It can be observed in 
Figure 4.11 that no incident case was reported in the month of August and September.  
The highest of 32 and the lowest of 2 incident cases were recorded in the months of 
February and July, respectively.  All 8 HCFs caused occurrences of incidents except 
HK.  A significant number of incident cases was reported due to MC and STF.  The 
number of incident cases reported due to MC and STF were 41 and 28, respectively.  
The number of incidents cases reported due to MTC, TH, FR, C and EF were 25, 20, 
15, 12 and 7, respectively. 
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4.4.4. Near Miss Causation 
A near miss can be defined as “The hazardous event that possess a tendency to cause 
fatality, accident or incident cases”.  Near miss cases were associated with the 
working environment.  A total number of 1,804 near miss cases recorded during the 
3.5 year data collection period for this study were plotted in Figure 4.12.  The highest 
number of near miss cases was recorded during the year 2008. 
 
Figure 4.12: Annual Trends of Near Miss Cases Occurrences for 3.5 Years Data 
Collection Period 
In the year 2007, during the 6 month period, 387 near miss cases were recorded.  
It can be observed in Figure 4.12 that the highest number of 112 near miss cases was 
reported in the year 2007 during the month of August.  The lowest number of 38 cases 
was reported in the month of October.  On average, 65 near miss cases occurred in 
each month. 
A progressing near miss occurrence pattern for the year 2008 can be observed in 
the Figure 4.12.  A total number of 756 near miss cases was recorded during the12 
month duration of the year.  On average, 63 near miss cases were reported in each 





























































November and February, respectively.  In the months of August, September and 
December, the number of near miss cases recorded was 85, 85 and 99, respectively. 
In the 12 month data collection period for the year 2009, 562 near miss cases were 
recorded.  The highest, 117, and the lowest, 1, near miss case was recorded in the 
months of December and January, respectively.  A significant fluctuating trend of 
near miss occurrences can be observed in Figure 4.12.  A significant number of near 
miss cases was recorded during the initial months of the year.  It was found that the 
near miss cases which occurred throughout the year consisted mainly of 7 HCFs.  No 
near miss case was recorded due to FR.  A significant number of near miss cases was 
reported due to MC, STF, C and TH.  Due to MC, 172; STF, 134; C, 89 and TH, 70 
cases were recorded.  The number of near miss cases recorded due to EF, HK and 
MTC were 52, 42, and 3, respectively. 
A noticeable reduction in near miss cases for the year 2010 can be observed in 
Figure 2.12.  During the 12 month duration of 2010, only 99 near miss cases were 
recorded.  From the period of July to December no near miss case was reported.  The 
highest, 34, and the lowest, 3, near miss cases were recorded in the months of 
February and May, respectively.  In the year 2010, a significant number of near miss 
cases were recorded due to MC.  Due to MC, C, and STF, the number of near miss 
cases recorded were 31, 24, and 21, respectively.  Whereas due to EF, TH, MTC and 
FR, the number of near miss cases reported was 8, 7, 4, 2 and 1, respectively. 
Safety conscious companies make a near miss a big deal.  Near misses are not 
funny; they are often deadly.  Reporting of near misses should be encouraged in 
organizations.  In initial stage for similar near miss cases immediate action need to be 
taken to prevent recurrences.  Near misses can be considered as warnings that 
something or someone is not performing the job correctly. 
4.5. Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances based upon their Impact on People, 
the Environment and Company Assets 
The third distribution of HSE non-compliances on the 3.5 year duration data was 
carried out with reference to their impact on people, the environment and company 
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assets.  A monthly and quarterly distribution of HSE non-compliances was performed.  
The mutual effects of all three classifications were studied.  It includes: 
1. The effects of HCFs to cause Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss cases, 
2. The effects of HCFs with reference to effects on people, the environment and 
company assets, and  
3. The relationship among Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss cases with 
reference to their effects on people, the environment and company assets. 
The tables attached in Appendix-D highlight the relationship among the mutual 
effects of all three classifications on a monthly and quarterly basis.  This section was 
not covered completely in this study.  The effects of the HCFs and HSE non-
compliances to cause Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss cases were covered 
and discussed in detail. 
4.6. Statistical Analysis for F, A, I and NM Causation 
A test of correlation was performed by using the windows based SPSS (statistical 
package of social sciences) version 18.0.  Pearson’s correlation test was performed.  It 
can be observed in Table 4.6 that N=6 because for the year 2007, 6 months of data 
was analyzed.  Whereas, for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, 12 months of data was 
analyzed therefore N=12. 
4.6.1. Correlation within F, A, I and NM cases for the year 2007 
Test of correlations within 674 HSE non-compliances for the year 2007 was 
conducted and presented in the correlation matrix in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6: Correlations between F, A, I and NN Cases for the Year 2007 
 F A I NM 
F 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 6    
A 
Pearson Correlation -.119 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .822    
N 6 6   
I 
Pearson Correlation -.357 -.178 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .487 .736   
N 6 6 6  
N 
Pearson Correlation -.495 -.194 .822* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .318 .712 .045  
N 6 6 6 6 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The level of correlation was significant at the level of 0.05.  It can be observed in 
Table 4.6 that a significant correlation with a value of 0.045 exists among the incident 
and near miss cases.  No significant correlation was found among the other variables. 
4.6.2. Correlation within F, A, I and NM Cases for the year 2008 
A test of correlation was performed for the year 2008.  A correlation matrix for the 
test of correlation was presented in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Correlations between F, A, I and NM Cases for the year 2008 
 F A I NM 
F 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 12    
A 
Pearson Correlation .075 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .817    
N 12 12   
I 
Pearson Correlation .247 .231 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .440 .470   
N 12 12 12  
NM 
Pearson Correlation -.011 .008 .708* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .972 .979 .010  
N 12 12 12 12 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
A correlation among 1,203 HSE non-compliances was calculated with reference 
to four variables, i.e., fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  In the 12 month 
duration of the year 2008, 5 fatalities, 90 accidents, 352 incidents and 756 near miss 
cases were recorded.  A significant correlation can be observed in Table 4.7 among 
the incident and near miss cases.  The Pearson Correlation co-efficient among 
incidents and near misses was 0.708 with a significance level of 0.10.  The correlation 
among the variables was significant at the 0.05 level. 
4.6.3. Correlation within F, A, I and NM Cases for the year 2009 
Test of correlation within 902 HSE non-compliances for the year 2009 was conducted 
and presented in the correlation matrix in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8: Correlations between F, A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2009 
 F A I NM 
F 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .    
N 12    
A 
Pearson Correlation .052 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .871 .   
N 12 12   
I 
Pearson Correlation .056 .151 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .862 .639 .  
N 12 12 12  
NM 
Pearson Correlation -.209 .089 .836(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .515 .782 .001 . 
N 12 12 12 12 
      ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
For the year 2009, 902 HSE non-compliances were recorded and these contributed 
to 1 fatality, 101 accidents, 238 incidents and 562 near miss cases.  The correlation 
among the variables was found to be significant at the level of 0.01.  In the year 2009, 
a strong Pearson’s Correlation can be observed in Table 4.8 between incident and near 
miss cases.  The Pearson Correlation coefficient among incident and near miss was 
0.836 with significance level of 0.001. 
4.6.4. Correlation within F, A, I and NM Cases for the year 2010 
Test of correlation within 437 HSE non-compliances for the year 2010 was conducted 
and is presented in the correlation matrix in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9: Correlations between F, A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2010 
 F A I NM 
F 
Pearson Correlation 1    
Sig. (2-tailed)     
N 12    
A 
Pearson Correlation .515 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .086    
N 12 12   
I 
Pearson Correlation -.206 -.475 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .521 .118   
N 12 12 12  
NM 
Pearson Correlation .016 -.273 .874** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .962 .390 .000  
N 12 12 12 12 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
For the year 2010, 437 HSE non-compliances were recorded and contributed to 7 
fatalities, 186 accidents, 146 incidents and 99 near miss cases.  During one hazardous 
event 4 fatality cases were reported. 
The correlation among the variables was found to be significant at the level of 
0.01.  In the year 2010, a strong Pearson’s Correlation can be observed in Table 4.9 
between fatality and accident cases.  The Pearson’s Correlation co-efficient among 
fatality and accident cases was 0.15 with a significance level of 0.086. A perfect 
Pearson Correlation with a value of 0.874 among near miss and incident cases was 
also recorded. 
4.7. Relationship among HCFs and occurrences of F, A, I and NM Cases 
The relationship among the HCFs and the occurrences of fatalities, accidents, 




Table 4.10: Relationship Among HCFs and Occurrences of Fatality Cases 
Period 
Fatality 
HK TH STF C FR EF MC MTC 
2007 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2009 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 0 
Total 0 5 0 2 5 1 1 0 
It can be observed in Table 4.10 that a total number of 14 fatality cases were 
reported during the 3.5 year study period.  TH and FR can be observed as the most 
significant cause of fatality cases.  A total number of 5 fatality cases were reported  
each due to TH and FR.  C and EF contributed to cause 2, and 1, fatality cases, 
respectively.  1 fatality case was reported due to MC. 
Table 4.11: Relationship Among HCFs and Occurrences of Accident Cases 
Period 
Accident 
HK TH STF C FR EF MC MTC 
2007 0 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 87 0 0 2 1 0 0 
2009 0 93 0 0 1 4 0 3 
2010 0 139 0 4 21 3 9 12 
Total 0 366 0 4 24 8 9 15 
In Table 4.11, the relationship among the HCFs and accident cases can be 
observed.  It can be viewed that TH caused a dominant number of accidents as 
compared to the remaining seven HCFs.  A total number of 366 accident cases were 
reported due to TH during the study period.  The highest number, at 139 accident 
cases, was reported due to TH in the year 2010.  24 accident cases occurred due to 




Table 4.12: Relationship Among HCFs and Occurrences of Incident Cases 
Period 
Incident 
HK TH STF C FR EF MC MTC 
2007 5 40 52 9 6 10 52 65 
2008 0 56 76 61 12 16 73 58 
2009 0 27 68 8 15 13 26 81 
2010 0 20 28 12 15 7 41 25 
Total 5 143 224 90 48 46 192 226 
Table 4.12 highlights the relationship among the HCFs and incident cases.  It can 
be observed in Table 4.12 that the highest number of incident cases, 226, was reported 
to be MTC.  STF were also identified as significant contributory factors to cause 
incident cases.  A total number of 224 incidents cases were reported due to STF.  The 
3rd and 4th incident occurring HCFs identified were MC and TH.  The total number of 
incident cases reported due to MC, and TH was 192, and 143, respectively.    Incident 
cases were also caused by C, FR and EF.  The number of cases reported due to C, FR 
and EF was 90, 48 and 46, respectively.  HK also contributed to cause 5 incident 
cases. 
Table 4.13: Relationship Among HCFs and Occurrences of Near Miss Cases 
Period 
Near Miss 
HK TH STF C FR EF MC MTC 
2007 49 40 85 78 1 24 106 4 
2008 55 109 139 162 3 81 205 2 
2009 42 70 134 89 0 52 172 3 
2010 4 7 21 24 1 8 31 2 
Total 150 226 379 353 5 165 514 11 
In Table 4.13, the relationship among the HCFs and near miss cases can be 
observed.  It can be viewed that the highest number of near miss cases, 514, was 
reported due to MC.  A total number of 379 and 353 near miss cases were reported 
due to STF and C cases.  A significant number of near miss cases were reported due 
to TH and HK practices.  The total number of near miss cases reported due to TH, and 
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HK was 226, and 150, respectively.  The near miss cases reported due to MTC and 
FR were 11 and 5, respectively.   
4.8. Quarterly Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances based upon the HCFs 
Data collected during the study period was reviewed on a quarterly basis.  The year 
2007 data contains two quarters due to the availability of only 6 months of data.  The 
years 2008, 2009 and 2010 data were grouped into 4 quarters in each year.  The 
quarterly distribution of HSE non-compliances was carried out based upon the 
occurrences of HCFs and to cause fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  
Detailed results of the quarterly distribution for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
pertaining to the HCFs are attached in Appendix-A.  Graphical representation of the 
quarterly distribution of HSE non-compliances based upon the HCFs and to cause 
fatality, accident, incident and near miss causation can be observed from Figure 4.13 
to Figure 4.16. 
 
Figure 4.13: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
HCFs for the Year 2007 
The quarterly distribution of the HCFs for the year 2007 can be observed in 
















































quarters significant numbers of HCFs were recorded pertaining to MC. The number of 
MC recorded in quarter 3 and quarter 4 was 94 and 64, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.14: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
HCFs for the Year 2008 
The quarterly distribution of HCFs for the year 2008 can be observed from  
Figure 4.14.  Year 2`008 contains quarterly distribution pattern of four quarters of the  
year 2008.  During the year 2008, 1,203 HCFs were recorded.  In quarter 1, quarter 2, 
quarter 3 and quarter 4, the HCFs recorded were 186, 191, 379 and 447, respectively.  
In quarter 1, highest 50 cases were reported due to STF.  In quarter 2, TH found 
significant.  HCFs recorded pertaining to TH, in quarter 2 were 50.  In quarter 3 and 
quarter 4, MCs occurrences found significant.  In quarter 3 and quarter 4, 94 and 108 



































































Figure 4.15: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
HCFs for the Year 2009 
The quarterly distribution pattern for the year 2009 can be observed from Figure 
4.15.  During the year 902 HCFs were recorded.  A highest 431 and lowest 93, HCFs 
were recorded in quarter 1, and quarter 4, respectively.  In quarter 2 and 3, 217 and 
161, HCFs were reported.  It can be observed from Figure 4.15 that in quarter 1, 
highest cases, 123 were reported due to STF.  In quarter 2 and 3, a highest numbers of 
46 and 44 cases were recorded due to MCs.  In quarter 4, a significant reduction of 
































































Figure 4.16: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
HCFs for the Year 2010 
Noticeable fluctuations in quarterly distribution of HCFs for the year 2010 can be 
observed from Figure 4.16.  During the year 437 HCFs were reported.  A highest 169 
and lowest 44, HCFs were recorded in quarter 1 and quarter 4, respectively.  In 
quarter 2 and quarter 3, 134 and 90, HCFs were recorded.  It can be observed from 
Figure 4.16 that TH caused highest cases in all 4 quarters.  In quarter 1, quarter 2, 
quarter 3 and quarter 4, cases reported due to TH were 46, 45, 57 and 17, respectively. 
A difference in occurrences of HCFs can be observed in all quarters.  It can be 
noticed that some quarters the occurrences of HCFs were more and in some quarters it 
is considerably small.  In all 42 quarters of 3.5 years study period fluctuations in 
occurrences of HCFs can be seen clearly.  For each quarter of the year the HCFs were 






























































Table 4.14: Summary of Quarterly Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances Based 
upon HCFs 
Duration Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
2007 
  
408 266 674 
2008 186 191 379 447 1203 
2009 431 217 161 93 902 
2010 169 134 90 44 437 
Total 786 542 1038 850 3216 
Table 4.14 depicts the summary of quarterly distribution of HSE non compliances 
based upon HCFs.  With reference to Q1 and Q2, a highest numbers of HCFs were 
recorded in the first and second quarter of the year 2009.  In Q3, a highest numbers of 
408, HCFs can be noticed in the year 2007.  Whereas, Q4 in the year 2008 were found 
to be most HCFs occurred period with a total HCFs of 447.  Conclusively, a Q3 
period was found to be most HCFs occurrences period within 3.5 years study period.  
In Q3 which consisted of three months duration i.e. July, August and September, a 
highest numbers of 1038 HCFs were recorded.  Whereas, in Q4, Q1 and Q2 the HCFs 
recorded were 850, 786 and 542, respectively. 
4.9. Quarterly Distribution of HSE Non-compliances based upon F, A, I and NM 
Cases 
3.5 years of HSE non-compliance study period data was distributed on quarterly 
based upon occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  6 months 
of data for the year 2007 and 12 months of data for each year 2008, 2009 and 2010 
were plotted to observe the trend of HSE non-compliances to cause fatality, accident, 
incident and near miss cases.  The quarterly distribution for each year was attached in 
Appendix-A while the graphical representation was plotted in Figure 4.17,  
Figure 4.18, Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20. 
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Figure 4.17: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
F, A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2007 
Figure 4.17 illustrates a quarterly distribution pattern of two quarters for the year 
2007 based upon fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  The data for the year 
2007 consisted of two quarters from July to December 2007.  Each quarter consisted 
of three month duration.  It can observe in Figure 4.17 that quarter 3 is more 
hazardous as compared to quarter 4.  No fatality was reported in either quarter.  
However, In Q3 and Q4, 34 and 14 accident cases were reported.  The number of 
incident cases increased from 93 to 146 from Q3 to Q4 and the number of near misses 








































Figure 4.18: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
F, A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2008 
In the year 2008 during quarters 1, 2, 3 and 4, a progressing pattern of fatality, 
accident, incident and near miss occurrences can be observed in Figure 4.18.  In each 
quarter of the year, one fatality case was reported.  The highest, 34, number of 
accident cases was recorded in quarter 3.  In quarter 4, 113 incident and 313 near miss 
















































Figure 4.19: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
F, A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2009 
A quarterly distribution pattern of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases 
for the year 2009 can be observed in Figure 4.19.  During the 4 quarters of 2009, 902 
HSE non-compliances were recorded.  A significant number of HSE non-compliances 
were recorded in quarter 1.  In quarter 1, 2, 3 and 4, the number of reported  
HSE non-compliances were 431, 217, 161 and 93, respectively.  1 fatality case was 
reported in quarter 3.  The highest number of accidents, 32, was reported in quarter 3.  
The highest number of incidents, 108, and near miss cases, 299, was recorded in 



















































Figure 4.20: Quarterly Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon 
F, A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2010 
During the 3.5 year data collection period, the lowest number of  
HSE non-compliances was recorded during the year 2010.  In the 12 month duration 
of 2010, 437 HSE non-compliances were recorded.  The quarterly distribution pattern 
of HCFs based upon fatality, accident, incident and near miss occurrences can be 
observed in Figure 4.20.  During the year 2010, 4 fatality cases were reported.  In 
quarter 3, 2 fatality cases were reported.  Whereas, 1 fatality case was reported in 
each, quarter 2 and quarter 4, respectively.  The highest number, 169, and the lowest, 
44, of cases were recorded in quarter 1 and quarter 4, respectively.  In quarter 2 and 
quarter 3, 134 and 90 cases were recorded. 
Table 4.15: Summary of Quarterly Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances Based 
upon Occurrences of F, A, I and NM Cases 
No Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
1 F 1 2 4 5 12 
2 A 68 101 166 93 428 
3 I 256 147 312 260 975 
4 NM 461 292 556 495 1804 
 





















































Table 4.15 depicts the summary of the quarterly distribution of the HSE non 
compliances based upon the occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss 
cases.  A total number of 12 fatality cases were recorded during the 3.5 year study 
period.  In any year, the highest number of 5 fatality cases was recorded in Q4.  The 
highest number of accident cases was recorded in Q3; whereas the highest number of 
312  incident cases was also recorded in Q3.  Conclusively, Q3 can be observed as the 
most reported HSE non compliances in the study period.  In Q3, the total number of 
1,038 cases was reported.  In Q1, Q4 and Q2, the total number of cases reported was 
853, 686 and 542, respectively. 
4.10. Seasonal Distribution of the HSE Non-Compliances based upon the 
HCFs 
A strong relation among the HCFs with reference to seasons was observed during the 
3.5 year study period.  The study area contained four seasons: cold, hot, warm and 
monsoon seasons.  The collected data was categorized according to the four seasons.  
The seasons were named as S1, S2, S3 and S4.  Table 4.16 shows the basis for the 
seasonal distribution of HSE non-compliances. 
Table 4.16: Bases for Seasonal Distribution of HSE Non-Compliances 
Cold Season (S1) Hot Season (S2) Warm Season (S3) Monsoon Season (S4) 
Mid Nov to Mid 
April 
Mid April to 
June 
Mid Sept to Mid 
Nov 
July to Mid Sept 
A detailed description of the seasonal hazard occurrences is attached in  
Appendix-A for the years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.  The graphical representation 
of the seasonal variation of the HCFs illustrated from Figure 4.21 to Figure 4.24. 
In Figure 4.21, a seasonal distribution of the HCFs can be viewed.  6 months of 
data from July to December were categorized according to seasons, S3 and S4. 
 164 
 
Figure 4.21: Seasonal Distribution of HCFs for the Year 2007 
A significant fluctuation pattern of the HCFs pattern can be observed in Figure 
4.21.  Occurrences of the dominant numbers of HCFs can be viewed in S4.  A peak in 
STF and MC can be observed.  A total number of 81 and 85 cases related to STF and 
MC were reported in S4. 
A graphical representation of the seasonal hazard distribution for the year 2008 






























































Figure 4.22: Seasonal Distribution of HCFs for the Year 2008 
In Figure 4.22, it can be observed that during 2008, the highest number, 448, and 
the lowest, 153, of HCFs was recorded in S1 and S2, respectively.  During the 
seasons, S3 and S4, the number of HCFs reported was 305 and 153, respectively.  It 
can be observed in Figure 4.22 that during S1, the dominant HCFs recorded were 
pertained to MC, TH, C, and STF.  In S1, TH, MC, C, and STF, caused significant 
numbers of HCFs.  In S3 and S4, the significant HCFs recorded were pertained to 
MC, TH, STF and C. 
In the year 2009, 902 HCFs were recorded.  The seasonal distribution of the HCFs 





































































Figure 4.23: Seasonal Distribution of HCFs for the Year 2009 
The highest, 480, and the lowest, 108, number of HCFs was recorded in S1 and 
S4, respectively.  During S1, the highest number, 128, of cases was recorded due to 
STF.  In S2 and S3, the highest number, 41 and 27, of cases was recorded due to TH.  
During S4, a significant number of cases, 37, 31, and 22, were recorded due to MC, 
TH and STF, respectively. 
For the year 2010, 419 HCFs were recorded.  The seasonal distribution of the 
































































Figure 4.24: Seasonal Distribution of HCFs for the Year 2010 
In Figure 4.24, a fluctuating pattern of HCFs for the year 2010 in all 4 seasons can 
be observed.  The highest number of HCFs was recorded in the S1.  In all four 
seasons, hazardous events pertaining to TH were reported significantly.  A total 
number of 54 and 49 hazardous events related to FR were reported in S1 and S4, 
respectively.  Peaks can be observed in Figure 4.24 related to TH and MC cases.  The 
highest number of hazardous events related to FR was reported in the S2. 
With reference to the seasonal classification for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010, it can be concluded that the occurrences of hazardous events also depends upon 
seasonal changes.  Table 4.17 illustrates the summary of hazardous events based upon 











































































Mid Nov to 
Mid April 
Mid April to 
June 
Mid Sept to 
Mid Nov 
July to Mid Sept 
2007 151 0 160 363 
2008 448 153 305 297 
2009 480 185 108 129 
2010 187 116 46 70 
Total 1266 454 619 859 
In Table 4.17, it can be observed that the highest number of HSE non-
compliances was recorded in the cold season.  The cold season contributed to 39.58% 
of the total occurrences during the study period.  During the Monsoon season (S4) 
that starts from July to Mid September, the second highest numbers of HSE non-
compliances were reported.  In S4, a total number of 856 HSE non-compliances were 
reported with a percentage of 28.68% events of the whole study period.  During S2 
and S3, the number of HSE non-compliances reported was 454 and 619, respectively.  
It can be concluded that safety consideration at PFS’s are more dominantly needed 
during the cold season that starts from Mid November to Mid April.  If attention is 
given to address safety issues at PFS’s during the cold season on a priority basis than 
occurrences of hazardous events during the year can be reduced significantly.  During 
the cold season, TH and FR contributed more hazardous events therefore they should 
be specifically dealt with more care. 
4.11. Seasonal Distribution of the HSE Non-Compliances based upon the 
occurrences of F, A, I and NM Cases 
The HSE non-compliances recorded during 3.5 year study period were categorized 
based upon occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  HCFs 
identified as root causes for the occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near 
miss cases.   A graphical representation of HSE non-compliances for the year 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 was plotted in Figure 4.25, Figure 4.26, Figure 4.27 and  
Figure 4.28.  Whereas, a detail description of seasonal hazards occurrences based 
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upon occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases for the year 2007, 
2008, 2009, and 2010 is attached as in Appendix-A. 
Figure 4.25 was plotted to see the effects of the seasonal variations to cause 
fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  
 
Figure 4.25: Seasonal Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon F, 
A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2007 
It can be observed in Figure 4.25 that in Season S3, the highest number of 
accidents, incidents and near miss cases was reported.  One fatality case was reported 













































Figure 4.26: Seasonal Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon F, 
A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2008 
Figure 4.26 depicts the seasonal distribution pattern for the year 2008.  It can be 
viewed in Figure 4.26 that a total number of 445 cases were reported in the cold 
season, S1.  As compared to S2, S3 and S4; S1 can be considered as the most 
hazardous season during the year 2008. 
 
Figure 4.27: Seasonal Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon F, 































































































Figure 4.27 depicts the seasonal distribution pattern for the year 2009.  It can be 
observed in Figure 4.27 that the highest number of non-compliances was recorded 
during S1.  One fatality case was reported during S4.  A continuous increment in 
accident, incident and near miss cases can be observed from S1 to S2, then S4 and 
finally to S3. 
 
Figure 4.28: Seasonal Distribution Pattern of HSE Non-Compliances Based upon F, 
A, I and NM Cases for the Year 2010 
Figure 4.28 shows the seasonal distribution of the HSE non-compliances based 
upon the F, A, I and NM cases for the year 2010.  Noticeable fluctuations in the 
occurrences of the HSE non-compliances to cause fatality, accident, incident and near 
miss cases can be observed in Figure 4.28.   During the year 2010, a total number of 8 
fatality cases were reported.  In the S2, 4 fatality cases were reported.  Whereas, in the 
S3, and the S4, a total number of 1 and 2 fatality cases were reported, respectively.  
The highest and lowest number of accident cases reported in S4 and S1 was 66 and 
39, respectively. 
The HSE non-compliances for each year in every season were added and  
Figure 4.18 was prepared.  Table 4.18 shows the summary of the seasonal distribution 
pattern to cause fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases during the 3.5 year 




















































Table 4.18: Summary of Seasonal Distribution pattern of HSE Non-Compliances 










Mid Nov to 
Mid April 
Mid April to 
June 
Mid Sept to Mid 
Nov 
July to Mid 
Sept 
1 F 3 5 2 4 
2 A 127 94 84 133 
3 I 411 119 200 248 
4 NM 752 247 333 473 
 
Total 1293 465 619 858 
It can be observed Table 4.18 that the highest number of HSE non-compliances 
was recorded in S1.  It may be due to occurrences of mist and fog in the atmospheric 
environment and the workers’ laziness to perform their assigned tasks.  A significant 
number of road accidents were also reported due to the foggy environment.  The 
highest number of slip, trip and fall cases due to slippery surfaces was also reported in 
the S1.  In addition, S1 is also longer in duration as compared to the other seasons. 
The second highest number, 858, of HSE non-compliances occurred in the S4, and 
can be observed in Table 4.18 whereas, a total number of 619 and 465  
HSE non-compliances were recorded in the S2, and the S3, respectively. 
4.12. Risk Calculation by using Existing Risk Assessment Criterion 
HSE non-compliances recorded for the year 2008 was analyzed by using existing 
three risk assessment criteria’s.  Total number of 1203 HSE non-compliances were 
recorded and risk was calculated.  The detail description of three risk assessment 
methods was presented in section 1.4.1, 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. 
4.12.1. Analysis Results of HSE Non-Compliances by As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) 
1203 HSE non-compliances were analyzed by using ALARP.  Table 4.19 showing the 
analysis result of HSE non-compliances. 
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Table 4.19: Results of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
 
It can be observed from Table 4.19 that 645 HSE non-compliances lying under 
acceptable risk region.  551 HSE non-compliances fall under yellow region and 
requires to take risk reduction measure.  An immediate control measures or change 
the process were needed for 7 HSE non-compliances. 
4.12.2. Analysis Results of HSE Non-Compliances by using Risk Ranking 
Criterion 
The analysis result of HSE non-compliances recorded by using risk ranking criterion 
is presented in Table 4.20.  
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to equipment or 
property  (A) 10 
24 158 43 43 
Long term illness 
or serious injury 
or major damage 
to property or 
equipment  (B) 
08 
 53 121  
Medical 
treatment several 
days off work or 
minor damage to 
equipment or 
property  (C) 06 
26 107 325 197 
First Aid needed 
or negligible 
property 
damaged  (D) 04 
  101 77 
It can be observed from Table 4.20 that 24 activities fall under category extremely 
severe.  These hazards could be happen at any time and could cause death or 
permanent disability or extreme damage to equipment or property.  158 activities fall 
under category often likely. These activities could happen sometime and can cause 
death or permanent disability or extreme damage to equipment or property.  Total 83 
activities, 43 in unlikely and 43 in very unlikely category falls.  Unlikely activities 
could happen but very rarely and can cause death or permanent disability or extreme 
damage to equipment or property.  Very unlikely activities could happen but probably 
never will occur again, these activities also have a potential to cause death or 
permanent disability.  53 activities fall under often likely and 121 activities fall under 
unlikely category.  Often likely activities could happen but very rarely.  Cumulative 
of often likely and unlikely activities (53 + 121) have a potential to cause long term 
illness or serious injury or major damage to property or equipment.  655 activities 
collectively (26 + 107 + 325 + 197) can result a medical treatment, several days off 
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work or minor damage to equipment or property.  Finally 178 activities can be cause 
first aid cases or negligible property damage. 
4.12.3. Analysis Results of HSE Non-Compliances by using Risk Evaluation     
Criterion 
Analysis result of HSE non-compliances by using risk evaluation criterion are 
presented in Table 4.21. 










80 – 100  
182 
Critical 
Isolate the hazard immediately.  Take 
corrective measures on high priority and 
eliminate the hazard as soon as possible. 
50 – 79  
112 
Major 
Isolate the hazard as soon as practicable. 
Engineering controls and Administrative 
controls need to be taken.  Regularly 
monitor the cause(s) until rectification.  
30 – 49 534 Moderate 
Must fix the cause(s) when time and 
resources permit.  Administrative control is 
to be taken. 
 29 375 Minor Need to monitor and consider. Administrative control is to be taken & use 
appropriate PPE. 
Table 4.21 shows the evaluation scale results after calculating risk by using risk 
evaluation criterion.  186 activities fall under critical, 111 activities were major, 579 
activities were moderate and 391 activities fall under minor category. Respective 
actions required with reference to categories also illustrated in Table 4.21. 
4.13. Risk Evaluation for Risk and Safety Analysis Models 
The detailed methodology for the development of the risk and safety analysis models 
was elaborated in section 3.4 of chapter 3.  This section will present the results and 
discussion for each risk and safety analysis model.  
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4.13.1. Risk Evaluation with Reference to the Risk and Safety Analysis Model 
Based upon the Monthly Classification of HCFs 
Risk was calculated by multiplying the likelihood and the severity.  The severity of 
each HCF for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 was calculated by using the 
Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) process using the Statistical Package of Social 
Sciences version 18.0 (SPSS 18.0).  The output of the MRA for the years 2007 is 
attached for reference in Appendix-B.  The analysis for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 
was also carried out in a same manner.  With the help of the MRA output and by 
using equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 as mentioned in section 3.4.1, 
the severity of each HCF was calculated.  The severity calculation for HK for the year 
2007 is described below: 
SHK = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βTH(TH) + βSTF(STF) + βC(C) +   
βFR(FR) + βEF(EF) + βMC(MC) + βMTC(MTC)                        (3.1) 
SHK = -14.076 + 0.655(128) + (0) (137) + (0.329)(87) + (0) (7) +   
             (1.283) ( 34) + (0.271)(158) + (-1.239)(69) 
SHK = 99.336 
The likelihood of each of the HCF for each year was calculated by dividing 
particular HCF occurrences with the total numbers of HCFs occurrences in that year.  
The Risk was then calculated by multiplying the severity with the likelihood of each 
of the HCF.  The results for the calculation for severity, likelihood and risk for the 
year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are attached in Appendix-C for reference.   
The summary of Severity, Likelihood and Risk values for the year 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010 are presented in Table 4.22, Table 4.23, Table 4.24 and Table 4.25 
below.  
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Table 4.22: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2007 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 HK 54 0.08 99.336 7.96 
2 TH 128 0.19 63.23 12.01 
3 STF 137 0.20 140.392 28.54 
4 C 87 0.13 29.511 3.81 
5 FR 7 0.01 58.459 0.61 
6 EF 34 0.05 5.642 0.28 
7 MC 158 0.23 285.269 66.87 
8 MTC 69 0.10 94.69 9.69 
  
674 
   
Table 4.22 shows the likelihood, severity and risk scores for the year 2007.  It can 
be viewed that the MC and EF got the highest and lowest risk scores with a value of 
66.87 and 0.28, respectively. 
Table 4.23: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2008 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 HK 55 0.05 210.266 9.61 
2 TH 256 0.21 52.903 11.26 
3 STF 217 0.18 186.493 33.64 
4 C 223 0.19 225.162 41.74 
5 FR 17 0.01 87.565 1.24 
6 EF 97 0.08 231.009 18.63 
7 MC 277 0.23 146.801 33.80 
8 MTC 61 0.05 156.727 7.95 
 
Total 1203 
   
The likelihood, severity and risk score values for the year 2008 are depicted in 
Table 4.23.  It can be noticed in Table 4.23 that C got the highest risk score with a 
value of 41.47.  The severity of C was not the highest, but due to the likelihood value 
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of 0.19 it got the highest risk score.  The lowest risk score was calculated due to FR 
with a severity value of 87.565 and likelihood value of 0.01.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that while calculating the risk score, not only the final risk score values are 
important but the respective likelihood and severity values also possess significant 
importance. 
Table 4.24: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2009 with Reference to 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 HK 42 0.05 168.787 7.86 
2 TH 191 0.21 230.391 48.79 
3 STF 202 0.22 99.906 22.37 
4 C 97 0.11 29.342 3.16 
5 FR 16 0.02 -133.79 -2.37 
6 EF 69 0.08 138.413 10.59 
7 MC 198 0.22 315.741 69.31 
8 MTC 87 0.10 61.224 5.91 
 
Total 902 
   
Table 4.24 shows the results of the risk score for the year 2009.  Table 4.24 
represents that MC got the highest risk score with a value of 69.31.  MC were also the 
highest risk score value in the year 2007.  The risk ranking scores for the year 2009 
were followed by TH, STF, EF, HK, C, MTC and FR, respectively. 
  
 179 
Table 4.25: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2010 with Reference to 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 HK 5 0.01 28.827 0.33 
2 TH 165 0.38 210.33 79.42 
3 STF 49 0.11 26.006 2.92 
4 C 41 0.09 72.958 6.85 
5 FR 39 0.09 -21.197 (1.89) 
6 EF 18 0.04 95.019 3.91 
7 MC 81 0.19 107.821 19.99 
8 MTC 39 0.09 110.474 9.86 
 
Total 437 
   
The risk scores for the year 2010 for the HCFs are depicted in Table 4.25.  The 
highest and lowest risk scores were calculated for TH and FR with a value of 79.42, 
and 1.89, respectively. 
Table 4.26: Risk Evaluation for the Year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
Rank No 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 RMC RC RMC RTH 
2 RSTF RMC RTH RMC 
3 RTH RSTF RSTF RMTC 
4 RMTC REF REF RC 
5 RHK RTH RHK REF 
6 RC RHK RMTC RSTF 
7 RFR RMTC RC RHK 
8 REF RFR RFR RFR 
Whereas, 
RHK = Risk score for Housekeeping 
RTH = Risk score for Transportation Hazard 
RSTF = Risk score for Slips, trips and falls 
RC = Risk score for Carelessness 
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RFR = Risk score for Fire Risk 
REF = Risk score for Electrical Fault 
RMC = Risk score for Miscellaneous Cases 
RMTC = Risk score for Medical Treatment Cases 
From the final results of the risk scores for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, 
the HCFs were prioritized and depicted in Table 4.26.  It can be observed that for the 
year 2007, MC got the highest priority that was followed by STF, TH, MTC, HK, C, 
FR and EF.  For the year 2008, C got the highest risk score followed by MC, STF, EF, 
TH, HK, MTC and FR.  During the year 2009, MC got the highest risk score and the 
1st priority.  TH, STF and EF got the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ranking.  For the year 2010, TH 
got the highest risk score followed by MC, MTC, C, EF, STF, HK and FR. 
4.13.2. Risk Evaluation with Reference to the Risk and Safety Analysis Model 
Based upon F, A, I and NM Cases 
The Risk score with reference to the risk and safety analysis model based upon 
fatality (F), accident (A), incident (I) and near miss (NM) cases was calculated by 
multiplying the likelihood and the severity.  The severity level of  the F, A, I, and NM 
cases for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 was calculated by using the Multiple 
Regression Analysis (MRA) process using the Statistical Package of Social Sciences 
version 18.0 (SPSS 18.0).  With the use of equations 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 and the 
MRA output as illustrated in section 3.4.2, the severity of each variable, .i.e., F, A, I 
and NM cases, was calculated.  The severity calculation for F during the year 2007 is 
stated below: 
SF = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βA(A) + βI(I) + βNM(NM)           (3.9) 
SF = 0.729 + (-0.221) (47) + (0.142) (239) + (387) (-0.655) 
SF = -229.205 
The equations developed for severity calculations were solved by using Microsoft 
Excel 2010 spreadsheets.  A likelihood and risk score associated with each variable, 
.i.e. F, A, I and NM cases, was also calculated by using Microsoft Excel 2010 
spreadsheets.  The spreadsheets for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are attached 
in Appendix-C for reference.  The likelihood of each variable for every year was 
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calculated by dividing the particular variable occurrences with the total number of 
occurrences in that year. 
The determined risk values for the F, A, I and NM cases were found to be 
negative in different years.  These values were considered as modular values during 
the risk prioritization process.  The summary of the Severity, Likelihood and Risk 
determination for the year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are presented in Table 4.27, 
Table 4.28, Table 4.29 and Table 4.30 below. 
Table 4.27: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2007 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 F 1 0.00 -229.426 -0.340 
2 A 47 0.07 -113.606 -7.9220 
3 I 239 0.35 344.021 121.989 
4 NM 387 0.57 174.541 100.218 
 
Total 674 
   
Table 4.27 presents the results of the likelihood, severity and risk scores for the 
year 2007 with reference to the risk and safety analysis model based upon the F, A, I 
and NM cases.  During the 6 month data collection period for the year 2007, a total 
number of 674 HSE non-compliances were recorded.  The number of highest cases 
was recorded due to near miss cases with a likelihood value of 0.57 but the severity of 
the NM cases was calculated as 174.541.  Near Miss cases also got the second highest 
risk score value was 100.218.  The highest risk score calculated belonged to the 
incident cases with a value of 121.989. 
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Table 4.28: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2008 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 F 5 0.00 -109.384 -0.454 
2 A 90 0.07 -75.221 -5.627 
3 I 352 0.29 561.618 164.330 
4 NM 756 0.63 278.886 175.260 
 
Total 1203 
   
The likelihood, severity and risk scores for the year 2008 with reference to the 
risk and safety analysis model based upon the F, A, I and NM cases are depicted in 
Table 4.28.  The risk score for the incident and near miss cases can be observed as 
significant.  The highest risk score, 175.260, was calculated for near miss cases 
followed by incident cases with the risk score value of 164.330. 
Table 4.29: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2009 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 F 1 0.00 -293.622 -0.325 
2 A 101 0.11 -11.18 -1.2518 
3 I 238 0.26 503.983 132.979 
4 NM 562 0.62 202.27 126.026 
 
Total 902 
   
Table 4.29 presents the results of the likelihood, severity and risk scores for the 
year 2009 with reference to the risk and safety analysis model based upon the F, A, I 
and NM cases.  It can be observed that incident cases got the first highest risk score 
with a value of 132.979 and near miss cases got the second highest risk score with a 
value of 126.026. 
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Table 4.30: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the Year 2010 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 F 7 0.02 69.16 1.100 
2 A 188 0.43 -46.522 -19.877 
3 I 146 0.33 54.436 18.062 
4 NM 99 0.23 151.013 33.977 
 
Total 440 
   
The results of the likelihood, severity and risk score values for the year 2010 with 
reference to the risk and safety analysis model based upon the F, A, I and NM cases 
are highlighted in Table 4.30.  Similar to the year 2008, near miss cases got the first 
highest risk score, i.e., 33.977, followed by incident cases with a risk score value of 
18.062. 
Table 4.31: Risk Evaluation for the Year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 with 
Reference to Risk and Safety Analysis Model Based upon F, A, I and NM Cases 
No 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 RI RNM RI RNM 
2 RNM RI RNM RI 
3 RF RF RA RF 
4 RA RA RF RA 
The risk evaluation/ prioritization results for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
are presented in Table 4.31.  It can be observed in Table 4.31 that incident and near 
miss cases got either first or second top risk score values during the study period.  
During the years 2007 and 2009, incident cases got the highest risk score values while 
during the years 2008 and 2010, near miss cases got the highest risk score.  Risk 
scores associated to occurrences of fatality cases got the third rank during the years 
2007, 2008 and 2010; whereas, during the year 2009, fatality cases got the fourth 
highest risk value.  Risk scores associated to accident cases got the fourth position 




RF = Risk score for Fatality Cases 
RA = Risk score for Accident Cases 
RI = Risk score for Incident Cases 
RNM = Risk score for Near Miss Cases 
4.13.3. Risk Evaluation with Reference to Risk and Safety Analysis Model Based 
upon the Seasonal Occurrences of HCFs 
The severity of each season .i.e. S1, S2, S3 and S4 for the year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 
2010 was calculated using Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) process using 
Statistical Package of Social Sciences version 18.0 (SPSS 18.0).  The output of MRA 
for the year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are attached in Appendix-B.  The severity of 
each of the season (S1, S2, S3 and S4) was calculated by substituting the 
unstandardized and standardized coefficients obtained from the MRA output into 
equations 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18 and 3.19 as mentioned in section 3.4.3, 
respectively.  The severity calculation for S1 for the year 2007 is described below; 
SS1 = Un-standardized Co-efficient + βS3 (S3) + βS4 (S4)               (3.13) 
S S1 = 0.921 + 0.377(160) + (0.577) (363) 
S S1 = 264.292 
The likelihood of each of the season for each year was calculated by dividing 
particular seasonal occurrences with the total numbers of occurrences in that year.  
The risk was then calculated by multiplying the severity with the likelihood of each of 
the season.  The results for the calculation for severity, likelihood and risk for the year 
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 are attached in Appendix-C for reference.   
The summary of Severity, Likelihood and Risk values for the year 2007, 2008, 




Table 4.32: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the year 2007 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 S1 151 0.22 264.292 59.210 
2 S3 160 0.24 245.239 58.217 
3 S4 363 0.54 151.739 81.722 
  
674 
   
Table 4.32 shows the likelihood, severity and risk scores for the year 2007.  It can 
be viewed that in S1, a highest severity value 264.292 was recorded with risk score of 
59.2108. In season S3, and S4 the severity and risk score got second and third 
ranking. 
Table 4.33: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the year 2008 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 S1 448 0.37 251.742 93.75 
2 S2 153 0.13 358.441 45.59 
3 S3 305 0.25 391.876 99.35 
4 S4 297 0.25 156.393 38.61 
 
Total 1,203 
   
Likelihood, severity and risk score values for the year 2008 shown in Table 4.33.  
It can be noticed that S3 got the highest risk score with a value of 99.35.  The season 
S2 got third highest risk value with second highest risk value during the year. 
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Table 4.34: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the year 2009 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 S1 480 0.53 210.816 112.186 
2 S2 185 0.21 302.66 62.0755 
3 S3 108 0.12 -36.691 -4.3932 
4 S4 129 0.14 239.465 34.25 
 
Total 902 
   
A Table 4.34 shows the results of risk score for the year 2009.  A severity and risk 
flow pattern can be observed from Table 4.34.  The severity flow recorded with 
respect to seasons was S2, S4, S1 and S3 whereas, risk ranking pattern with reference 
to seasons were S1, S2, S4 and S3 can be noticed from Table 4.34.  It can be 
concluded that it is possible that severity of HSE non-compliance of any season may 
be higher but its risk score can be lower. 
Table 4.35: Likelihood, Severity and Risk Score for the year 2010 with Reference 




Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 S1 5 0.45 161.634 72.133 
2 S2 165 0.28 91.891 25.442 
3 S3 49 0.11 26.006 7.773 
4 S4 41 0.17 43.215 7.22 
 
Total 437 
   
Risk scores for the year 2010 for HCFs on seasonal basis is shown in Table 4.35.  
The highest and lowest risk score were calculated for S1 and S4 with a value of 
72.133, and 7.22, respectively. 
  
 187 
Table 4.36: Risk Evaluation with Reference to Risk and Safety Analysis Model 
Based upon Seasonal Distribution of HCFs for the year 2007, 2008, 2009 
and 2010 
Rank No 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 RS4 RS3 RS1 RS1 
2 RS1 RS1 RS2 RS2 
3 RS3 RS2 RS4 RS3 
4 
 
RS4 RS3 RS4 
Whereas, 
RS1 = Risk score for Season S1 
RS2 = Risk score for Season S2 
RS3 = Risk score for Season S3 
RS4 = Risk score for Season S4 
The results of risk and safety analysis model based upon seasonal occurrences of 
HCFs are presented in Table 4.36.  Similar results in risk flow pattern were observed 
during the year 2009 and 2010.  In year 2008 the risk associated to S4 got first 
ranking although the risk flow in S1, S2 and S3 follows consecutive flow pattern.  
The risk flow pattern for the year 2007 was not found similar to the risk flow for the 
year 2008, 2009 and 2010.  It was due to unavailability of twelve months data that 
was leads to unequal distribution of HSE non-compliance during the year.  The 
calculated values for likelihood, severity and risk scores for the years 2007, 2008, 
2009 and 2010 were calculated different in different periods.  It was due to variation 
in HSE non-compliances during the years.   
4.14. Validation for Safety and Risk Analysis Model Developed Based upon 
Seasonal Occurrences of HCFs 
The risk and safety analysis model developed by using multiple regression analysis 
process was tested by developing severity equations for the year 2009.  The 
unstandized and standardized co-efficient for the year 2009 was used and equations 
for the four seasons of the year was developed.  The equations were; 
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SS1  = 6.902 + (-0.811) (S3) + (0.338) (S4) + (1.34) (S2)  (4.1) 
SS2  = 0.023 + (0.533) (S3) + (0.017) (S4) + (0.506) (S1)  (4.2) 
SS3  = 2.089 + (-0.607) (S1) + (1.055) (S2) + (0.455) (S4)  (4.3) 
SS4  = (-4.747) + (0.351) (S1) + (0.048) (S2) + (0.619) (S3) (4.4) 
4.14.1. Validation of Risk and Safety Analysis Model with Reference to the Year 
2010 
The data for the year 2010 was analyzed by using equation 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.  A 
severity value for respective seasons for the year 2010 was calculated as below; 
SS1  = 6.902 + (-0.811) (46) + (0.338) (70) + (1.34) (116)       
SS1  = 148.696 
R S1  = (187/419)*148.696 = 66.363 
SS2  = 0.023 + (0.533) (46) + (0.017) (70) + (0.506) (187)       
SS2  = 120.353 
R S2  = (116/419)*120.353 = 33.319 
SS3  = 2.089 + (-0.607) (187) + (1.055) (116) + (0.455) (70)    
SS3  = 42.81 
R S3  = (46/419)*42.81 = 4.699 
SS4  = (-4.747) + (0.351) (187) + (0.048) (116) + (0.619) (46) 
SS4  = 94.932 
R S4  = (70/419)*94.932 = 15.859 
Table 4.37: Comparison of Risk Score for the Year 2010 by using Generalized 
Model Equations and Actual Regression Equations 
Rank No 
Year 2010 Actual Risk 
Flow Pattern 
Year 2010 predicted risk flow 
pattern by using generalized 
model equations 
1 RS1 RS1 
2 RS2 RS2 
3 RS3 RS4 
4 RS4 RS3 
A similar risk score results with reference to year 2010 by using generalized 
severity equations and actual multiple regression equations can be observed from 
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Table 4.37.  It shows successful application of four models that developed by using 
year 2009 data on year 2010 data. 
4.14.2. Validation of Risk and Safety Analysis Model with Reference to the Year 
2008 
The further validation of generalized model equations was carried out by using year 
2008 data.  In generalized model equations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 as described above, 
the year 2008 data was tested and compared with the actual results.  The application 
of generalized model equations is described below; 
SS1  = 6.902 + (-0.811) (S3) + (0.338) (S4) + (1.34) (S2) 
SS1  = 6.902 + (-0.811) (305) + (0.338) (297) + (1.34) (153) 
SS1  = 64.953 
R S1  = (448/1203)*64.953 = 24.188 
SS2  = 0.023 + (0.533) (S3) + (0.017) (S4) + (0.506) (S1) 
SS2  = 0.023 + (0.533) (305) + (0.017) (297) + (0.506) (448) 
SS2  = 394.32 
R S2  = (153/1203)*394.32 = 50.158 
SS3  = 2.089 + (-0.607) (S1) + (1.055) (S2) + (0.455) (S4) 
SS3  = 2.089 + (-0.607) (448) + (1.055) (153) + (0.455) (297) 
SS3  = 26.703 
R S3  = (305/1203)*26.703 = 6.77 
SS4  = (-4.747) + (0.351) (S1) + (0.048) (S2) + (0.619) (S3) 
SS4  = (-4.747) + (0.351) (448) + (0.048) (153) + (0.619) (305) 
SS4  = 348.64 
R S4  = (297/1203)*384.64 = 86.073 
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Table 4.38: Comparison of Risk Score for the Year 2008 by using Generalized 
Model Equations and Actual Regression Equations 
Rank No 
Year 2008 Actual Risk 
Flow Pattern 
Year 2008 predicted risk flow pattern 
by using generalized model equations 
1 RS3 RS4 
2 RS1 RS1 
3 RS2 RS2 
4 RS4 RS3 
A Table 4.38 shows the comparison of risk score for the year 2008 and calculated 
risk flow pattern by using generalized model equations.  Similar results in each season 
of the year can be observed.  It shows the validation of generalized model equations 
on year 2008 data.  Therefore, for calculation of severity of respective season in any 
season of the year the proposed severity equations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 as mentioned 
above can be used successfully. 
4.15. Mitigation Strategies Results and Discussion 
Mitigation strategies are a set of training programs, refresher courses, safety talks, 
safety alerts and lessons learned.  During the application of checking and review 
process, the mitigation strategies prepared were communicated to the employees 
through emails, publications, brochures and posters.  The titles of the mitigation 
strategies that were prepared and implemented during the operation and maintenance 
of the PFS’s are tabulated in Table 4.39. 
 191 
Table 4.39: Mitigation Strategies Applied during Operation and Maintenance of PFS 
No Title No Title No Title 
1 Seat Belts 19 Driver and Vehicle Safety 37 Hard Hat Maintenance (Safety Helmet) 
2 During an Earthquake 20 Motorcycle Safety 38 HSE at Home 
3 Noise Pollution 21 Tips for Better Driving  39 Microwave Ovens (Safe Use) 
4 Use of Drinking Water 22 Fuel Conserving Tips 40 Slips and Trips (floor cleaning) 
5 Health Hazards of Osteoarthritis 23 Fire Safety at Workplace 41 Swine Flu 
6 Hazards of Carbon Monoxide gas 24 Tips to Prevent Food Poisoning 42 Be-Aware: LPG Decanting  
7 CNG Safety 25 Tips to Understand Safety Signs 43 Cell Phone Hazards 
8 Global Warming 26 Electrical Safety 44 Portable Generator- Storage & Shifting 
9 Safety for CNG Vehicles 27 Water and Soil Pollution 45 Computer Fire Safety 
10 Bird Flu 28 Prevention of Back Strain 46 Safety Measures in Fog 
11 Road Safety 29 Diesel Engine Emission 47 Safety Tips for Driving 
12 Workplace Safety Rules 30 Heat Stress 48 Road Safety Tips 
13 Need for Water Conservation 31 Workplace Eye Safety 49 Snakebite 
14 Fire Extinguisher use & Safety Tips  32 Dengue Fever 50 Hazards of Water Pollution 
15 Legionnaires Disease 33 Safe Lifting Techniques 51 Ten "Steps" to Stairway Safety 
16 Mobile Manners 34 Basic Energy Saving Tips 52 Sun Safety 
17 Stress Management 35 Ladder Safety Tips 53 Chemical Handling 
18 Driving in the Rain 36 Seating Ergonomics 54 Heart Attack 
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Table 4.39: (Cont’d) Mitigation Strategies Applied during Operation and Maintenance of PFS 
No Title No Title No Title 
55 Staying Safe at the Pump 68 Smoking is a Serious Health Hazard 81 Psychological Health 
56 Safety Tips for Computer Uses 69 Blind Spot 82 Housekeeping 
57 Hazards of Chemical Products 70 Cough 83 Fossil Fuel & Environmental Impacts 
58 Prevention of Cold Flue at Workplace 71 Global Warming 84 Tips for Preventing Back Injuries 
59 Extra Care in Ramadan  72 Dehydration 85 Tips of Reducing Paper Waste at work 
60 Healthy Brain 73 Driving in Fog   
61 Swine Influenza 74 Cell Phone can be Deadly   
62 Hand Hygiene 75 Prevention from Cold   
63 Using Gas Heater Safely 76 Asthama and Air Pollution   
64 Hazards Identification 77 Kitchen Safety   
65 Controlling Stress 78 Tips for good Foot Health   
66 Keep the Geyser’s Thermostat at 
WARM 
79 Safety Tips from (CO) during 
Travelling 
  
67 Electricity Breakdown & Generator 
Safety 
80 How to detect Mosquito Spreading 
Dengue Viral Hemorrhagic Fever 
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The reduction in HSE non-compliances were noticed with application of 
mitigation strategies.  Table 4.40 illustrated the results of reduction in HSE non-
compliances with application of mitigation strategies.  During year 2009, in July, 
August and September, 226 HSE non-compliances were recorded.  After application 
of mitigation strategies the reported HSE non-compliance cases were 163 cases. 











1- Maintenance 26 12 
2- House Keeping 7 2 
3- Mechanical Fault 4 0 
4- Electrical Fault 4 4 
5- Carelessness 183 143 
6- Miscellaneous 2 2 
Total 226 163 
Safety conscious companies make a near miss a big deal.  Near misses are not 
funny; they are often deadly.  Reporting of near misses may be encouraged in 
organizations.  In the initial stage, for similar near miss cases, immediate action needs 
to be taken to prevent recurrences.  Near misses can be considered as warnings that 
something or someone is not performing the job correctly.  Those involved should not 
let near misses repeat themselves or they may find themselves or a co-worker being 
treated for an injury that could have been avoided. 
4.16. Evaluation of Checking and Review Process for Petrol Filling Stations 
The data collected from July 2007 to December 2008 was used for the development of 
checking and review process for petrol filling stations.  The data collected for the 
years 2009 and 2010 was analyzed by using the developed checking and review 
process.  A significant reduction in the occurrences of HCFs was noticed in each year.    
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Table 4.41shows the reduction in the occurrences of the HCFs in the years 2009 and 
2010. 
Table 4.41: Yearly Reductions in Occurrences of HCFs 












2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 Housekeeping 54 55 42 5 
2 Transportation Hazard 128 255 191 165 
3 Slips, trips and falls 137 215 202 49 
4 Carelessness 87 224 97 41 
5 Fire Risks 7 17 16 39 
6 Electrical Fault 34 97 69 18 
7 Miscellaneous Cases 158 279 198 81 
8 Medical Treatment Cases 69 61 87 39 
 Total 674 1203 902 437 
In the year 2007 during the 6 month data collection period, 674 HCFs were 
recorded.  The number of HCFs recorded in the year 2008 was 1,203.  With the 
application of the Checking and Review Process a noticeable reduction in the HCFs 
was recorded in the year 2009 and 2010.  The number of HCFs recorded in the year 
2009 was 902.  For the year 2010, the reported HCFs were further reduced to 437. 
The HSE non-compliances recorded during the 3.5 year data collection period 
were categorized on the basis to cause fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  
The proposed Checking and Review Process was applied during the years 2009 and 
2010.  Table 4.42 shows the results of the recorded fatality, accident, incident and 
near miss cases before and after application of Checking and Review Process for the 
years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
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Table 4.42: Yearly Reduction in Occurrences of F, A, I and NM Cases  
No 
Summary of F, A, I and NM Cases 
Classification 
HSE Non-Compliances 
before application of 
Checking and Review 
Process 
HSE Non-Compliances 
after application of 
Checking and Review 
Process 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
1- Fatality 1 5 1 7 
2- Accident 47 90 101 188 
3- Incident 239 352 238 146 
4- Near Miss 387 756 562 99 
 Total 674 1203 902 440 
Overall, a significant reduction in the occurrences of unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions can be observed in Table 4.42.  The number of fatality cases increased to 4 
in the year 2008 and decreased to 1 in the year 2009.  However, in the year 2010, the 
number of fatality cases increased back to 4 cases.  During the 3.5 year data collection 
period 14 fatality cases were reported.  The noticeable increment pattern of accident 
occurrences can be viewed in Table 4.42.  In the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, 
the accident cases recorded were 48, 91, 101 and 188, respectively.  A significant 
incident and near miss reduction pattern can be observed in Table 4.42 during the 
years 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
4.17. Safety Triangle for Petrol Filling Stations 
A safety triangle for PFS’s was developed by using the occurrences of fatality, 
accident, incident and near miss cases. 
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Table 4.43: Fatality, Accident, Incident & Near Miss Cases Occurrences and 
Weights for the Year 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
No Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
1 Fatality 1 5 1 7 14 
2 Accident 47 90 101 188 426 
3 Incident 239 352 238 146 975 
4 Near Miss 387 756 562 99 1804 
 Total 674 1203 902 440 3219 
 Weight 20.94 37.37 28.02 13.67  
Table 4.43 shows the yearly number of fatality, accident, incident and near miss 
cases flow pattern.  The weighted average of each variable, .i.e., fatality, accident, 
incident and near miss cases was calculated and a safety triangle for the PFS’s was 
prepared. 
The weight of each variable was calculated by dividing the respective year’s 
column total value by the aggregate total.  The calculation for each weight was carried 
out as described below: 
Weight for the year 2007 = (674/3219)*100 = 20.93 
Weight for the year 2008 = (1203/3219)*100 = 37.37 
Weight for the year 2009 = (902/3219)*100 = 28.02 
Weight for the year 2010 = (440/3219)*100 = 13.66 
Calculated weights were assigned to each variable for that particular year and 
summed up to get the final result.   
Table 4.44: Development of Safety Triangle for PFS 
No Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total Approximate 
1 Fatality 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.51 0.73 1 
2 Accident 2.24 2.41 3.60 13.75 22 22 
3 Incident 11.41 9.42 8.49 10.68 40 40 
4 Near Miss 18.48 20.23 20.06 7.24 66 66 
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A Table 4.44 illustrating the calculated values after assigning associate weight to 
the variables.  The variables values were calculated as follows, 
Fatality year 2007 = (1/20.94) = 0.05 
Fatality year 2008 = (5/37.37) = 0.13 
Fatality year 2009 = (1/28.02) = 0.04 
Fatality year 2010 = (7/13.67) = 0.51 
Accident year 2007 = (47/20.94) = 0.05 
Accident year 2008 = (90/37.37) = 2.41 
Accident year 2009 = (101/28.02) = 3.60 
Accident year 2010 = (188/13.67) = 13.75 
Incident year 2007 = (239/20.94) = 11.41 
Incident year 2008 = (352/37.37) = 9.41 
Incident year 2009 = (238/28.02) = 8.49 
Incident year 2010 = (146/13.67) = 10.68 
Near Miss year 2007 = (387/20.94) = 18.48 
Near Miss year 2008 = (756/37.37) = 20.23 
Near Miss year 2009 = (562/28.02) = 20.05 
Near Miss year 2010 = (99/13.67) = 7.24 
In Table 4.44, it can be concluded that during the operation and maintenance of 
the PFS’s, the occurrence of 1 fatality case is followed by 22 accidents, 40 incidents 
and 66 near miss cases.  Figure 4.29 shows the pictorial representation of the safety 
triangle for the PFS’s. 
 
 Figure 4.29: Safety Triangle for PFS 
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Figure 4.29 can be read in a reverse way.  The numbers of near miss cases at the base 
of the triangle were of more significance.  Each set of 66 near miss cases would result 
in the occurrence of 1 fatality case.  Therefore, to minimize the occurrences of 
fatality, accident and near miss cases, consideration should be given to near miss 
cases reporting.  Moreover, if these near miss cases can be controlled by the safety 
triangle, the situation will improve by itself.  The flow pattern of the fatality, accident, 
incident and near miss cases with reference to the safety triangle for the PFS’s was 
also in line with the studies conducted by  [27, 59, 60].  Heinrich in 1995 proposed a 
relationship among major or lost time injury, minor injury and no injury accident 
cases as 1:29:300.  Bird in 1969 developed a relationship among the serious or 
disabling injury, minor injury, proper damage accidents and incidents with no visible 
injury or damage as 1:10:30 and 600.  The Tye & Pearson study in 1974 introduced a 
ratio among fatality or serious injury, lost time injury, injury requiring first aid, 
property damage/accidents and near misses as 1:3:50:80:400.  In all the three 
proposed theories and the safety triangle for the PFS’s, near miss got the base 
position.  These near misses are considered less important but, actually, they have a 
noticeable value.  If the reporting of near misses cases is encouraged, the pyramid 
flow would be improved significantly. 
4.18. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Evaluation Results 
An AHP (analytical hierarchy process) was designed to solve decision making 
problems.  It is a tool that combines qualitative and quantitative analysis and 
successfully implementation in many fields of health and safety [120].  The AHP 
application was described by [118] in detail.  It was also highlighted by [121] that 
AHP developed by Saaty has become a popular approach and has been used in a 
broad variety of situations by various researchers.  Furthermore, apart from the 
occupational health and safety discipline, the successful application of the AHP have 
been reported in marketing, economics, finance, public policy, education, medicine 
and sports.  Moreover, AHP applications have been proven to be well tested and 
supportive in many other decision situations concerning evaluation and selection 
processes [122].  The AHP approach is helpful to address selection, evaluation, 
resource allocation, benchmarking, quality management, health care and strategic 
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planning as well.  The AHP provides an environment that creates simplicity and 
easiness in decision making process. 
Table 4.45 illustrates the cumulative data related to the HSE non-compliances 
during the 3.5 years study period.  The HSE non-compliances during the study period 
were categorized into eight variables.  The first column contained the eight variables.  
These eight variables were Housekeeping (HK), Transportation Hazard (TH), Slips, 
trips and falls (STF), Carelessness (C), Fire Risks (FR), Electrical Fault (EF), 
Miscellaneous Cases (MC), and Medical Treatment Cases (MTC).  The rest of the 
columns represents the duration in months from January to December.  The data 
Table 4.45 consisted of a 6 month duration of data for the year 2007 from July to 
December and a three year duration covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
By using the measurement scales in Table 3.1 and comparing each HCF to 
another, the original criteria matrix was composed.  Table 4.46 gives a glimpse of the 
decision maker’s judgment and preference of the criteria with pairwise comparisons. 
Generally, for any pairwise comparison matrix, 1s have been placed down the 
diagonal from the upper left hand corner to the lower right hand corner then a 
comparison of the respective criteria is made.  Considering Table 4.46, HK has a 
moderate importance with TH, therefore 3 has been placed in the intersection cell.  
STF has an extreme importance with HK, therefore 9 has been placed in the 
intersection of HK in the first row.  By applying the same method all the rest of the 
cells were filled.  Since comparing row 1, the other can similarly be compared.  On 
the flip side of the diagonal, when TH was compared with HK it was 1/3 and so on. 
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Table 4.45: Cumulative Data Related to HSE Non-Compliances during 3.5 Years Study Period 
No Variable Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
1 HK 11 2 4 14 8 9 17 35 16 10 17 13 156 
2 TH 68 43 57 54 47 39 84 85 74 70 50 68 739 
3 STF 53 66 91 19 28 33 46 74 66 29 45 53 603 
4 C 36 25 30 38 15 25 34 52 58 40 62 34 449 
5 FR 8 8 5 18 3 3 4 8 4 9 4 5 79 
6 EF 26 8 25 11 8 18 23 17 24 21 22 15 218 
7 MC 45 63 51 48 32 40 83 72 87 56 83 56 716 
8 MTC 18 10 33 13 9 10 29 27 19 28 30 30 256 




Table 4.46: Original Criteria Matrix 
 
HK TH STF C FR EF MC MTC 
HK 1.00 3.00 9.00 7.00 9.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 
TH 0.33 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
STF 0.11 0.33 1.00 7.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
C 0.14 0.20 0.14 1.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
FR 0.11 0.20 0.33 0.20 1.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 
EF 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.14 1.00 3.00 7.00 
MC 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.33 1.00 5.00 
MTC 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.20 1.00 
Total 2.57 5.41 14.15 20.88 23.54 20.48 29.20 42.00 
Once these comparisons had been made, the data were used to determine the 
weights of the criteria; the process, as was summarized before, was in three steps: 
calculating the total of each column, dividing each value obtained by its column total, 
and calculating the averages of the rows.  Table 4.47 depicts the final results and it 
illustrates the weights for each HCF. 
The last column in Table 4.47 includes the weights of all the eight involved HCFs 
in this process.  It shows that the final weights of Housekeeping (HK), Transportation 
Hazard (TH), Slips, trips and falls (STF), Carelessness (C), Fire Risks (FR), Electrical 
Faults (EF), Miscellaneous Cases (MC), and Medical Treatment Cases (MTC) were 
0.34, 0.18, 0.14, 0.11, 0.10, 0.07, 0.04 and 0.03. 
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Table 4.47: Normalized Criteria Matrix 
 
HK TH STF C FR EF MC MTC Weights 
HK 0.39 0.55 0.64 0.34 0.38 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.34 
TH 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18 
STF 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.34 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.14 
C 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.11 
FR 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.34 0.17 0.12 0.10 
EF 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.07 
MC 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.04 
MTC 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
4.19. Forecasting of Hazards for the Years 2011, 2012 and 2013 
Forecasting is an important aspect to predict the HSE non-compliances that may occur 
in the future.  Normally, past years’ data are used to predict the future hazard 
occurrences.  In a similar way to predict the upcoming HSE non-compliances during 
the operation and maintenance of the petrol filling stations, the 3.5 year study data 
was used.  The occurrences of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases were 
predicted. 
Table 4.48: Summary of Actual Fatality, Accident, Incident and Near Miss Cases 
Occurrences during 3.5 Years Study Period 
No Period Fatality Accident Incident Near Miss 
1 2007 1 47 239 387 
2 2008 5 90 352 756 
3 2009 1 101 238 562 
4 2010 7 188 146 99 
Table 4.48 illustrates the number of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases 
that was reported during the data collection period.  An exponential smoothing 
method was used and the number of fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases for 
the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 was forecasted.  The values were forecasted by using 
 203 
equation 3.20 described in section 3.12.  The exponential smoothing constant (α) 
values were used as 0.6 and 0.4 with the forecasted and actual values, respectively.  
The forecasted values for each year from 2007 to 2013 were calculated and compared.  
The forecasted value for the year 2007 was calculated by taking the average of the 
number of fatality cases reported in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.  Therefore, the 
forecasted numbers of the fatality cases for the year 2007 were: 
F (2007) = (1+5+1)/3 = 2.33 
The calculation for forecasted values for fatality cases was determined as; 
F (2008) = 0.4 F (2007) + 0.6 A (2007) 
F (2008) = 0.4 (1)  + 0.6 (2.33) 
F (2008) = 1.798 
The forecasted values for each HCF was determined in a similar way as described 
above and are presented in Tabular form in Table 4.49. 
Table 4.49: Summary of Forecasted Values for Fatality, Accident, Incident and 
Near Miss Cases for the Year 2011, 2012 and 2013 
No Period Fatality Accident Incident Near Miss 
1 2011 5 127 223 391 
2 2012 4 127 224 414 
3 2013 4 136 212 367 
Table 4.49 depicts the predicting values for fatality, accident, incident and near 
miss cases for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013.  It can be observed in Table 4.49, that 
similar to past years the frequency for occurrences of near miss cases were still higher 
as compared to accident and incident cases.  The chances for occurrences of fatalities 
still exist.  Therefore, HSE professionals with the management committee should take 
preventive measures and closely monitor the HSE management system at all PFS’s.  
Accident and incident case prediction is also noticed to be higher.  Therefore, close 
monitoring is also required to reduce occurrences of accident and incident cases. 
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4.19.1. Comparison between Forecasted and Actual Values for Fatality, 
Accident, Incident and Near Miss Cases 
The actual data for the year 2011 was requested from the Company.  Reported fatality 
cases were 6, accident cases were 160, incident cases were 210 and near miss cases 
were 350.  Percentage variation between actual and forecasted values was calculated.  
The results of %age variation are presented in Table 4.50. 
Table 4.50: %age Variation of Fatality Cases Occurrences 
S. No Period Actual Forecasted %age Variation 
1 2007 1   
2- 2008 5 2 +60.0% 
3- 2009 1 3 -66.67% 
4- 2010 7 3 +57.14% 
5- 2011 6 5 +16.66% 
Table 4.51 shows the %age variation of fatality cases occurrences.  It can be 
observed from Table 4.51 that during the year 2008 its 60.0% higher as compared to 
actual values.  Whereas, as for the year 2009 the forecasted values were 66.67% 
higher as compared to actual values.  During the year 2011, the forecasted fatality 
cases were 5, whereas the actual cases reported were 6.  The variation of only 16.66% 
can be noticed among actual and forecasted values. 
The Table 4.51,  
Table 4.52 and Table 4.53 shows the %age variation of accident, incident and near 
miss cases.  
Table 4.51: %age Variation of Accident Cases Occurrences 
S. No Period Actual Forecasted %age Variation 
1 2007 47   
2- 2008 90 67 +25.55% 
3- 2009 101 76 +24.75% 
4- 2010 188 86 +54.25% 
5- 2011 160 127 +20.62% 
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Table 4.52: %age Variation of Incident Cases Occurrences 
S. No Period Actual Forecasted %age Variation 
1 2007 239   
2- 2008 352 262 +25.58% 
3- 2009 238 298 -25.21% 
4- 2010 146 274 -87.67% 
5- 2011 210 223 -6.19% 
Table 4.53: %age Variation of Near Miss Cases Occurrences 
S. No Period Actual Forecasted %age Variation 
1 2007 387   
2- 2008 756 496 +34.39% 
3- 2009 562 600 -6.76% 
4- 2010 99 585 +490.25% 
5- 2011 350 391 +20.62% 
Minor %age variations in actual values and forecasted values can be observed among 
accident, incident and near miss cases in Table 4.51, Table 4.52 and Table 4.53. It shows 
the successful application of forecasting approach to predict the occurrences of upcoming 
fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases.  It is helpful to the safety professionals to have 
an idea that how many upcoming hazards can be occurred in the future so that they can take 
preventive and corrective action to avoid their occurrences.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the major concepts and progress that this research 
intends to achieve.  Moreover, some recommendations that might be done as expected 
works for further improvement and better results are explained. 
5.2. Conclusion 
The HSE non-compliances were recorded during the operation and maintenance of 
petrol filling stations (PFS).  3.5 years data related to HSE non-compliances was 
recorded.  The HSE non-compliances were categorized into two main classifications. 
These were, those based upon hazard contributing factors (HCFs) and occurrences of 
incidents [fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases].  HCFs were identified 
as the root causes for occurrences of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss 
cases.  With reference to first classification, HSE non-compliances were categorized 
further into eight HCFs; these were housekeeping (HK), transportation hazards (TH), 
slips, trips and falls (STF), carelessness (C), fire risks (FR), electrical faults (EF), 
miscellaneous cases (MC) (Oil spillages, water leakages, snakebite cases, minor 
damages, maintenance issues, robbery, theft, natural disasters/wind storms, law and 
order situations) and medical treatment cases (MTC).  These two classification 
systems introduce a new systematic approach for HSE non-compliance categorization. 
Both classification systems were further extended to monthly, quarterly and 
seasonal distribution of hazards.  The monthly and quarterly form of classification 
was chosen by keeping in consideration that normally in organizations,  
HSE committee meetings organized on a monthly and quarterly basis.  By showing 
the results of the classifications to management committee, the safety professionals 
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can highlight the potential accident causes and discuss the preventive actions that can 
be taken.  With reference to the seasonal distribution of the hazards, the long term 
safety measures can be taken.  The three ways of the classification system are viably 
important to achieve HSE objectives and targets at every PFS.  The seasonal way of 
classification is also helpful to implement a study on a large scale in any country.  It 
was found that normally the HSE department in any industrial sector has a lot of data 
and it may difficult for the HSE professional to extract useful information.  By using 
the seasonal way of classification, the HSE professionals focus on particular hazards 
during that specific season and come up with remedial measures.  The same approach 
can be adopted for the monthly and quarterly classification systems. 
The potential accident root causes were identified as HCFs and were discussed in 
detail.  It was felt that if the occurrences of HCFs can be minimized, then the 
occurrences of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases may be reduced 
significantly.  The PFS business requires an extensive use of tank lorries and road 
network systems.  Most of the accidents that were reported, occurred during the 
transportation of fuel through tank lorries from oil storage depots to the PFS.  The 
accidents happened due to three main factors.  These were the negligence of the 
driver, inappropriate maintenance of the tank lorries and unsatisfactory conditions of 
road/highway.  The negligence of the drivers could be minimized by organizing 
defensive driving training programs and awareness sessions.   Refresher courses for 
tank lorry drivers after every six month period were felt to be necessary.  Past 
accident/incident findings should be discussed to avoid re-occurrences.  Detailed 
investigations to find the root causes of road/highway accidents and record keeping 
will also lead to accident reduction in the future.  A scheduled inspection and 
maintenance of tank lorries by designated and certified dealers enhance the conditions 
of tank lorries and would be highly effective in minimizing accidents.   Improving the 
road/highway conditions is beyond the control of the company but the accidents 
related to this aspect can be reduced by describing to drivers about the road/highway 
configurations, conditions and dangers related to that particular section.  In that way, 
drivers can take extra safety measures and drive carefully during fuel transportation 
along that portion of the road/highway.  The training of the contractor’s staff members 
should be carried out if the fuel transportation network is being taking care of by the 
contractors as well.  It was also noticed that with tank lorries monitoring during fuel 
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transportation was also helpful to avoid accidents; therefore, tank lorries satellite 
tracking monitoring can be used.  Other contributing factors such as housekeeping 
(HK), slips, trips and falls (STF), carelessness (C), fire risks (FR), electrical faults 
(EF), miscellaneous cases (MC), and medical treatment cases (MTC) can be 
minimized by organizing worker’s training and awareness sessions and PFS facility 
infrastructure improvement. 
The risk and safety analysis models were prepared by using two proposed 
classification systems.  The risk and safety analysis model prepared by using monthly 
classification of hazard contributing factors and occurrences of fatality, accident, 
incident and near miss cases.  The results compared and some variations were 
recorded.  It was due to noticeable fluctuations in occurrences of HSE non-
compliances on monthly basis.  To overcome this difficulty a seasonal classification 
of hazards contributing factors was used and new risk and safety analysis model was 
prepared and validated.  It was found very successful to evaluate and prioritize the 
hazards associated during operation and maintenance of PFS.  The models were 
developed by using multiple regression analysis (MRA) method.  The MRA was 
performed by using statistical package of social sciences version (18.0).  The 
proposed risk analysis model reduce the chances of errors that normally occur during 
risk evaluation process and may leads to wrong judgment and hazard ranking.  The 
risk analysis by using proposed risk and safety analysis model incorporates all hazards 
during risk assessment and come up with accurate risk ranking of hazards pertaining 
to the workplace. 
A simplified checking and review process framework based upon HSE non-
compliances was developed and proposed for implementation during this study 
period.  It can be seen from the results that implementation of the checking and 
review process was found to be successful in reducing the occurrences of HSE non-
compliances during the operation and maintenance of PFS.  It consisted of seven steps 
that can be performed within an organizational set up without additional resources. 
Different statistical tools such as the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and 
exponential smoothing methods were used to predict the HSE non-compliances that 
could occur in future.  It provides guidance and helps to HSE professionals to take 
preventive necessary measures to protect the workplace.  It will lead to a noticeable 
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reduction in occurrences of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near miss cases and 
helps to improve the overall safety statistics. 
There were a few problems faced during the data collection phase from the PFS.  
As the PFS’s monitored were located in different areas, the data was collected with 
the help of different people.  Some of them were responsible for other work 
assignments in addition to data collection pertaining to HSE non-compliances at PFss.  
A briefing and detailed description of the project study was provided to all the focal 
persons.  But still, due to the performance of other duties by the focal persons, the 
data collection frequency was affected.  More data could be collected if the focal 
persons were only responsible to perform tasks related to safety duties at PFS.  It may 
lead to taking more comprehensive safety management measures to raise the safety 
standards at PFS’s. 
5.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
This research work has several future directions that might be followed.  The 
following points address a few future directions for further related research work:  The proposed system for the HSE non-compliance classification, risk and 
safety analysis model development, analytical hierarchy process and 
exponential smoothing may be employed in other industrial sectors.  With the availability of data from other industrial sectors a safety triangle can 
be developed with the use of the proposed methodology for PFS.  It enables 
safety professionals to see the flow of fatalities, accidents, incidents and near 
miss occurrences.  For future work, the possible construction of facilities such as shopping 
arcades, office buildings and multilevel car parking areas with a change in the 
roof design is recommended.  Normally flat roof is designed for PFS.  With 
the elimination of hazards associated with PFS’s and roof design 
modifications, the multilevel construction can be performed.  As PFS’s are 
located within urban areas and the property value in urban areas is normally 
high, if a multilevel construction can be made than the space can be utilized in 
a better way with revenue generation.   
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 Underground storage tanks (UGSTs) are considered to be the main source of 
hazard at PFS’s.  If they can be shifted away from the PFS’s and connected to 
the retail outlet via piping than it would be very helpful to reduce the major 
source of hazards as well as it encourage the utilization of space in a better 
way.  It is also possible that UGSTs could be mutually shared by other PFS 
located in the close vicinity as a fuel supply source.  A further research work 
in the future could be carried out to address the appropriate location of UGSTs 
and the possibility mutual sharing.  The close monitoring of outside vehicles that are arriving for taking fuel at 
PFS was felt. It has the possibility that vehicle may contains 
hazardous/flammable material.  With minor negligence any catastrophic event 
may occur. 
5.4. Limitations of Research 
There are 3 main stages of work in which hazardous events may occur at PFSs.  These 
are the preliminary stage, the development and construction stage and the operation & 
maintenance stage.  The probability and severity of hazards at every stage are unique.  
This study focuses on occurrences of hazardous events during the operation and 
maintenance stage at the PFS.  The data for the study was collected from one the 
biggest Petrol Filling Station’s operating Company in Pakistan.  The company is 
operating various PFS’s around the country.  The data was collected from more than 
2500 PFS’s.  The data was consisted of 3.5 years of duration (from July 2007 to  
December 2010).  HSE representatives at PFS’s were trained to collect data.  At those 
PFS’s where dedicated HSE representative was not available, focal persons were 
assigned to record observations pertaining to HSE Non-Compliances. 
5.5. Summary of Research Contribution 
The main contributions of this research are illustrated in the following points;  The proposed study highlights the HSE non-compliances that occurred during 
operation and maintenance of petrol filling stations.  These HSE non-
compliances may results in occurrences of catastrophic events.  With 
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application of this study the HSE non-compliances can be reduced and helpful 
to make petrol filling stations safer.  Different ways of HSE non-compliances classifications proposed in this study.  
It includes monthly, quarterly and seasonal classifications.  It is helpful to 
view collected data from different perspectives and target the most hazardous 
period so that remedial measures can be taken to avoid future recurrences.  Statistical tools such as test of correlation, multiple regression analysis, 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and exponential smoothing method that is 
seldom being used by the safety professionals introduces a new approach in 
analysis of data.  The use of these methods plays vital role in the analysis of 
specific hazard, period of occurrences and the needed appropriate control 
measures.  Ultimately, it leads to improve in safety records and reduction in 
occurrences of HSE non-compliances.  Gaps identified in existing risk assessment methods.  A new risk and safety 
analysis model was developed by using 3.5 year study data.  The use of 
inappropriate risk assessment process just merely shifts the hazard.  By using a 
proposed risk assessment model accurate risk assessment can be performed, 
hazards prioritized and control measures can be taken timely.  It helps to 
eliminate hazard from the system and make work place safer.    The development of safety triangle for petrol filling stations provides guidance 
about the flow pattern of occurrences of fatalities, accident, incident and near 
miss cases.  The fatality, accident, incident and near miss cases forecasting approach 
highlighted in this study provide guidance to the safety professionals to use 
past years data and forecast the upcoming hazards that may arise at the 
facility.  It helps safety professionals to plan future safety objectives and 
targets and significantly reduce the occurrences of fatality, accident, incident 
and near miss cases. 
